Marc E. Smith

The Respondent Mother, entirely successful in a prior Hague Application, sought costs from the Applicant Father.

The Mother requested $50,714.80, arguing for substantial recovery up to her offer to settle and full recovery thereafter, citing the Father's alleged bad faith.

The Father disputed the amount and denied bad faith, arguing the offer did not meet Family Law Rules requirements for full indemnity.

The court, applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, found the Mother presumptively entitled to costs.

While acknowledging the Father's unacceptable conduct, the court determined it did not meet the high threshold for bad faith warranting full recovery costs.

The Father's claims of inability to pay were not substantiated due to a lack of financial disclosure.

The court ultimately awarded the Mother $37,500.00 in all-inclusive costs, representing a slightly higher award than on a partial indemnity basis.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to place the child, K, in the custody of her paternal great-grandmother, D.L., pursuant to section 102(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

K's parents, E.K. (Mother) and O.K. (Father), opposed the motion, while D.L. supported it.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding that the parents had not made significant progress to address protection concerns since a previous order, and that it was in K's best interest to remain in D.L.'s care, ensuring a safe, stable environment and continuity of care, especially given K's serious medical needs.

The defendant, Bruce McConville, brought a motion to amend his Statement of Defence by withdrawing an admission regarding the non-disclosure of asset sales in a prior family law proceeding.

The plaintiff, Jennifer Horrocks, opposed the motion, citing the defendant's history of non-disclosure and previous court findings.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing admissions, finding that the defendant met the low threshold for showing a triable issue due to contradictory evidence, provided a reasonable explanation for the inadvertent admission, and that no uncompensable prejudice would result.

The motion was granted, but no costs were awarded to the successful moving party due to the motion being necessitated by his own error and troublesome conduct in the underlying family law matter.

The City of Ottawa brought a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss Michael Tardif's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Tardif's claim sought to quash a municipal by-law regarding garbage limits, without seeking damages.

The court found the action was improperly brought as a statement of claim instead of an application, exhibited characteristics of querulous litigant behaviour, and constituted a collateral attack on previous dismissals of similar actions by Tardif against the City.

The court dismissed the action, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and awarded costs to the City.

The Applicant Mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Respondent Father's Motion to Change and an order for sole decision-making responsibility for their youngest child, C. The Father's Motion to Change sought sole custody and alleged parental alienation.

The court denied the Father's motion due to lack of leave.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding C's parenting, rejecting the Father's parental alienation claims as unsupported and attributing the strained parent-child relationships to the Father's own conduct.

Given a material change in circumstances and C's clear, independent views and preferences (at nearly 17 years old) to remain with the Mother, the court granted the Mother sole decision-making responsibility, maintaining the status quo in C's best interest.

The trial addressed two main issues: the respondent's claim for legal costs and disbursements incurred between 2012 and 2018, and the proper division of the parties' respective pensions.

The court dismissed the respondent's claim for costs due to credibility issues, lack of evidence, and inappropriate conduct, including dishonesty.

Regarding pensions, the court ordered the division of both parties' pensions based on gross values, rejecting the respondent's request to include pre-marital accruals for the applicant's pension and setting interest accumulation from March 1, 2017, due to shared responsibility for delays, but primarily attributing delay to the respondent's dishonesty.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which sought damages under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for alleged discrimination and obstruction of justice by court staff due to her whistleblower status.

The court, applying Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Statement of Claim unintelligible, an attempt to relitigate past proceedings, and that court staff are statutorily immune from such claims.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff sought leave to discontinue a wrongful dismissal action in Ontario, which was a condition for proceeding with a related action in Florida.

The defendant consented to the discontinuance but sought costs for the action and the motion on an elevated scale, and that the discontinuance be with prejudice.

The court granted leave to discontinue with prejudice, awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the action (fixed at $7,500), but ordered each party to bear their own costs for the motion, finding both parties' conduct regarding the motion costs unreasonable.

The Appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to address significant inconsistencies in the Complainant's evidence and by applying a stricter level of scrutiny to the Appellant's evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the credibility findings were entitled to deference, and no uneven scrutiny of evidence occurred.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to reconcile every minor inconsistency or explicitly address every argument, provided the reasons demonstrate an intelligible and logical path to the conclusion.

The respondent brought a motion to change a spousal support order, seeking termination of obligations, rescission of arrears, and cancellation of life insurance security, citing a material change in circumstances due to his business and personal bankruptcies and subsequent financial hardship.

The applicant opposed, arguing no material change.

The court found a material change had occurred, noting the respondent's severe financial difficulties and the applicant's accumulated wealth and self-sufficiency.

The motion was granted, terminating spousal support and cancelling all arrears.

The Mother sought to relocate with the children from Ontario to Nova Scotia, citing health and financial reasons.

The Father opposed the relocation, arguing it was not in the children's best interests due to the negative impact on their relationship and stability.

The court considered factors under the Divorce Act, including the children's needs, relationships with parents and extended family, and the parents' willingness to cooperate.

The court denied the Mother's request to relocate, finding that it would destabilize the children and negatively impact their strong bond with the Father.

Decision-making responsibility was shared, with the Mother responsible for medical care and religion, and the Father for education.

The existing equal shared parenting time schedule was maintained.

The Father brought a motion seeking the return of one child (R.M.) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and a declaration that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over parenting issues.

The court dismissed the Father's motion, finding that it had jurisdiction under both s. 22(1)(b) and s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found that all six criteria under s. 22(1)(b) were met, including that there were no pending extra-provincial proceedings due to the Father's bad faith in concealing UAE custody proceedings from the Mother.

Furthermore, the court found that R.M. would suffer serious physical and psychological harm if returned to the UAE, given the Mother and children's Convention refugee status, the Father's history of abuse and lack of credibility, and R.M.'s strong, consistent views against returning.

This decision addresses two motions: one by AIG Insurance Company of Canada for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Neil Doef, regarding a paralysis benefit claim, and another by Hockey Canada seeking leave to withdraw an affidavit and replace it.

The court dismissed AIG's summary judgment motion due to an unjustifiable 42-month delay in bringing it, finding it contrary to the principles of timely access to justice.

Hockey Canada's motion for leave to withdraw the affidavit was also dismissed, as granting it would have prejudiced the plaintiff by denying him the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants before the summary judgment motion, which was subsequently vacated.

The Creditors, 1770650 Ontario Inc. and 1062484 Ontario Inc., brought a motion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine their entitlement to proceeds from a professional liability insurance policy issued by Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (LawPro) to the Debtor, Paul McEnery, a disbarred lawyer.

The motion sought an order for LawPro to pay out policy proceeds to satisfy outstanding debts.

The issues were whether the $500,000 sublimit for dishonest acts was per claim or in aggregate, and whether LawPro had improperly eroded the policy limits through defence costs.

The court found the $500,000 sublimit was an aggregate limit and that LawPro had not eroded the policy limits, dismissing the Creditors' motion.

The Applicant brought a motion seeking permission to amend her application to include claims for constructive trust, intentional infliction of mental suffering and distress, and a restraining order against disseminating compromising videos/photographs.

She also sought an appraisal of an Australian property and further financial disclosure.

The Respondent opposed the motion, arguing delay, bad faith, and lack of merit for the new claims.

The court partially granted the motion, allowing the amendments, vacating the trial date, permitting the appraisal, and ordering specific financial disclosure, including intimate images and personal effects valuation.

The court found the proposed amendments tenable and necessary to avoid duplicative proceedings, despite the Applicant's delay.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion to correct the name of a defendant from Ali Al-Shammari to Enad Al-Shammari and to add West-Way Taxi Nepean Ltd. as an additional defendant.

The Defendants consented to the name correction but opposed adding West-Way.

The Defendants also brought a cross-motion to compel the Plaintiffs to specify the amount of damages claimed in their Statement of Claim.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' motion, finding that the discoverability principle applied to the addition of West-Way, and dismissed the Defendants' cross-motion, ruling that the Plaintiffs were not yet obligated to particularize damages at the pleadings stage given the early stage of the proceedings.

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of 39 years, brought an action for wrongful dismissal, aggravated/moral damages, and discrimination based on sex, age, and disability following her termination without cause.

The court found no break in service despite a new employment agreement signed to access a pension, entitling her to 26 months' notice.

Claims for aggravated/moral damages and additional discrimination grounds (age and disability) were dismissed due to insufficient pleading.

The claim for discrimination based on sex was also dismissed due to a lack of prima facie evidence.

The plaintiff's mitigation efforts were deemed reasonable.

The Estate Trustee brought a motion for directions seeking payment declarations and orders for beneficiaries to provide documents and funds to pay estate debts.

The beneficiaries opposed, arguing lack of jurisdiction and seeking the Estate Trustee's removal due to alleged mismanagement.

The court dismissed both the Estate Trustee's motion, finding it an improper procedural mechanism for substantive relief, and the beneficiaries' application for removal, determining there was insufficient evidence to meet the high threshold for removing an estate trustee.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

This trial addressed two main issues: custody of the children and their attendance at the Rodnik Russian School on Saturdays.

The court found that despite a history of conflict, the parents demonstrated a sufficient ability to communicate and cooperate, leading to an order for joint custody.

Regarding the Russian school, the court determined it was an extracurricular activity, not a part of the normal curriculum, and therefore not mandatory during the Father's parenting time, to allow for diverse experiences and quality time with him.