Mario D. Faieta

The defendant, a retired Canada Revenue Agency investigator, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a civil action alleging conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, defamation, and interference with contractual relations arising from a tax audit and prosecution for tax evasion.

The court found that the plaintiff’s responding affidavit merely repeated vague allegations contained in the statement of claim and failed to provide evidence supporting any alleged tort.

On a summary judgment motion, the responding party must put their best foot forward with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue requiring trial.

The court concluded there was no evidence that the moving party acted improperly or conspired with others, and that the evidence only showed the performance of supervisory duties in good faith.

Summary judgment was granted and the action against the moving party dismissed.

The applicant sought to enforce Letters Rogatory issued by a United States District Court to compel the examination of two former employees of a corporate defendant, including its former in-house counsel.

The former in-house counsel opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application against the former in-house counsel, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate her evidence was necessary for trial or not otherwise obtainable from other former executives.

The court concluded that enforcing the Letters Rogatory would impose an undue burden on the respondent.

The applicant sought payment of the outstanding balance under a promissory note after the respondents failed to make required quarterly instalment payments.

The proceeding was brought under Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for determination of rights dependent on the interpretation of a contract.

The court held that the note required payment of the full $100,000 instalment on the first day of each quarter and rejected the respondents’ argument that payment could be completed anytime within the quarter.

The court further held that written notice of default had been provided and that the respondents failed to cure the default within the 30‑day notice period required to avoid the acceleration clause.

The entire outstanding balance therefore became immediately due and payable.

The plaintiff, a former nursing student, sued the defendants for damages after they falsely accused her of academic fraud.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, related to an academic matter, and was an abuse of process.

The court found that while the university has broad discretion in academic matters, this does not extend to the negligent performance of an internal investigation or intentional torts.

The court struck the claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, bad faith, and breach of privacy due to pleading deficiencies, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim.

A university brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith arising from alleged deficiencies in a medical residency training program.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because discoverability and factual context had not yet been fully developed.

The court further held that although courts generally defer to universities on academic matters, contractual claims may proceed where the plaintiff alleges failure to meet express or implied contractual obligations.

However, several causes of action were insufficiently pleaded or legally unavailable in the context of academic discretion.

Portions of the claim were therefore struck, some with leave to amend and others without leave.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, sued the College, its external counsel, the complainant, and witnesses for damages arising from the revocation of her registration following a disciplinary hearing.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the College and its counsel were protected by statutory immunity under the Social Work and Social Services Work Act, 1998, and that the complainant and witnesses were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The court also struck claims relying on evidence rendered inadmissible by statute and claims lacking sufficient material facts, granting leave to amend only certain specific claims.

The plaintiffs, VoIP service providers, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from suspending network carrier services and to allow the migration of telephone numbers without paying port-out fees.

The court determined the requested relief was a mandatory injunction, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of contract or intentional interference with economic relations, failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

The court also noted the plaintiffs did not come to court with clean hands due to unpaid invoices.

A construction crane collapsed onto a partially completed retirement residence, causing significant property damage covered by the owner’s “all risks” construction insurance policy.

The owner’s insurer commenced a subrogated action and co‑defendants sought contribution and indemnity from the contractor and crane supplier.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing the crossclaims, arguing that the construction contract contained an insurance covenant allocating the risk of property loss to the owner’s project insurance and benefiting contractors and subcontractors.

The court held that the covenant barred claims against those parties and prevented contribution claims under the Negligence Act.

The court further held that the insurer’s waiver of subrogation and the doctrine recognizing insurable interests of trades on construction projects also barred the claims.

All crossclaims against the moving parties were dismissed.

Following a settlement between defendants and several third parties in a defective window litigation, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the settlement terms and scheduled a motion for that relief.

Before the motion proceeded, the plaintiff received sufficient information about the settlement through exchanged emails and draft releases and abandoned the motion but sought costs for bringing it.

The responding parties also sought their costs.

The court declined to determine the abstract merits of the abandoned motion solely for costs purposes and held that continuing the motion solely to support a costs claim was a waste of court and counsel resources.

No costs were awarded to any party.

The applicant brought an application under section 23 of the Solicitors Act for a declaration that legal services provided by the respondent lawyer in an underlying veterinary malpractice action were rendered on a pro bono basis.

The respondent argued the oral retainer was a contingency fee arrangement and billed the applicant $34,000 after the action settled.

The court found that the respondent failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving the terms of the oral retainer over the client's understanding.

The court declared the services were provided pro bono and ordered the return of fees previously paid.

Franchisee applicants sought declarations that their franchise agreements had been terminated due to fundamental breaches by the franchisor entities and that restrictive covenants were unenforceable.

The applicants alleged the franchisor failed to maintain the franchise system, including advertising, training, approved suppliers, branded materials, and operational support.

The court held these failures constituted fundamental breaches terminating the franchise agreements.

As a result, the non‑competition clauses were declared void, and the court ordered the waiver of landlord consent requirements to permit assignment of certain commercial leases under s. 23 of the Commercial Tenancies Act.

Costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis were awarded to the applicants.

Following a successful motion to enforce a settlement agreement, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis exceeding $32,000.

The defendants argued their conduct did not justify elevated costs and that a genuine legal issue existed regarding whether a binding settlement agreement had been reached.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court of Appeal’s guidance on when substantial indemnity costs are appropriate.

The court found the defendants’ conduct did not meet the threshold of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous behaviour warranting substantial indemnity costs.

However, costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis in a reduced amount due to excessive hours claimed.

Following a motion in a civil proceeding, the defendants sought costs against the self‑represented plaintiff.

The plaintiff did not provide submissions on the issue of costs.

The court considered the defendants’ submissions and concluded that an award of costs was fair and reasonable.

Each defendant was awarded $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court also dispensed with the requirement that the defendants obtain the plaintiff’s approval of the form and content of the dismissal and costs order.

Following a trial, the defendant requested production of opposing counsel’s computer dockets to obtain evidence of the time and expenses incurred for the purpose of assessing costs.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing such detailed disclosure was not required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs assessments, emphasizing that fixing costs is not a mechanical calculation based on hours multiplied by rates.

Considering the significant expense and privilege concerns associated with producing detailed dockets, the court held that such production was not appropriate in the circumstances.

The request for production of the dockets was dismissed and the responding party was directed to deliver its costs submissions within two weeks.

The appellant appealed a master's decision refusing relief from the deemed undertaking rule to permit use of discovery evidence outside the litigation.

The moving party sought to disclose documentary discovery to a securities regulator and to police authorities in order to report alleged regulatory violations and perjury by a non-party.

The court held that relief from the deemed undertaking rule requires an evidentiary foundation demonstrating a superior public interest in disclosure, consistent with the principles in Juman v. Doucette.

The appellant failed to provide the discovery documents or identify the specific regulatory or criminal violations allegedly revealed, and its affidavit evidence was speculative and inadmissible in parts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant regarding a restaurant business dispute, and the defendant counterclaimed.

Shortly before trial, the plaintiff discontinued its action.

The defendant offered to discontinue the counterclaim on a without-costs basis, which the plaintiff rejected.

The defendant then discontinued the counterclaim.

Both parties sought costs of the discontinued proceedings.

The court dismissed both claims for costs, finding that the general rule of indemnifying a successful party applied and neither party could claim success on the merits.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of the costs motion, as the plaintiff had rejected a sensible offer to resolve the matter without costs.

Following a three‑day trial in which the plaintiff’s claim for $68,506.25 was dismissed, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no Rule 49 offer triggering such consequences and no reprehensible conduct by the opposing party.

The court also adjusted the claimed partial indemnity rate, finding that a 67% recovery of actual counsel rates was excessive and that a rate approximating 60% of substantial indemnity was more typical.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors, including a refused settlement offer, the court awarded a global costs amount reflecting fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

The defendant appealed an order of a Master setting aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal of an action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying action alleged a fraudulent conveyance of property by a judgment debtor to his spouse in order to defeat creditors.

The court reviewed the discretionary standard governing motions under Rule 37.14 and the contextual test for reinstating actions dismissed for delay, including considerations of explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice.

The court held that a plaintiff is not required to provide extensive affirmative evidence of absence of prejudice where the defendant offers none and the surrounding circumstances indicate no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed and the Master’s order reinstating the action was upheld.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation regarding his claim for unpaid bonuses following the termination of his employment.

The defendants refused to finalize the settlement after discovering the plaintiff was working for a competitor, alleging a breach of his non-competition agreement.

The court found that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement on all essential terms.

The court held that the alleged breach of the non-competition clause was not material to the plaintiff's entitlement to a bonus earned during his employment, and enforced the settlement agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.