Mario D. Faieta

The defendant, King Packaged Materials Company, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Construction Distribution & Supply Co. Inc.) action for insufficient termination notice of a distribution agreement and to grant its counterclaim for unpaid products.

The court found that the unwritten, non-exclusive distribution agreement, which lasted 18 years, implied a term for reasonable notice of termination based on industry custom.

Considering factors such as the plaintiff's low dependence on the defendant's products (less than 5% of total sales) and lack of substantial investment, the court determined that the three months' notice provided by the defendant was reasonable.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed, and the defendant's counterclaim for $93,890.49 plus interest for unpaid products was granted.

The plaintiff, Mitchell Cohen, brought a motion for an interim preservation order under Rule 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to have 5% of the purchase price from the sale of the Summerhill Condominium Project held in trust.

Cohen claimed a 5% interest in the profit from the development or sale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Cohen failed to satisfy the three-part test for an interim preservation order.

Specifically, there was no specific, readily identifiable fund at the time of the motion, Cohen's claim was for damages rather than a legal right to a specific fund, and there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a risk of dissipation to satisfy the balance of convenience.

Octagon Capital Corporation, an investment dealer, brought an application against Niko Resources Inc., an oil and natural gas company, seeking a declaration that it was entitled to a $211,500 fee.

Octagon claimed that Niko's December 2013 debt restructuring, which involved JGB Management Inc., constituted "further financing" under their May 2013 Engagement Agreement's "Tail Provision." The court dismissed the application, finding that "further financing" meant the supply of additional funds, and the debt conversion by JGB did not involve new money but rather a restructuring of existing debt.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against her husband, the defendant, for damages arising from his attempted murder of her.

The defendant had previously pled guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment.

The court awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, past and future care costs, past and future loss of income, aggravated damages, and punitive damages, totaling $1,127,730.83 plus costs.

The plaintiffs brought an action against their former solicitors (Hicks Defendants) for professional negligence, alleging that the solicitors missed a limitation period for an action against previous solicitors (Arnone Defendants) concerning the purchase of contaminated land.

The Hicks Defendants admitted liability for the missed limitation period, and the trial proceeded solely to assess the plaintiffs' damages.

The court awarded damages for environmental remediation costs and a nominal amount for the inconvenience of managing the remediation, totaling $57,712.31.

However, claims for loss of property value, real estate commission on a failed sale, roof replacement costs, excess mortgage interest, and mental distress were dismissed due to lack of expert evidence, legal prohibitions (for commission), or being deemed not reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligence.

The plaintiff, FLS Transportation Services Inc., sought an interim injunction against former employees and their new employer, Charger Logistics Inc., to restrain them from working for a competitor, soliciting clients and employees, and misusing confidential information.

The court applied the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction (serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and also considered the "clean hands" doctrine.

The court found that FLS failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of restrictive covenants, breach of confidence, or fiduciary duty, largely due to FLS's own prior statements in other proceedings that the information was not confidential.

Furthermore, FLS failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The motion was dismissed, also noting that FLS's conduct in misrepresenting the court's order to a client constituted a failure to come to court with "clean hands."

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement to lease a commercial property for a car dealership.

The defendant landlord argued the agreement was null and void due to the failure to waive certain conditions, including a solicitor review condition and a due diligence condition, within the stipulated timeframes.

The court found that the defendant, through its conduct and communications, had represented that it would not rely on its strict legal rights regarding the conditions, and the plaintiff had relied on these representations to its detriment.

Applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court held the agreement was binding.

Finding the property to be unique for the plaintiff's intended use, the court granted summary judgment and ordered specific performance.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim and sought a declaration that Nova Scotia law governed their Aircraft Management and Operating Agreement.

The court determined that Ontario law was the proper law of the agreement, applying principles of issue estoppel, rectification of mistake, bona fide choice of law, and public policy (attornment).

The motion to strike was granted in part: claims for regulatory complaint, inducing breach of contract against the corporate defendant, and oppression remedy were struck without leave to amend.

Claims for unlawful means and charter revenue were struck with leave to amend.

The request to strike the declaratory relief regarding a possessory lien was dismissed.

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of a residential property under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, alleging it was the proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity (marihuana trafficking).

The respondent property owner argued she was a legitimate and responsible owner who purchased the property with an inheritance.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence, finding the property was acquired with proceeds of unlawful activity and used as a marihuana distribution centre.

The court held the respondent was not a legitimate or responsible owner and that forfeiture was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

The plaintiff, Oasis Addiction Recovery Society, brought a motion for judgment to enforce an accepted offer to settle made by the defendants, Upper Canada 1ST Financial Group Inc. and Steve Erdelyi.

While both parties agreed to enforce the settlement, they disputed the interpretation of an indemnity clause, specifically the phrase "amounts paid to date." The plaintiff argued for a lower indemnity amount based on payments made directly to it, while the defendants contended for a higher amount including payments made to a third party (ICAN) before the loan transfer.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, considering the surrounding circumstances, and found in favour of the defendants' interpretation, obliging the plaintiff to provide an indemnity for the higher amount.

The plaintiff, Sherley Leandre, brought a motion seeking over $10 million from Windsor Regional Hospital for alleged discrimination and refusal to recognize her Quebec Health Insurance Card for the birth of her son.

She also sought orders for the immediate arrest of hospital members and charges of treason, sedition, and terrorism, citing sections of the Criminal Code.

The court, noting the action's similarity to a previous case and the unavailability of criminal remedies in civil proceedings, found the motion potentially frivolous and vexatious.

Pursuant to Rule 2.1.01, the court directed the registrar to notify the plaintiff of a potential dismissal of the motion and stayed the motion pending a written hearing.

The plaintiff, whose claim for statutory accident benefits was denied by the defendant insurer, proceeded through mediation and arbitration.

After the arbitrator issued a decision, the plaintiff commenced a civil action for punitive and general damages, alleging bad faith, negligence, and breaches of the Human Rights Code in the handling of his claim.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff's claims were "in respect of" entitlement to statutory accident benefits and thus subject to the mandatory dispute resolution scheme of the Insurance Act.

The court found the action barred because the plaintiff had elected arbitration to its conclusion, and the two-year limitation period had expired, with neither the discoverability principle nor the doctrine of special circumstances applying.

Furthermore, the Human Rights Code allegations were struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action for events predating the relevant statutory amendment.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for a settlement of $2,750,000 for a disabled plaintiff, Jared Edwards, who suffered a brain injury at a summer camp, and approval of their contingency fee agreement (CFA) with De Rose Professional Corporation.

The court approved the settlement as being in the plaintiff's best interests, but found the CFA void due to non-compliance with the Solicitors Act and its regulations, and because it was not fair and reasonable.

The court reduced the legal fees on a quantum meruit basis and ordered the additional funds to be used for a larger annuity for the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a mandatory injunction to require the defendants to remove a mass of concrete poured onto the plaintiffs' property during a home renovation.

The defendants, who were renovating the adjacent property, removed the plaintiffs' walkway and excavated soil without permission, and later poured concrete that encroached onto the plaintiffs' property when their temporary shoring failed.

The court found the defendants liable in trespass and rejected their defence of necessity.

The court adjourned the issue of the mandatory injunction pending a joint engineering report on the safety and feasibility of removing the concrete.

The defendants' counterclaim for delay damages was dismissed.

Following a four-day trial where both the claim and counterclaim were dismissed, the parties made submissions on costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $71,412.81, while the plaintiff argued each party should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found that success somewhat favoured the defendant, as the trial focused primarily on the main claim.

Applying the principle that costs should reflect what an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $25,000 in costs.

The individual defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of trust claim under the Construction Lien Act, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had agreed to extend the time for payment of outstanding invoices after the corporate defendant requested forbearance.

The court found that the forbearance agreement was supported by consideration and was therefore enforceable.

Furthermore, the court held that the limitation period for a breach of trust claim does not automatically commence when payment is due, but is governed by the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The moving parties, family members of a disabled plaintiff, brought a motion to remove the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as his Litigation Guardian.

The underlying action involved allegations of police assault and the use of tasers.

The moving parties alleged the PGT was not acting in the disabled plaintiff's best interests by pursuing a settlement rather than proceeding to trial.

The court applied the 'best interests' test and found no evidence of misconduct, conflict of interest, or failure to disclose material facts by the PGT.

The motion to remove the PGT was dismissed.

The plaintiff buyer sought specific performance of a condition in an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a commercial investment property, alleging the defendant seller failed to deliver required due diligence documents.

The seller counterclaimed for the $100,000 deposit, arguing the buyer defaulted.

Following a four-day trial, the court dismissed both claims.

The court found the seller had satisfied its document delivery obligations.

Furthermore, the court held that specific performance was unavailable because the property was purchased solely for investment purposes and lacked uniqueness.

The seller's counterclaim was dismissed because the buyer never waived the condition, meaning the agreement became null and void and the deposit was returnable to the buyer.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to anti-psychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan, and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's finding on incapacity, noting the appellant's lack of insight into her condition.

However, the court granted the appeal regarding the Community Treatment Order, finding it invalid because the Community Treatment Plan was not 'entered into' by all required parties within 72 hours of the physician's examination, as required by the Mental Health Act.

The plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's dog, losing part of her thumb, after the dog suffered a seizure and fell into a ditch while the plaintiff was walking it.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the plaintiff was in 'possession' of the dog and thus an 'owner' precluded from claiming compensation under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

The court held that novel questions of law can be decided on summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff was not in 'possession' of the dog as she did not exercise dominion and control similar to an owner.

The court found the defendant strictly liable under the Act, dismissed the negligence claim as the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable, and found no contributory negligence by the plaintiff.

The defendant's motion was dismissed and the plaintiff's cross-motion was granted, with the action to proceed to trial on damages only.