Leo S. Russomanno

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing explosive materials for the purpose of endangering life or causing serious property damage in a terrorism context.

The court emphasized the gravity of terrorism-related offences under the Criminal Code and the serious threat posed to public safety.

After considering the joint submission of counsel and the circumstances of the offence, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 24 years with credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 to 1, totaling six years of credit.

The court ordered that the accused serve a further 18 years and imposed a delayed parole eligibility period pursuant to s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code.

Additional ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

In a terrorism prosecution, the applicants sought further disclosure from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service relating to payments made to a human source relied upon in a CSIS affidavit supporting investigative warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that records detailing remuneration and reimbursements paid to the source were likely relevant to a pending Garofoli voir dire because financial incentives may affect credibility and the affiant’s assessment of reliability.

Production of records relating to payments to the source was therefore ordered.

However, the request for disclosure of any CSIS reliability assessments concerning a target of the investigation was refused, as the target was not a traditional informant whose reliability required evaluation.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of CSIS search warrants that formed the basis for subsequent RCMP wiretap warrants in a terrorism investigation.

The applicant alleged breaches of s. 8 of the Charter and argued the information to obtain the warrants failed to establish both a threat to the security of Canada and investigative necessity under s. 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that the affidavit contained sufficiently reliable information, including detailed statements from a human source relaying incriminating admissions from a target of the investigation, and that the issuing judge could reasonably conclude the statutory requirements were met.

The court further held that the investigative necessity requirement under the CSIS Act differs from the investigative necessity standard applicable to Criminal Code wiretaps.

The application to set aside the warrants was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, obstructing a peace officer, and breaching probation.

The offences arose from a collision between the accused's vehicle and a snowmobile operated by a 16-year-old victim, resulting in life-threatening injuries including internal organ damage, brain bleed, and multiple fractures.

The accused fled the scene without rendering assistance and subsequently lied to police.

The court imposed a global sentence of 44 months, with credit for 428 days of pretrial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in a remaining sentence of 22 months and 20 days.

The court also imposed a lifetime driving prohibition and DNA order.

During a jury trial for multiple robberies and a conspiracy charge, the Crown brought a similar fact application seeking permission for the jury to use evidence from several robbery counts as proof of identity across those counts.

The court analyzed similarities between four convenience store robberies occurring within a short time frame in the Ottawa area, including the method of operation, division of labour among perpetrators, use of masks and firearms, handling of store clerks, and the repeated presence of a distinctive heavy-set participant.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence in identity cases, the court held that the cumulative similarities were sufficiently significant to render coincidence objectively improbable.

The probative value of the evidence outweighed potential prejudice, particularly because each event was already charged in the indictment.

The court therefore permitted the jury to consider the four group robbery counts as similar act evidence for identity and allowed evidence of robberies or attempted robberies to be considered on the issue of intent regarding the conspiracy charge.

The applicants sought leave to cross‑examine a CSIS affiant in a Garofoli‑type challenge relating to warrants issued under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in a terrorism prosecution.

They alleged material non‑disclosure and mischaracterization in the affidavit supporting the warrants, including contradictions in source material regarding an alleged attempt to acquire a firearm, the remuneration structure of a confidential source, the source’s alleged status as an agent, and the possibility of direct meetings between the source and one applicant.

Applying the threshold in R. v. Garofoli and R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, the court held that cross‑examination is permitted only where it could undermine a statutory precondition for authorization.

The court found a sufficient factual foundation regarding a contradiction about attempts to obtain a gun, which could relate to the existence of reasonable grounds and the duty of full, fair, and frank disclosure.

Leave was granted on that issue but denied for the remaining proposed lines of questioning.

During a jury trial for multiple convenience store robberies where the perpetrators wore masks, the Crown sought to admit a 2009 police booking photograph of the accused showing him wearing a jacket with three stripes.

The Crown argued the photograph was admissible as a police business record under s. 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and constituted circumstantial evidence linking the accused to robbery surveillance footage depicting a similarly striped jacket.

The defence objected on the basis that the evidence carried significant prejudicial risk and minimal probative value.

The court held that while the photograph could qualify as a business record, admissibility still required a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Given the common nature of the clothing, the two‑year time gap, and the risk the jury would infer prior police involvement, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking admission of similar fact evidence relating to several convenience store robberies to prove identity of the perpetrators in a multi-count indictment involving robberies committed by one or more offenders.

The court applied the framework governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Perrier, R. v. Handy, and R. v. Arp, including the additional requirements where group criminal activity involves rotating participation.

The court found sufficient distinctive similarities among three robberies committed by a single offender to admit evidence of a prior conviction as similar fact evidence against one accused on the issue of identity.

However, the Crown failed to establish the necessary distinctive modus operandi among the group robberies because numerous material differences undermined the alleged common signature.

As a result, most of the requested similar act evidence was excluded.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a motor vehicle accident on February 9, 2013, in which his car struck a snowmobile operated by a 16-year-old, causing serious injuries.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire regarding alleged Charter breaches.

The court excluded evidence obtained through unconstitutional questioning and breath samples derived therefrom, but admitted evidence of alcohol odour.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain at the scene with knowledge of bodily harm, breach of probation, and obstruction of justice, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to exclusion of breath samples.

The court found the accused was impaired by alcohol and that his impairment was a significant contributing cause of the collision.

Application under s. 29 of the Extradition Act seeking committal of the respondent for surrender to the United States to face prosecution for conspiracy to traffic marijuana.

The court considered whether the record of the case established a prima facie case and whether the respondent was the person sought.

The evidence consisted primarily of a certified record including information from a cooperating witness involved in the trafficking organization and corroborating investigative details.

The court found the informant evidence sufficiently reliable at the committal stage and concluded there was evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could convict.

The court also found on a balance of probabilities that the respondent was the individual identified in the record.

Committal for extradition was ordered pending the Minister’s surrender decision.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a police officer and two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in determining when the appellant was detained by police, thereby triggering Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The appellant argued detention occurred from the outset of the police interaction in a park during proactive policing.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held the initial interaction constituted general questioning and did not amount to detention until the appellant provided false identifying information confirmed by another officer.

The court concluded there was no Charter breach and no error of law by the trial judge.

The offender was convicted after trial of three counts of trafficking in cocaine and three counts of possessing proceeds of crime under $5,000 arising from a police sting operation involving small-scale cocaine sales over three days.

The offender was a first-time offender with stable employment and parental responsibilities but did not testify at trial and did not accept responsibility for the offences.

The court emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence in cocaine trafficking cases while also considering the offender’s youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the offender’s lack of remorse and failure to acknowledge wrongdoing.

A custodial sentence followed by a lengthy probation order was imposed to balance denunciation with rehabilitation.

The applicant, facing serious and complex drug and criminal organization charges, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings until state-funded counsel was provided.

He had been refused legal aid due to incomplete financial documentation regarding the disposition of several properties.

The court found that the applicant required counsel for a fair trial and that he was indigent, having exhausted his financial resources and being unable to provide further documentation to Legal Aid.

The court granted a conditional stay of proceedings until funding for counsel was provided.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's request to appoint specific counsel at a specific hourly rate, noting that the court lacks jurisdiction to set fees or dictate how Legal Aid retains counsel.

The accused was charged with three counts of trafficking crack cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and three counts of possession of proceeds of crime under the Criminal Code arising from controlled purchases conducted by an undercover officer over three consecutive days.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the individual known as “Cinderella” who sold the drugs, pointing to several investigative deficiencies including failure to preserve buy money and failure to conduct a lineup.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the surveillance evidence, photographs, and continuity of observation established identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also accepted the evidence of the undercover officer regarding the drug transactions and proceeds.

Convictions were entered on all trafficking and proceeds of crime counts.

Two accused were charged with drug offences arising from a police investigation of a suspected marijuana grow operation at 21 St. Clair Avenue in Ottawa on June 25, 2010.

Eneida Pino was charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Randall Scott Edwards was charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and unlawfully producing cannabis marijuana.

The Crown alleged that Pino removed a box containing 50 marijuana clone plants from the residence and placed it in her vehicle.

Edwards was found inside the residence during the execution of a search warrant.

Pino claimed she believed the box contained groceries and was unaware of its contents.

Edwards' defence was that the Crown failed to prove he was party to the grow operation enterprise or in possession of the marijuana.

The court found Pino guilty as charged, rejecting her testimony as incredible and finding she had knowledge and control of the marijuana for trafficking purposes.

The court acquitted Edwards, finding insufficient evidence to prove he exercised control over the grow operation or possessed the marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held that under s. 16(3) of the Canada Evidence Act, an adult witness with mental disabilities is competent if they can communicate evidence and promise to tell the truth.

Requiring abstract understanding of truth-telling obligations was rejected.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.