Mario D. Faieta

The applicant appealed the Chief Building Official's refusal to issue a building permit for interior renovations to convert a commercial building into a day nursery.

The City refused the permit on the basis that the application failed to comply with applicable law, including site plan control, park levies, development charges, and zoning by-law requirements for a landscape buffer.

The court held that the proposed alterations did not constitute 'development' under the City of Toronto Act, as they did not substantially increase the usability of the building when measured against its actual prior commercial use.

Consequently, site plan control, park levies, and development charges did not apply.

However, the court upheld the requirement for a 1.5-metre landscape buffer under the zoning by-law, finding no acquired rights protected the applicant from this requirement.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the City was directed to issue the building permit subject to the landscape buffer and other reasonable building code issues.

The applicant sought to quash a warrant issued under s. 20 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 authorizing Toronto Fire Services to enter and inspect his residence for fire safety concerns after complaints that the home was occupied by a hoarder.

The court treated the proceeding as an application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the applicant effectively sought certiorari to set aside a justice of the peace’s decision.

The court held that the justice of the peace had reasonable grounds to issue the warrant based on an affidavit describing complaints, repeated unsuccessful attempts to inspect, and concerns about combustible materials in a rowhouse dwelling.

The court further found no violation of s. 8 of the Charter because regulatory fire safety inspections involve a reduced expectation of privacy and serve an important public safety purpose.

The application was dismissed and the warrant’s expiry date was extended.

The defendant driver brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against him following a motor vehicle collision involving an unidentified vehicle that turned left across his path.

The plaintiff was a passenger and also sued his insurer under unidentified automobile coverage.

The insurer brought a cross-motion arguing that the driver was at least partially negligent, which would negate the insurer’s liability.

Applying Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the driver failed to exercise reasonable care in poor visibility and slippery winter road conditions.

The court held the driver was at least 1% liable for the collision and dismissed the claim against the insurer.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sued the defendant for a commission of $68,506.25 under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) after the defendant purchased a home using another brokerage.

The court found that the BRA had been repudiated by the defendant and that the plaintiff accepted the repudiation by its conduct in failing to provide further services.

Alternatively, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement by failing to assist the defendant in locating a home, which the defendant accepted.

The claim was dismissed.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him in an action alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding his role in managing an estate.

The lawyer argued he ignored the statement of claim because he believed it lacked merit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the lawyer's explanation implausible and noting that his failure to defend showed a careless disregard for the legal process.

The court also found that the prejudice to the plaintiff, due to the death and incapacity of key witnesses, outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay, citing a 15-year period since the action was commenced.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to place the action on the trial list.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the delay was due to settlement discussions.

However, the court dismissed the motion because the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice by showing that all documentary evidence was preserved and witnesses were available and had been previously examined.

The defendants failed to show actual prejudice.

The action was ordered to be placed on the trial list.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, seeking to freeze their assets based on an alleged debt owed under a Repayment Agreement.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were planning to move to the United States and dissipate their Ontario assets to avoid judgment.

The court found that while the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case for the debt, there was insufficient evidence to prove a real risk that the defendants were removing assets from the jurisdiction to avoid judgment.

The motion for a Mareva injunction was dismissed.

The minor plaintiff, who had a pre-existing condition making his bones prone to fracture, was injured while attempting to board a continuously moving amusement park ride.

The plaintiffs sued the amusement park operator for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to post warning signs, failing to provide verbal instructions that the ride did not stop, and failing to have sufficient staff present.

The court dismissed the defendant's claims of contributory negligence against the minor and his father.

Damages were awarded to the minor plaintiff and his parents, taking into account the minor's pre-existing condition under the crumbling skull rule.

The defendant employer appealed a master's order requiring production of an external investigation report prepared by a lawyer following a fatal incident at a long‑term care facility.

The employer argued the report and related documents were protected by solicitor‑client privilege and that the master erred in ordering disclosure.

The court held the investigation was undertaken for the purpose of providing legal advice and was therefore privileged, rejecting the master’s finding that the lawyer had not been retained in that capacity and rejecting application of the common interest exception.

However, the court concluded that privilege had been waived through fairness considerations and public disclosure of portions of the report’s findings by the employer’s representatives.

The master’s order requiring production was upheld.

The defendant driver of the lead vehicle in a rear-end collision brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and the co-defendant's crossclaim against her.

The co-defendant driver of the rear vehicle opposed the motion, alleging the lead vehicle stopped suddenly.

The court applied the presumption that the rear driver is at fault and found the co-defendant failed to discharge the onus to show the accident did not occur as a result of his negligence.

The motion was granted and the claims against the lead driver were dismissed.

The insurer moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim under unidentified automobile coverage arising from a multi-vehicle collision involving an alleged unknown driver.

The court applied the Rule 20 framework and held the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine that one of the identified defendants would necessarily be at least 1 percent liable, particularly where the insurer relied on a deficient affidavit and the other defendants expressly denied liability.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial and declined to use the enhanced fact-finding powers.

The court also rejected the insurer's alternative proposals to abstain from mandatory litigation steps or to be dismissed without prejudice, and awarded the plaintiff costs.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice action arising from emergency treatment of a laceration caused by broken glass.

The court held that, while the plaintiff's plastic surgery expert was not practising in the same field as the emergency physician and therefore could not alone establish the standard of care in emergency medicine, the defendant's own emergency medicine expert did not eliminate a genuine issue for trial because his opinion was premised on an assumption contrary to the admitted evidence that the plaintiff reported feeling glass in the wound.

Applying the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and Hryniak, the court found a triable issue on breach of the standard of care.

The motion was dismissed and the court remained seized.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing an unjust enrichment claim arising from a residential construction project, arguing she had no beneficial interest in the property and therefore received no enrichment.

The court held that the evidentiary record disclosed a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether the moving defendant was a partner or beneficial participant in the purchase, construction, and sale of the property, particularly given conflicting evidence about her financial advances, involvement in the project, and statements allegedly made to the plaintiff.

The credibility of all three principal witnesses was central and could not be resolved on the written record.

Summary judgment was refused, the action was ordered to proceed expeditiously to trial, a case conference was directed, and costs of $8,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

Following an unsuccessful personal injury jury trial arising from an automobile collision, the court determined the defendant's entitlement to costs.

The plaintiff recovered nothing and the threshold declaration under the Insurance Act barred non-pecuniary and health care claims.

The court held that none of the parties' settlement offers engaged Rule 49.10, and the plaintiff's conduct, while hard-fought, was not reprehensible so as to justify elevated costs.

Applying the costs factors, indemnity principles, and proportionality, the court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $75,000 plus disbursements of $35,638.18.

The applicants sought judgment under the Solicitors Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure for an unpaid legal services invoice arising from a patent-related retainer.

The respondents argued that some work was unnecessary, duplicative, and of unsatisfactory quality.

The court rejected those objections, finding no evidence that the applicants departed from the requested review approach, duplicated work, or provided substandard advice.

Judgment was granted for the invoice amount plus pre-judgment interest, and partial costs were awarded, but not on a substantial indemnity basis.

On a motion by auditor defendants to quash notices of examination served by a co-defendant before a pending Mareva injunction motion, the court held the proposed examinations were not shown to be properly relevant to the issues on the injunction.

The notices sought sweeping document production and testimony extending back to 2003, despite the injunction motion focusing on whether the co-defendant had misappropriated funds and seeking no relief against the moving parties.

The court found the notices functioned as premature discovery before the close of pleadings and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The notices of examination were quashed.

On an appeal from a Master's production order, the appellants challenged an order requiring disclosure of seven years of post-contract financial statements and tax returns relating to companies in which a non-party had an interest.

The court held that, given the pleadings alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from advice leading to a marriage contract, the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's broad damages claim, including restitutionary assessment for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court rejected arguments that post-valuation records were irrelevant, that the order caused prejudice, or that disclosure should await a pending summary judgment motion.

The appeals were dismissed.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a noting in default, set aside a default judgment, stay a notice of garnishment, and obtain release of garnished funds in a construction deficiency action involving allegedly improper installation of paving stones.

Applying the Rule 19.03 and Rule 19.08 frameworks, the court found the motion was brought promptly, the defendants had a plausible explanation rooted in their reasonable reliance on an insurer and an erroneous dismissal order, and they had an arguable defence on standing, warranty, and damages.

The prejudice to the defendants from enforcing a judgment exceeding $120,000 outweighed any compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court also held there was no basis to maintain a pre-judgment asset freeze through garnishment in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

Following an eleven-day jury trial where the jury awarded no damages, the defendant brought a motion for a declaration that the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss and health care expenses was barred by the threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed to suffer from soft tissue injuries, headaches, and neck pain following a minor rear-end collision.

The court found that the plaintiff's impairments did not substantially interfere with her volunteer activities or usual activities of daily living, and preferred the medical evidence indicating no permanent impairment caused by the collision.

The motion was granted, barring the plaintiff's claims.

The defendants brought motions arising from a self-represented plaintiff's failed purchase of a condominium unit and the subsequent release of deposit monies to the vendor.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the vendor's solicitors, holding they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff in an arm's-length transaction where she had her own counsel, were not parties to the agreement, and had lawfully dealt with the deposit funds.

The court also struck the claim against the regulator under Rule 21, holding it owed no private law duty of care and that the pleading failed to allege bad faith sufficient to overcome statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act.

The pleading was additionally described as a rambling narrative contrary to proper pleading principles and one that would also have been struck under Rule 25.11 without leave to amend.