Marie Deschamps

The respondents were charged with wilfully promoting hatred against the Roma people after participating in a demonstration outside a motel housing Roma refugee claimants.

The trial judge acquitted the respondents, finding the Crown failed to prove that the term 'gypsies' used in the demonstration was interchangeable with 'Roma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered new trials, holding that the trial judge erred in law by focusing solely on the interchangeability of the terms rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and that he should have taken judicial notice of dictionary definitions linking the two terms.

The appellant was convicted of committing an indecent act in a public place after neighbours observed him masturbating in his illuminated living room through an uncovered window.

The trial judge found he had converted his living room into a public place.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that a private living room is not a 'public place' within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The Court concluded that 'access' to a public place requires physical access, not merely visual access from the outside.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction due to a fatally flawed jury charge and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the jury charge was flawed, specifically regarding the strict causation requirement under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting a verdict, as another verdict might be reasonable.

A new trial on the original indictment for first degree murder was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

During an undercover operation, he confessed to police officers posing as members of a criminal organization who claimed they could use corrupt police contacts to influence the murder investigation.

The trial judge admitted the statements without a voluntariness voir dire, finding the undercover officers were not 'persons in authority'.

The trial judge also excluded defence evidence suggesting a third party committed the murder due to an insufficient connection to the crime.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the undercover officers were not persons in authority because the appellant believed they were acting against the state's interests, and that the third-party evidence was properly excluded as lacking probative value.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no air of reality supporting the objective components of the test for the defence of provocation.

Justice Fish dissented, finding that a reasonable jury could have been left with a reasonable doubt on the issue.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the liability of an amalgamated corporation for the remediation of a contaminated site caused by the pre-amalgamation activities of one of its predecessor corporations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Rowles J.A. in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, holding that the wording of the amalgamation agreement did not limit the liability of the amalgamated corporation.

The appellant was served a notice of ascertained forfeiture under the Customs Act for allegedly attempting to export stolen automobiles using false statements.

He appealed the Minister's decision upholding the forfeiture to the Federal Court.

The Minister sought to examine the appellant for discovery, which the appellant resisted, claiming protection against self-incrimination under section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not a 'person charged with an offence' because ascertained forfeiture is an administrative, civil collection mechanism, not a penal proceeding, and does not impose true penal consequences.

Therefore, section 11(c) of the Charter did not apply, and the appellant could be compelled to submit to examination for discovery.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering threats after beating the victim with a baseball bat.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, specifically regarding whether the victim's life was endangered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the stringent standard from R. v. Morrissey.

The Court held that to set aside a conviction, a misapprehension of evidence must go to the substance rather than detail, and must play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in the conviction.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after failing to properly investigate and secure a knife found at his son's school.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife handle was made of metal.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge commits a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari if they fail to consider the whole of the evidence as required by section 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The infant respondents suffer from autism and sought funding from the Province of British Columbia for applied behavioural analysis (ABA) or intensive behavioural intervention (IBI) therapy.

The Province refused to fund the therapy, arguing it was an emergent and controversial treatment and citing financial constraints.

The respondents argued this refusal violated their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislative scheme does not promise funding for all medically required treatment, but only for core services provided by medical practitioners.

Since ABA/IBI therapy is a non-core service and the Province had not designated its providers as health care practitioners, the benefit claimed was not provided by law.

The Court concluded there was no discrimination and allowed the Province's appeal.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The appellant developer agreed to construct $1.08 million in extra infrastructure improvements for the respondent municipality in exchange for an implied commitment to maintain zoning for a waterfront development.

After the developer completed the improvements, the municipality down-zoned the property, preventing the development.

The Supreme Court of Canada previously ruled the municipality's zoning commitment was ultra vires and unenforceable as a contract.

In this unjust enrichment claim, the Court held that the municipality could not rely on the ultra vires contract as a juristic reason to retain the benefit of the improvements without paying for them.

The appeal was allowed and the municipality was ordered to reimburse the developer $1.08 million.

The Province of British Columbia granted a project approval certificate to a mining company to reopen a mine, which included building an access road through the traditional territory of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN).

The TRTFN objected, arguing their unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims were not adequately accommodated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a duty to consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal peoples prior to proof of rights or title claims, grounded in the honour of the Crown.

However, the Court found that the environmental assessment process engaged in by the Province fulfilled this duty, as the TRTFN was consulted and its concerns were reasonably accommodated in the project approval conditions.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, which had set aside his acquittal on a charge of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was sufficient material before the Justice of the Peace to support the issuance of the search warrant.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which quashed the accused's conviction for sexual offences and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence without the benefit of the Court's reasons in R. v. Handy.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the police use of Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) aerial camera technology to detect heat emanating from a home constituted a search under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court found a serious breach of the accused's privacy rights, excluded the real evidence under section 24(2), and entered an acquittal.

A note appended to the decision indicates that the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently allowed an appeal of this judgment.