Mario D. Faieta

Following a motion for summary judgment, the court raised the question of whether to make an order declaring a litigant vexatious under section 140(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, given a previous family court order limiting such a declaration to specific proceedings.

The court received submissions from the defendants and the Attorney General.

The court ultimately declined to answer the question, as the Attorney General indicated an intention to commence a formal application to declare the litigant vexatious, rendering the court's question moot.

The court, on its own initiative following a defendant's request, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The plaintiff's claim included allegations of racism, defamation, and harassment, along with gratuitous details about the defendant's personal life.

The court noted the plaintiff had previously been declared a vexatious litigant in family law matters.

Applying the robust interpretation of Rule 2.1, the court found the claim appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff regarding the potential dismissal and stayed the action pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The defendants abandoned their motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim on the day of the hearing.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity or partial indemnity costs for preparing for this motion.

The court considered various factors under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of the issues, the importance of the issues, and the parties' conduct.

The court found the hourly rates reasonable but the time docketed excessive given the nature of the motion and the plaintiffs' prior experience with similar motions.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding that the defendants' conduct did not warrant substantial indemnity.

The plaintiffs, former residential tenants, sued the landlord and property managers for conversion, alleging wrongful disposal of their personal property following an eviction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

A proposed intervenor, claiming to be a subtenant, brought a motion for leave to intervene.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene, finding the proposed intervenor lacked credibility and was likely the same person as the plaintiff.

The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the landlord had complied with section 41 of the Residential Tenancies Act regarding abandoned property, which barred the action.

The court also dismissed claims related to swearing false affidavits, noting no such civil cause of action exists.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $10.5 million claim and the granting of the defendant's counterclaim on a motion for summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct did not meet the requisite standard of reprehensible conduct.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principle of proportionality, the court reduced the defendant's claimed hours and fixed costs at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant tenants sought a declaration that their commercial lease was renewed or, alternatively, relief from forfeiture after missing the deadline to provide written notice of renewal.

The respondent landlords argued the renewal option had expired.

The court found that the landlords had repeatedly misstated the lease term, leading the tenants to believe they were in the fourth year rather than the fifth.

While the landlords did not waive the notice requirement, the court granted relief from forfeiture because the tenants made diligent efforts to renew and their failure to provide timely notice was caused by the landlords' misstatements.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and ancillary medications.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the test for capacity and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably applied the statutory test and Supreme Court jurisprudence in concluding the appellant's mental disorder prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The plaintiff brought a dental malpractice action against the defendants for defective implant surgery and dentures.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court applied the subjective and modified objective tests for discoverability and found that the plaintiff did not discover that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate remedy until the defendants refused to repair his dentures at no cost.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of $29,900 found in an abandoned suitcase.

The claimant asserted ownership of the cash.

The parties reached a settlement to forfeit $25,900 and return $4,000 to the claimant.

The court found the cash was the proceeds of unlawful activity and the claimant failed to prove legitimate ownership.

The court refused to give effect to the settlement, holding that Rule 49 is not an independent basis for an order under the Civil Remedies Act, and ordered the entire $29,900 forfeited to the Crown.

The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution against the defendant, a home builder who had constructed the plaintiff's house.

Following a dispute over warranty repairs, the defendant initiated two private criminal charges against the plaintiff for mischief and criminal harassment, alleging the plaintiff made numerous baseless by-law complaints.

The criminal charges were ultimately stayed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the malicious prosecution action, finding the plaintiff failed to prove the criminal proceedings were terminated in his favour or that the defendant lacked reasonable and probable cause to initiate them.

The defendant's counterclaim was also dismissed due to his failure to attend the trial.

The plaintiff supplier claimed damages for unpaid goods against the individual defendants, arguing they were personally liable as the existence of their corporation was undisclosed.

The defendants argued the orders were placed on behalf of their corporation, which had been placed in receivership.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff was aware the orders were made on behalf of the corporation, given the long history of payments from the corporate bank account and the prominent display of the corporation's registered business name.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a BMW registered to the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that he was not the owner of the BMW, arguing his identity had been stolen and used to fraudulently register the vehicle and obtain insurance.

The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court accepted the moving party's evidence that he never purchased, owned, or registered the vehicle, nor applied for insurance, thereby rebutting the presumption of ownership under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for unpaid invoices dating from 2007 to 2012, arguing they were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff, a receiver who acquired the assets of the original creditor, argued the claims were not discoverable due to poor record-keeping and alleged part payments.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the claims were discoverable by 2012 and that the defendant had paid his accounts annually, meaning no part payments extended the limitation period.

A secondary motion to strike the claim for late appointment of counsel was dismissed.

The individual defendants sought costs for two successful motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and amended claim.

The plaintiff argued success was divided because leave to amend was granted, and that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the defendants were substantially successful.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no egregious misconduct by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the individual defendants $18,052.30 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend its Statement of Claim, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis relying on a provision in a construction bond.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding it unduly onerous and noting that only one of the three proposed amendments related to the enforcement of the bond.

Applying the principle of proportionality and the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $12,000.

State Farm insured a property damaged by fire and issued a cheque to Alfedany.

A person purporting to be Alfedany cashed the cheque at Money Mart.

Alfedany later claimed he had not received the cheque and disputed the endorsement as forged.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Money Mart's action seeking payment as a "holder in due course." The court found the cheque's negotiation was affected by fraud or illegality, meaning Money Mart was not deemed a "holder in due course" under s. 57(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Furthermore, Money Mart failed to prove it was a "holder in due course" under s. 55(1) due to its wilful disregard of multiple discrepancies in the customer's identity, which indicated a lack of good faith.

The court also noted that even if Money Mart were a holder in due course, it would be barred from enforcing payment by s. 48(1) of the Act due to the forged signature, as State Farm was not estopped from raising this defence.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Money Mart's claim was dismissed.

The corporate plaintiff sued for the return of a deposit on a failed real estate transaction.

The defendants counterclaimed and successfully moved before a Master for security for costs and leave to amend their counterclaim to add the plaintiff's principals as defendants.

The plaintiff and its principals appealed.

The Superior Court granted the appeal regarding security for costs, finding the Master erred by relying on speculation rather than evidence of the plaintiff's financial insufficiency.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding the amendment of pleadings, finding a tenable claim that the corporation acted as a bare trustee or agent for its principals.

A duplicative second action commenced by the defendants was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, argued the Board unfairly characterized his evidence and erred in applying the capacity test by focusing on his disagreement with the schizophrenia diagnosis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant lacked capacity because he was unable to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental illness, preventing him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision.

The plaintiff sued for unpaid invoices related to an environmental remediation project in Ontario.

The defendants moved to stay or dismiss the action, arguing lack of jurisdiction and relying on a forum selection clause (FSC) designating California courts.

The court found that while it had jurisdiction, the FSC was not a term of the contract for the majority of the unpaid invoices, its language was unclear regarding California as an exclusive forum, and there was insufficient evidence that the purchase orders were issued in California.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

Ozz Electric Inc., a subcontractor, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Claim to advance various claims against the project owner, The Corporation of the City of Kitchener.

The proposed amendments included claims that the City was liable under a Labour and Material Payment Bond, liable in negligence for economic loss due to project delays, and liable for contribution and indemnity for alleged deficient workmanship.

The court dismissed all proposed amendments, finding no legal basis for the City's liability under the bond, that the negligence claim for economic loss was insufficiently pleaded, and that the claim for contribution and indemnity lacked a tenable legal basis.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to Ozz Electric Inc. to bring a further motion to amend the negligence claim with proper pleading.