Lois B. Roberts

Shareholders of two successive corporate ventures to develop oil and gas fields in Russia sued defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, and conspiracy.

The defendants had induced the plaintiffs to invest US$50 million in a sham public company (Magellan) by falsely representing that another investor (BDW) had committed to investing US$70 million.

When the fraud was discovered, the parties reorganized under a new company (Koll), but the defendants continued to deceive the plaintiffs about asset values and IPO prospects to induce further investment.

The trial judge awarded full compensatory damages to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the court upheld liability for pre-June 2006 conduct but set aside liability for post-June 2006 conduct based on unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding IPO-related statements, while maintaining liability for wrongful garnishment of remaining Magellan funds.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion to stay the respondents' counterclaim on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and an arbitration clause.

The motion judge found two presumptive connecting factors establishing Ontario's jurisdiction: the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation was committed in Ontario, and the contract was made in Ontario.

The motion judge also determined that the arbitration clause in a draft agreement was never agreed upon by the parties and therefore did not oust Ontario's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the factual findings or legal conclusions.

A homebuilder appealed the dismissal of its action against its Commercial General Liability insurer for a declaration of duty to defend and indemnify in relation to a claim by homeowners.

The homeowners had purchased a lot and home where the property grading exceeded municipal standards.

The builder failed to include a required warning in the purchase agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no coverage under the CGL policy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the claims were either based on intentional conduct or were clearly excluded under the policy's exclusion clauses, particularly those relating to property damage arising from defects in the builder's work and failure to provide warnings.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine into Canada.

She challenged the trial judge's decision to admit statements she made to Canada Border Security officers at the airport.

The appellant argued that she was detained before making these statements and that her Charter rights were engaged, requiring exclusion of the statements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during routine questioning and luggage searches, and that detention only occurred after x-ray images revealed suspicious tins and the appellant asked what was in them.

The court found no error in admitting the pre-detention statements and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, principal owner of a Cora franchise, appealed a summary judgment against him as guarantor of the franchisee's indebtedness.

The appellant sought to assert a set-off and counterclaim for damages arising from the loss of a potential franchise sale that failed to close when the franchisee refused to provide the franchisor with a release as required by the franchise agreement.

The motion judge found no basis for set-off and determined the damages claim was statute barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the franchise agreement explicitly precluded set-off, the damages claim belonged to the franchisee not the appellant, and the limitation period had commenced before the appellant commenced the action.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court dismissing their motions to set aside a settlement order approving a settlement of their son George Lochner's claim for damages arising from a police altercation in which he was tasered.

The appellants lacked standing to challenge the settlement order as they were not parties or persons affected by it within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Their second motion was an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate the same standing issue.

The appellants' proposed fresh evidence regarding George Lochner's taser injuries was inadmissible as it could not have affected the outcome of the motions.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action against her former employer.

The appellant was employed under a one-year fixed-term contract and was terminated after less than three months without notice or payment in lieu.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the termination valid under the contract and that the appellant was not entitled to statutory notice under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the termination provisions in the employment contract were void as they violated the Employment Standards Act.

The court awarded the appellant damages equal to her salary for the remaining weeks of the unexpired contract term, without deduction for mitigation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Children's Law Reform Act seeking a declaration that his daughter was habitually resident in Israel and was wrongfully retained in Canada by the respondent.

The application judge found that the parties had mutually agreed to change their habitual residence from Israel to Ontario while visiting Toronto, and that the appellant had subsequently consented to or acquiesced in Ontario as the daughter's habitual residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings as factual determinations entitled to considerable deference, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his civil action seeking damages against his former spouse and her parents for alleged fraudulent concealment of assets.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's claim for damages was premised on an alleged entitlement to an equalization payment governed by the Family Law Act, which can only be pursued in family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting that while the appellant's equalization claim was time-barred under the Family Law Act, he was not necessarily without recourse if he could satisfy the criteria for an extension of time and pursue the matter through family law proceedings.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against the respondents.

The central issue was whether the appellant was the sole or majority shareholder of John Bordynuik Inc. of Delaware and therefore entitled to bring claims on behalf of or as an assignee of that company.

The motion judge found that the respondent John Bordynuik was not obliged to give up his shares in the Delaware Company when he purchased his majority interest in JBI Inc. of Nevada.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, accepting her interpretation of the documentary evidence, including an email and share ledger, over the appellant's interpretation of a Settlement Agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering into a dwelling house contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on fingerprint evidence linking him to a theft of over $4,000 from a condominium unit where he worked as a concierge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the reliability of the fingerprint evidence; (2) a violation of s. 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay; and (3) a violation of s. 7 Charter rights regarding the failure to preserve video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of part of its application for relief arising from a fire at an adjoining semi-detached property.

The appellant sought recovery of losses caused by the fire and subsequent conduct of the respondent and its predecessor.

The key issue was whether the respondent, having purchased the damaged property several months after the fire, became liable for damages caused to the appellant's property prior to the respondent's acquisition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the respondent had no involvement in and could not be responsible for damages accrued before it acquired the property.

The court also reduced the respondent's costs award on appeal.

This is a costs decision supplementary to the Court of Appeal's February 3, 2017 judgment allowing in part an appeal from an application judge's order regarding spousal support and insurance benefits.

The appellant sought to set aside the application judge's costs award to the respondent and obtain costs for both the application and appeal.

The respondent sought to maintain the costs award and obtain additional costs for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that unusual circumstances existed because the appropriate reduction to the respondent's obligations remained open for determination by another application judge, warranting a departure from the general principle that the successful party on appeal receives costs below.

The Court reserved costs of the application and any further application to the application judge and awarded the appellant costs of the appeal in the amount of $13,000.

The appellant sought to appeal a costs order made by Gibson J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated May 24, 2016.

The appellant did not seek leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the proposed appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary costs order.

Costs were fixed at $250 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes in favour of the respondent.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 9 years less 18 months pre-sentence custody for aggravated assault with a weapon.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider whether intent to kill was the only available inference and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of proportionality given the mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge carefully balanced the mitigating and aggravating factors and was entitled to consider the appellant's intent to kill as a seriously aggravating factor.

The sentence was found to be fit in the circumstances.

This decision addresses costs of the proceedings below following a partial appeal success.

The appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing they were substantially successful on the issues that drove the proceedings.

The respondents sought no costs or costs on a partial indemnity basis, arguing the success was divided.

The court found that while the appeal was allowed only in part, the appellants enjoyed greater success on the key issues and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting the divided success.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 16-month global sentence imposed for trafficking in crack cocaine while on probation.

Although the sentencing judge initially misunderstood counsel's submission regarding the proposed sentence, the Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit given the nature of the offense, the quantity and type of drugs involved, and the breach of probation.

The sentencing judge appropriately declined to impose an unfit sentence to avoid adverse immigration consequences for the appellant.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor who was between 13 and 16 years old during the period 1988 to 1991, when the appellant was the complainant's Big Brother.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting Big Brothers organization records as evidence of the truth of their contents when filed in reply after the close of the defence, and (2) the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because he failed to explain why he rejected corroborating evidence from the appellant's sister.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the records and finding the trial judge's reasons adequate when read as a whole in context.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that an error was made in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.

The pre-sentence custody credit was recalculated at a 1.5 to 1 ratio, resulting in a reduction of the sentence from 10 years 290 days to 9 years 251 days, with pre-trial custody credited as 3 years 114 days instead of 2 years 75 days.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and related offences arising from a jewellery store robbery, as well as his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal on conviction: that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence was equally consistent with him being a fence rather than a perpetrator; that the trial judge failed to provide a Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness; and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three grounds, finding that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported only one rational inference that the appellant was one of the two masked perpetrators, that the trial judge had properly considered the witness's credibility issues without requiring a formal caution in a judge-alone trial, and that the trial judge's factual findings were sound.

The court also found the 12-year sentence was fit.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.