Mario D. Faieta

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for damages via summary judgment, the defendant sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued the claimed costs were excessive.

The court, applying the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, including the proportionality principle under Rule 1.04(1.1) and the objectives of Simplified Procedure (Rule 76), determined a fair and reasonable costs award.

The defendant's pre-litigation offer did not meet Rule 49 requirements for substantial indemnity, and the plaintiff's conduct was not reprehensible.

The court awarded the defendant $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendant, New Era Development (2011) Inc., brought motions seeking to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from the plaintiff's representative, Ebrahim Bulbulia, arising from an examination for discovery, and for leave to deliver an expert report.

The plaintiff, Rescon Financial Corporation, a mortgage broker, claimed $400,000 in fees, which the defendant denied, alleging breach of contract and fiduciary duties.

The court largely dismissed the defendant's requests to compel answers, upholding most refusals as irrelevant or disproportionate, except for the identity of one specific private lender.

The court also denied the defendant leave to deliver an expert report, finding that the proposed evidence was not responsive to cross-examination, would cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff, and the defendant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in seeking expert evidence.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $70,851.70.

The court considered the principles of costs under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 57.01 and Rule 1.04(1.1) regarding proportionality and access to justice.

It noted that the defendant's offers to settle were not Rule 49 compliant and that the action proceeded under Simplified Procedure (Rule 76), which aims for cost-effectiveness.

Finding the case not complex and the defendant's claimed hours and rates excessive, the court awarded the defendant $25,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff, a 59-year-old senior designer, brought a motion for summary judgment against his former employer, Thumper Massager Inc., alleging wrongful termination without proper notice or pay in lieu thereof after less than six months of probationary employment.

The plaintiff sought damages for pay in lieu of notice, expenses, and benefits.

The court found that the plaintiff was bound by the six-month probationary period in his employment contract and that the employer was entitled to dismiss a probationary employee without cause or notice, provided the assessment of suitability was not performed in bad faith.

The court determined that the defendant had provided a fair opportunity to the plaintiff and did not act in bad faith in terminating his employment.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed, and summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendant.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, which sought to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, on three grounds: lack of standing, the claim being statute-barred, and lack of legal capacity.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the action.

The primary reason for dismissal was the plaintiffs' lack of standing under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as they were not "creditors or others" at the time of the impugned transfer in 1993.

Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to obtain proper court approval under section 38(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence proceedings against the non-bankrupt transferee.

The court disagreed that the claim was barred by the Real Property Limitations Act, finding that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is not an action to "recover land."

The appellant appealed a Master's order granting the respondent leave to amend his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim to add the appellant as a defendant by counterclaim.

The appellant argued the Master erred in granting leave after the action was set down for trial, in her application of the discoverability principles under the Limitations Act, 2002, and in finding the respondent had standing to bring an oppression claim.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law in the Master's decision to allow the amendments and add the appellant as a party.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of US$720,000 lent to the defendant at an interest rate of 10% per month.

The defendant, a lawyer, claimed he acted merely as a conduit for the plaintiff's investments in gold with a third-party broker.

The court found a valid oral loan agreement, rejecting the defendant's conduit defense due to inconsistencies in his evidence and lack of corroboration.

The court also addressed the legality of the interest rate under section 347 of the Criminal Code, reading it down to the maximum legal rate of 60% per annum.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiff sought the return of deposits paid for a property, bringing a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the property's residential tenancy use could not be lawfully continued.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had waived this objection.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had, through its conduct and amendments to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, communicated an unequivocal intention to abandon its right to terminate the agreement based on the use objection.

The applicant, Qi Xue, brought a motion seeking an order for financial disclosure from his stepdaughter, Yimeng Sun (Serena), in the context of a broader family law application for divorce, support, and property equalization against his spouse, Xiuping Sun, and Serena.

Serena opposed the disclosure, arguing that there was no evidence of parental care from Xue, the disclosure sought was disproportionate, and that support should be primarily sought from the spouse.

The court found that Xue had an arguable case for having provided care or support to Serena, thereby engaging Section 32 of the Family Law Act, and demonstrated a need for support.

Additionally, both Xue's property and support claims, and Serena's own property claim against Xue, triggered the financial disclosure requirements under Rule 13(1) of the Family Law Rules.

The court granted the motion, ordering Serena to provide the requested financial disclosure.

The applicant initiated proceedings seeking divorce, sole custody of the parties' two daughters, and their return to Toronto from Lebanon, where the respondent had unilaterally relocated with them.

The applicant also sought a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching prior court orders.

The court affirmed Ontario's jurisdiction based on the children's habitual residence and granted sole custody to the applicant.

It ordered the respondent to immediately return the children to Toronto at her own expense and to take all necessary steps to lift any existing travel bans.

Furthermore, the court found the respondent in contempt of court orders and issued a warrant for her arrest.

The court declined to issue orders directly compelling foreign police forces but utilized its parens patriae jurisdiction to request assistance from Canadian and Lebanese authorities for the children's return.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement in a medical malpractice action.

The settlement was conditional on the defendants obtaining releases in a form acceptable to them.

A dispute arose regarding the scope of the release for the minor plaintiff, specifically concerning an indemnity clause for future claims by the minor after reaching majority.

The court found that the conditional nature of the settlement meant it was at an end when the parties could not agree on the form of the release.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to stay an action for payment on written guarantees, arguing that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter or, alternatively, that Alberta was the more appropriate forum (forum non conveniens).

The guarantees contained a choice of law and forum selection clause designating Ontario.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction based on the contracts being made in Ontario (acceptance by email) and that the defendants, as sophisticated business parties, failed to demonstrate "strong cause" to override the forum selection clause.

The court rejected arguments of uneven bargaining power and public policy concerns, distinguishing consumer protection cases.

The plaintiff, Arsim Grajqevci, suffered personal injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury award, the statutory third party, Allstate Insurance Company, brought a motion for directions on two issues: (1) whether a threshold determination under s. 267.5(15) of the Insurance Act was required for non-pecuniary general damages and health care costs, even though the award for pain and suffering was reduced to nil by deductibles; and (2) whether payments received by the plaintiff from the Government of Ontario under the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) and Ontario Works (OW) should be deducted from the award for past loss of income.

The court ruled that a threshold determination was not required when the plaintiff was not entitled to an award for health care expenses or non-pecuniary loss after deductibles.

The court also found that OW and ODSP payments were not deductible because Allstate failed to establish they were "in respect of the incident" (the motor vehicle accident), as the benefits were primarily related to the plaintiff's other health conditions (HIV, tuberculosis).

The Applicants brought a motion seeking an accounting of loans and a determination regarding the collateral nature of a $650,000 mortgage (the "Castlemore Mortgage") against 4415 Castlemore Road, Brampton, in relation to a $700,000 mortgage (the "Wilson Mortgage") against 1031 Wilson Avenue, Toronto.

While the accounting issue was resolved, the central dispute concerned whether the Castlemore Mortgage was collateral to the Wilson Mortgage, and if an amendment deleting the collateral provision was valid.

The court found that the Castlemore Mortgage was not collateral security for the Wilson Mortgage due to a valid amendment registered in April 2015, and that the Respondent Graff was entitled to rely on this amendment, despite the Applicants' claims of lack of authority by the bare trustee.

The Applicants' motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff commenced an action for disability benefits.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the policy's limitation period or the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the policy's limitation period unenforceable as it did not meet the statutory exceptions.

Applying the Limitations Act, the court determined that the claim was discovered on May 23, 2012, when the defendant's counsel communicated that the claim would not receive further consideration if requested medical documents were not provided within 14 days.

The knowledge of the plaintiff's paralegal was imputed to the plaintiff.

As the action was commenced on October 6, 2015, it was outside the two-year limitation period.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The court, acting sua sponte under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim failed to comply with Rule 25.06, lacking concise material facts and containing irrelevant and abusive allegations regarding the defendant's sexual history and mental health.

Despite receiving notice, the plaintiff made no submissions.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, an automotive technician, was terminated for cause by the defendant dealership for intentionally misrepresenting the need for brake replacement on a customer's vehicle to generate lucrative work.

The plaintiff sued for common law wrongful dismissal damages and statutory termination/severance pay.

The court found the plaintiff's testimony not credible and concluded that his actions were driven by greed and constituted intentional misrepresentation, striking at the heart of the employment relationship.

Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding just cause for dismissal and that his conduct met the 'wilful misconduct' exception under the Employment Standards Act, disentitling him to statutory payments.

The defendant insurer sought to examine the plaintiffs and their insured under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in advance of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to address the procedural order at a case conference.

While acknowledging the insured, Ian Horsefield, possessed relevant evidence regarding the fire's cause, the court dismissed the insurer's request to compel examinations.

It held that the insurer could not re-litigate the facts of the claim, including the circumstances of the fire, which were established by a prior consent judgment against the insured, as the insurer had chosen not to defend the original action.

The "equities" defence under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act was limited to policy construction and breaches, not the underlying liability or damages.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $41,608.83 for unpaid invoices and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed, the plaintiff sought costs of $87,103.50.

The defendant argued the amount was disproportionate for a simplified procedure action.

The court considered the plaintiff's successful offers to settle, which presumptively entitled it to substantial indemnity costs, but balanced this against the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1.1) and the objectives of the simplified procedure.

The court fixed costs at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Thelma Rycroft died of septic shock after a gastroscopy performed by Dr. Dean Chen.

Her spouse and son brought an action for negligence, alleging inadequate pre-operative preparation and negligent continuation of the procedure despite retained food in her stomach, leading to aspiration pneumonia.

The court found Dr. Chen liable for breaching the standard of care by failing to instruct Mrs. Rycroft on an extended clear liquid diet and by proceeding with the gastroscopy after encountering food and liquid in her stomach.

The court concluded that Dr. Chen's negligence caused Mrs. Rycroft's death and awarded damages to her spouse and son under the Family Law Act, along with OHIP's subrogated claim.