Mario D. Faieta

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal for delay after the appeal was perfected approximately ten months late.

The court applied the test for dismissing an appeal for delay and found that the appellants had maintained an intention to appeal, the delay was largely due to counsel's inaction, and the respondent had not demonstrated any prejudice arising from the delay.

The motion to dismiss the appeal was dismissed, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his discrimination claim.

The respondents raised the issue of prematurity because the applicant did not seek reconsideration at the Tribunal.

The prematurity issue was bifurcated for a separate hearing.

The Divisional Court concluded it was not advisable to separate the prematurity issue from the rest of the application and adjourned it to be decided by the panel hearing the full application for judicial review.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the enforcement of a $34,508.98 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario award pending its application for judicial review.

The applicant argued there was a real risk the respondent would be unable to repay the award if the judicial review succeeded.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as the evidence of the respondent's inability to repay was speculative and based on outdated income information.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding she persistently paid rent late and ordering her to pay rent in full and on time for a year.

The tenant argued she paid partial rent on time because she was disputing a rent increase and self-abating.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Residential Tenancies Act, rent means the entire amount due, and any shortfall constitutes late payment.

The Court confirmed that tenants are not permitted to self-abate rent and must pay in full pending LTB adjudication of any abatement claims.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 inclusive to the responding party.

The moving party, The Corporation of the City of Peterborough, brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties (appellants) sought a stay of several endorsements pending their appeal of an order directing a buyout of their shares in a condominium development project.

The underlying dispute involved mutual allegations of oppression between two 50% shareholders.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay pending appeal.

It found no serious issue to be tried, noting the broad discretion of the motion judge under the OBCA.

While acknowledging that loss of mortgage security could constitute irreparable harm, the court concluded that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the respondents, who risked losing $25 million in financing and the entire buyout transaction if the stay were granted.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant sought judicial review of decisions from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) and the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

On consent, the Divisional Court quashed the HRTO decisions and remitted the matter for further adjudication without specific directions.

The Court also quashed the LAT decisions and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a different adjudicator, with reasons to follow.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the City of Toronto from raising the flag of the State of Palestine at City Hall.

The applicants argued the approval was ultra vires, breached the City's Flag Policy, and violated the duty of neutrality.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found no serious issue to be tried, as the City's decision was reasonable and within its authority.

The court also found the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The appellant, a teacher, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers finding her guilty of professional misconduct for physically and emotionally abusing a special needs student and for unprofessional conduct towards colleagues.

The appellant argued that the Committee erred by excluding expert evidence on anti-Black racism, failing to address unconscious bias, improperly assessing credibility, and admitting an investigation report containing hearsay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the Committee's factual findings or credibility assessments.

While the Committee erred in relying on prior consistent statements, the error did not result in a substantial wrong.

The penalty of a five-month suspension and costs was upheld.

The landlords appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the Residential Tenancies Act applied to the tenants' rooming house tenancies and awarding damages for an illegal lockout.

The landlords argued the LTB erred by allowing them to be represented by an unlicensed friend, by permitting tenants to hear each other's evidence, and by classifying one of the appellants as a landlord.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants were responsible for their choice of representative, that parties have a right to hear evidence, and that the classification of a landlord is an unappealable question of mixed fact and law.

The applicant, a former graduate student, sought judicial review of Toronto Metropolitan University's decisions rejecting his grade appeal, denying a reassessment of his coursework, and dismissing his discrimination complaint.

The Divisional Court found that the university's decisions under its academic policies and human rights procedures were reasonable and that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a WSIB decision approving a worker's third-party settlement retroactively, allowing the worker to claim 'top-up' benefits under s. 30(14) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The employer argued the statute strictly requires WSIB approval before a settlement is made.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the WSIB's interpretation reasonable.

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and the mandatory/directory distinction, the court held that the pre-approval requirement is directory, and barring the worker from benefits due to timing would undermine the remedial purpose of the Act.

The moving parties, comprising various social media companies including Meta, Snap, and TikTok entities, brought motions for leave to appeal the substantive and costs orders of Leiper J. The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal without costs and directed the parties to provide an agreed schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

The appellant retained the respondents for an employment law matter and paid a $5,000 retainer.

Dissatisfied with the services, she terminated the retainer and later commenced a Small Claims Court action seeking the return of the funds, alleging she was overcharged.

The Small Claims Court struck the claim, finding it had no jurisdiction to assess or reduce legal fees.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, confirming that disputes over legal fees must be addressed through the assessment process under the Solicitors Act, and found no error in the Deputy Judge's refusal to transfer the matter to the Assessment Office.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by a Small Claims Court deputy judge regarding document production and costs.

The underlying action involved a rental car company suing the insurer after coverage was denied for a rental car accident due to the insured's failure to cooperate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances, excess of jurisdiction, or denial of natural justice that would warrant intervention in a Small Claims Court interlocutory order.

The matter was directed to proceed to trial where the trial judge would determine the admissibility of the subpoenaed documents.

The tenant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's decision dismissing her motion for leave to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board consent eviction order.

The Divisional Court panel held that under the newly enacted Rule 62.02(1)3, leave to appeal a tribunal order requiring leave must be heard by a three-judge panel, not a single judge.

The panel set aside the single judge's decision, heard the leave motion, and granted leave to appeal the eviction order.

The appellant appealed a family court order dismissing her application for $745,286 in retroactive spousal support for the period of 2015 to 2022.

The parties separated in 2006 and had an informal financial arrangement until 2015.

The trial judge found the appellant's financial evidence unreliable and concluded she failed to establish an ongoing entitlement to compensatory support after 2015.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the trial judge's credibility assessments and confirming that the burden of proving entitlement on an initial application rests with the claimant, regardless of delay.

The appellant defendants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the payment of settlement funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant who pays settlement funds directly to a plaintiff in the face of a Solicitors Act charging order does so at its peril.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding party solicitors.