ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 10-30345
DATE: 2014/09/18

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

– and –

HIVA ALIZADEH
Applicant

– and –

MISBAHUDDIN AHMED
Applicant

Martha Devlin, Q.C., for the Crown

Matthew C. Webber and Leonardo Russomanno, for the Applicant

Mark Ertel, for the Applicant

HEARD: January 31, February 4, and 5, 2014 (Ottawa)

REASONS FOR Decision on the Garofoli Application

C. mckinnon j.

Background

[1] Hiva Alizadeh and Misbahuddin Ahmed are charged with conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity, knowingly participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group, and possession of an explosive substance with intent to endanger life or cause serious damage to property.

[2] Mr. Alizadeh brought a Garofoli application to have certain search warrants set aside as having been obtained illegally, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. On February 5, 2014, I denied the application with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

[3] The warrants in question were issued by Noel J. of the Federal Court of Canada. The warrants were obtained pursuant to ss. 12 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. C-23 (CSIS Act). CSIS obtained information about the applicant by executing the warrants.

[4] CSIS then disclosed some of the information obtained from the CSIS warrants to the RCMP by way of Disclosure Letters and Advisory Letters. This information subsequently formed the basis of an RCMP affidavit that the RCMP used to obtain warrants from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice pursuant to Part VI of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. In executing the RCMP warrants, the RCMP obtained information that comprises the entirety of the Crown’s criminal case against the accused.

[5] The parties agreed that the lawfulness of the RCMP warrants is premised on the lawfulness of the CSIS warrants; if the CSIS warrants were obtained unconstitutionally, then the RCMP warrants are also unconstitutional. As a result, the applicant has standing to challenge the CSIS warrants before me in the course of the criminal proceedings against him.

[6] In previous related applications, I granted the applicant disclosure of CSIS records. I also granted the applicant the right to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on one specific point. My reasons for these decisions are cited as R. v. Alizadeh, 2013 ONSC 5417, 2013 ONSC 7540, 2014 ONSC 206 and 2014 ONSC 1624.

[7] As a result of the production order, it was revealed that the affiant had made an inaccurate statement concerning whether Mr. Awso Peshdary, one of the targets of the CSIS investigation, was “actively” looking for a gun. In cross-examination on this point, the affiant agreed that the statement that Mr. Peshdary was “actively” looking for a gun could be misinterpreted, given the context in which the statement was made. He testified that he should have stated that Mr. Peshdary “had not abandoned his intention to acquire a gun.” I was satisfied that certain contradictory information produced following a hearing in the Federal Court was not known to the affiant. That information suggested that Mr. Peshdary had abandoned his intention to acquire a gun. I found the affiant to be a credible witness, and that the inaccurate statement was not made in bad faith.

[8] Notwithstanding the evidence of the affiant, Ms. Devlin on behalf of the Crown agreed that for the purposes of argument on the Garofoli application, she was willing to excise from the affidavit the statement that Mr. Peshdary was “actively looking for sources on the street that could sell him a gun.” I agree that in light of the contradictory information not known to the affiant, the reference to the gun should be excised from the affidavit.

Facts

[9] The CSIS warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit sworn by a CSIS Intelligence Officer whose identity has been redacted. The un-redacted portions of the affidavit indicate the affiant’s almost complete reliance on a human source, “Source 2.” In particular, Source 2 relays conversations that he had with Mr. Peshdary. In those conversations, Mr. Peshdary revealed incriminating information about himself and about Mr. Alizadeh. Source 2 obtained all of his information concerning Mr. Alizadeh from Mr. Peshdary.

[10] The assessment of Source 2’s reliability is detailed in Exhibit B of the affidavit. Source 2 is described as a leader in the Ottawa community and as a core member of the same local Muslim youth group with which Mr. Peshdary was involved. Source 2 was motivated to disclose the information by a strong ideological belief against extremism and the protection of the Muslim identity in Canada. In addition, Source 2 received financial remuneration, both for the information he provided and as reimbursement for his expenses. Source 2 did not have a criminal record. To the best of the affiant’s knowledge, Source 2 had never been a subject of interest to Canadian law enforcement agencies.

[11] CSIS had Source 2 undergo a polygraph test. The information that Source 2 provided was determined to be truthful. While the polygraph results provides evidence that Source 2 was truthful about the conversations he had with Mr. Peshdary, it was acknowledged in the affidavit that the polygraph results in no way addressed whether the information that Mr. Peshdary relayed to Source 2 was accurate or truthful.

[12] Source 2, through conversations with Mr. Peshdary, obtained information concerning Mr. Peshdary’s and Mr. Alizadeh’s involvement with international Islamist terrorism.

[13] Mr. Peshdary told Source 2 that he considered Mr. Alizadeh to be someone who shared his beliefs and aspirations for jihad. He told Source 2 that Mr. Alizadeh had recently been to Afghanistan, although Mr. Alizadeh had told CSIS and most of his family that he was in Kurdistan visiting relatives. While in Afghanistan, Mr. Alizadeh had undergone mujahideen training, pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar, and had been instructed to return to Canada to recruit individuals to conduct attacks within Canada and the West. Furthermore, Mr. Alizadeh had travelled to Afghanistan once prior to this most recent trip. During the later of his visit, he spent three to four months in Afghanistan, where he underwent weapons training and participated in fighting against American troops.

[14] Mr. Peshdary also told Source 2 that while Mr. Alizadeh was overseas, Mr. Peshdary eagerly anticipated Mr. Alizadeh’s return, as he believed that Mr. Alizadeh would possess answers to logistical questions which would ultimately assist in the facilitation of Mr. Peshdary’s travel for jihad.

[15] Mr. Peshdary told Source 2 that before Mr. Alizadeh disclosed the information concerning his recent training in Afghanistan to Mr. Peshdary, he asked Mr. Peshdary to remove the battery from his cell phone. Mr. Alizadeh then stressed the importance of confidentiality, emphasizing that he was only disclosing the information to Mr. Peshdary. Mr. Peshdary also said that at one point, when he expressed concern to Mr. Alizadeh regarding potential trouble or attention from Canadian authorities, Mr. Alizadeh “calmly” advised Mr. Peshdary that, due to potential scrutiny on the part of Canadian authorities, they must remain diligent and careful. Mr. Alizadeh then explained that when he returned from his trip and was detained and interviewed by CSIS, he told the CSIS authorities that he had been visiting his relatives in Kurdistan.

[16] Mr. Peshdary informed Source 2 that Mr. Alizadeh had expressed an interest in developing a network of individuals whom he could send for training and call upon to conduct attacks when the time was right. Mr. Peshdary agreed to assist Mr. Alizadeh in his identification and recruitment of these individuals and Mr. Peshdary understood that there might be a need to conduct attacks in the West. Mr. Peshdary also said that Mr. Alizadeh was searching for bomb-making materials and had asked Mr. Peshdary to “assist him in gaining access to weapons and C-4 explosives”.

[17] Mr. Peshdary told Source 2 that he had agreed to assist Mr. Alizadeh with his recruitment campaign, and Mr. Alizadeh told Mr. Peshdary that he would help pave the way for Mr. Peshdary to travel for jihad. Mr. Alizadeh told Mr. Peshdary that those interested in assisting in the “cause” must first be willing to pledge allegiance, and that if a recruit failed to follow orders he would be immediately killed.

[18] Mr. Peshdary said that in August 2009, Mr. Alizadeh told him that if he wanted to assist Mr. Alizadeh, he would have to pledge allegiance directly to Mr. Alizadeh. Since Mr. Alizadeh had pledged allegiance directly to the leadership chain of Osama Bin Laden, if Mr. Peshdary pledged allegiance to Mr. Alizadeh, he would be pledging allegiance to Osama Bin Laden as well. Mr. Alizadeh said that he was qualified to give orders in Canada. Once Mr. Peshdary pledged allegiance, he would have to follow Mr. Alizadeh’s orders as, ultimately, they should be considered the orders of Osama Bin Laden. Mr. Peshdary asked Mr. Alizadeh if he wanted him to pledge allegiance. Mr. Alizadeh smiled at Mr. Peshdary and said “It is up to you.”

[19] Mr. Peshdary said that in September 2009, Mr. Alizadeh told Mr. Peshdary that he would be willing to work with, or under, any local individual or group if it would mean advancing the goal of conducting an attack in Ottawa or Canada. Mr. Alizadeh told Mr. Peshdary “I need you to be my guy here” and “I was sent back to make an attack here.” He also affirmed to Mr. Peshdary that “I want to recruit people for the cause,” and that “people over there want us to hit from within.”

[20] Finally, Mr. Peshdary told Source 2 that Mr. Alizadeh was from Winnipeg and that he told Mr. Peshdary that he has a “solid group of brothers back in Winnipeg.” Mr. Peshdary told Source 2 that Mr. Alizadeh did not know anyone in Ottawa. Mr. Peshdary speculated that Mr. Alizadeh may have chosen to come to Ottawa either because of a disagreement with someone in Winnipeg, or because there were better targets in Ottawa.

[21] In addition to the information provided by Source 2, the affiant refers to some other sources of information, which either provided new information or corroborated aspects of Source 2’s information concerning Mr. Alizadeh. These include: Mr. Alizadeh’s and Mr. Peshdary’s immigration statuses, which were obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada; Mr. Alizadeh’s and Mr. Peshdary’s addresses, which were determined either through physical surveillance, verifications through the Canadian Police Information Centre, or open information; and details unveiled during interviews CSIS had with Mr. Peshdary, although Mr. Alizadeh was not discussed during those interviews.

[22] The affiant also referred to an interview that CSIS conducted with Mr. Alizadeh in March 2007. The interview concerned Mr. Alizadeh’s contact with a person of interest to CSIS. Mr. Alizadeh stated that he believed that it is okay to have martyrdom or beheading videos on a website and it is up to the viewer to decide if they believe in them or not. He stated that he also believed in the right to defend oneself but did not believe in using violence if it is not justified.

[23] The affiant referred to an interview between CSIS and Mr. Alizadeh that occurred at the Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport in Montreal on July 14, 2009. At that time, Mr. Alizadeh had just returned from Iran. Mr. Alizadeh said that he had spent four months in Iran, visiting family, as the winter months in Winnipeg made him depressed.

The Applicable Law

Standard of Review and Procedure

[24] The applicant makes a facial and a sub-facial challenge to the warrant. With respect to the facial challenge, the court must examine the Information to Obtain (“ITO”) the warrant and determine whether, on the face of the information disclosed therein, the authorizing judge could have issued the warrant (R v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65; R v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72).

[25] With respect to the sub-facial challenge, the court must consider the record before the authorizing judge subject to the appropriate excisions or amplifications. Excision is a remedy granted to an accused person when the accused can show that evidence relied on to justify a search was obtained in breach of the Charter or is otherwise erroneous. Amplification is the opposite of excision; the accused, or in limited circumstances, the Crown, provides additional information to expand on the information in the ITO which is presented to the authorizing judge (R v. Van Diep, 2013 BCSC 1435 at paras. 30-31). While the accused may lead evidence to generally support the challenge to the ITO, the Crown is restricted to the use of evidence that corrects good faith errors of the police in preparing the ITO. Amplification evidence cannot be led by the Crown to correct deliberate attempts to mislead the authorizing judge. Furthermore, the evidence relied on to amplify the record must be evidence that was available to the investigators at the time the ITO was sworn, not information obtained later (Sadikov at para. 85).

[26] While the record on a sub-facial review may be amplified, the scope of review is the same as for facial challenges. The task of a reviewing judge is to consider whether, on the record before the authorizing justice as amplified on the review, the authorizing justice could have issued the warrant (Araujo at para. 50; Sadikov at para. 38). The reviewing judge should “carefully consider whether sufficient reliable information remains in the amplified record, in other words, information that might reasonably be believed, on the basis of which the enabling warrant could have issued” (Sadikov at para. 38).

Requirements of the Enabling Statute

[27] The question is whether the enabling judge could have determined that the requirements of the enabling statute were made out on the face of the ITO or, in the case of the sub-facial challenge, on the record as excised and/or amplified on review. In this case, the enabling legislation is section 21 of the CSIS Act. The relevant portions read as follows:

21. (1) Where the Director or any employee designated by the Minister for the purpose believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16, the Director or employee may, after having obtained the approval of the Minister, make an application in accordance with subsection (2) to a judge for a warrant under this section.

(2) An application to a judge under subsection (1) shall be made in writing and be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant deposing to the following matters, namely,

(a) the facts relied on to justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16;

(b) that other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or why it appears that they are unlikely to succeed, that the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation using only other investigative procedures or that without a warrant under this section it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada or the performance of the duties and functions under section 16 referred to in paragraph (a) would not be obtained…[Emphasis added.]

[28] The term “threats to the security of Canada” is defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act:

"threats to the security of Canada" means

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage.

(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,

(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state, and

(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,

but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).

[29] There are, therefore, two main requirements for the issuance of a warrant under s. 21. First, the affidavit must demonstrate, on reasonable grounds, the existence of a threat to the security of Canada. Second, the affidavit must demonstrate necessity for the warrant.

[30] The statutory criteria must be established on a standard of reasonable and probable grounds: Atwal v. Canada, 1987 8975 (FCA), [1988] 1 F.C. 107 at para. 36; Garofoli at paras. 53-54. When a police informant is the source of the information, the issuing justice must be satisfied as to the reliability of the tip, taking into account the “totality of the circumstances”: Garofoli at para. 68. In Garofoli, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the following factors should be taken into account in assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip:

(i) Hearsay statements of an informant can provide reasonable and probable grounds to justify a search. However, evidence of a tip from an informer, by itself, is insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

(ii) The reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to "the totality of the circumstances". There is no formulaic test as to what this entails. Rather, the court must look to a variety of factors including:

(a) the degree of detail of the "tip";

(b) the informer's source of knowledge;

(c) indicia of the informer's reliability such as past performance or confirmation from other investigative sources.

(iii) The results of the search cannot, ex post facto, provide evidence of reliability of the information [para. 68].

Issues and Analysis

[31] Mr. Webber, on behalf of Mr. Alizadeh, submits that on its face, the ITO could not establish the requirements of s. 21(2)(a), namely, that the facts relied on justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada.

[32] Second, he submits that on its face, the ITO could not establish the requirements of s. 21(2)(b) relied upon, namely, that without the warrant it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada would not be obtained.

[33] Third, he submits that on a sub-facial review, taking into account the amplified record, the ITO could not establish the requirements of s. 21(2)(b).

[34] In the course of earlier proceedings, Mr. Webber raised issues concerning deficiencies in the affidavit regarding the corroboration of Source 2 and Source 2’s compensation. In this application, Mr. Webber clarified that those issues are no longer being pursued. Mr. Webber also conceded that insofar as Mr. Peshdary was a target of the CSIS investigation, given the words directly attributed to him by Source 2, s. 21(2)(a) of the CSIS Act is satisfied with respect to Mr. Peshdary. Finally, as noted earlier, the parties agreed that the inaccurate statement regarding Mr. Peshdary actively searching for a gun should be excised. Despite this, Mr. Webber conceded that this issue has little or no bearing on whether or not the issuing justice could have issued the warrant.

A “threat to the security of Canada”

[35] Mr. Webber submits that the information in the ITO relied on to establish the fact that the warrant is required to investigate a threat to the security of Canada is not sufficiently reliable. In particular, he submits that in the circumstances, Mr. Peshdary, and not Source 2, is the true source of the information against Mr. Alizadeh. As such, CSIS ought to have conducted a reliability assessment of Mr. Peshdary, as is done for traditional sources or police informants.

[36] In my Addendum to Production Application #2, reported at 2014 ONSC 206, I considered the argument that Mr. Peshdary is a de facto source, such that a reliability assessment should have been conducted and disclosed in the ITO. I stated, at para. 11, that it is plain and obvious from the CSIS affidavit and the source documents produced that Mr. Peshdary was a target of the CSIS investigation, not a source whose reliability would be required to be assessed and disclosed in an ITO. Those comments apply equally to this application.

[37] Even if the caselaw concerning the reliability of police informants was relevant to Mr. Peshdary as a de facto source, the reliability of the information he provided would have been established on the face of the ITO. There are indicia of reliability in the statements made by Mr. Peshdary to Source 2. First, the statements made by Mr. Peshdary implicated both Mr. Alizadeh and Mr. Peshdary in the planning of very serious crimes. Statements made against one’s interest are more likely to be reliable, as is reflected by the exception for “statements against interest” in the law of hearsay and confessions. Second, the information provided was highly detailed. Third, some of the information was corroborated.

[38] I find that based on the totality of the affidavit there is sufficient reliable information in the ITO to establish that the warrant was required to investigate threats to the national security of Canada. It is clear that the issuing justice could have issued the warrant on this basis.

Necessity for the warrant

The Test

[39] Section 21(2)(b) of the CSIS Act requires that the ITO demonstrate that the warrant was necessary. In a previous decision cited at 2014 ONSC 1624, I referred to the three criteria set out in s. 21(2)(b) as “rubrics.” The ITO need not demonstrate that all three rubrics are met, but only that one of the three be satisfied. The affiant in this case relied only on the third rubric: that without a warrant under this section it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada would not be obtained.

[40] Mr. Webber repeated his argument made on a previous application that the necessity requirement in s. 21(2)(b) of the CSIS Act is analogous to the investigative necessity requirement of s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

[41] In Araujo, the Supreme Court interpreted the second method of proving necessity pursuant to s. 186(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, namely that “other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed.” It is this section that Mr. Webber argues is analogous to the requirement in the CSIS Act to show that information of importance with respect to the security of Canada would likely not be obtained without the warrant.

[42] Mr. Webber submits that the test for investigative necessity set out in Araujo should apply to the CSIS Act. In Araujo, the Supreme Court held, at para. 29, that “there must be, practically speaking, no other reasonable alternative method of investigation in the circumstances of the particular criminal inquiry.”

[43] I do not agree that the test set out in Araujo applies to the third rubric of the necessity criterion in s. 21(2)(b) of the CSIS Act. In my Reasons for Decision with Respect to an Application to Cross-Examine the CSIS Affiant, reported at 2014 ONSC 1624, I considered whether the test for investigative necessity as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Araujo should apply to s. 21(2)(b) of the CSIS Act. I held, at paras. 25-30, that in applying the spirit of Araujo, the third rubric of s. 21(2)(b) must be read as imposing some meaningful threshold reflecting the seriousness of the privacy interests at stake. However, it must be remembered that the purpose and scope of the CSIS Act differs from that of the Criminal Code. I determined that the likelihood of loss of important information with respect to the threat to the security of Canada is a legitimate and necessary ground upon which a justice can issue a warrant.

[44] I also noted that there are internal limitations found in the wording of this provision, namely, that the information must be “important” and that there must be a “likelihood” that the information would not otherwise be obtained. I held that these words must be interpreted in a meaningful way so as to protect the important privacy interests of Canadian citizens and residents.

[45] For these reasons, the test in Araujo does not apply to the third branch of the necessity requirements in the CSIS Act. The ITO need not establish that there are no other reasonable means of investigation. So long as it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada would not be obtained without the warrant, the statutory criterion will be satisfied.

Facial Challenge to the Necessity Criterion

[46] Mr. Webber submits that on its face, the ITO fails to establish that it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada would not be obtained without the warrant. I disagree.

[47] The affiant explains the necessity for the warrant at paras. 50-57, in which the affiant states that the interception of communications would serve to corroborate the information relayed by Source 2, provide unique insight into contacts, tasking, and priorities of persons engaged in threat-related activities, and provide access to spontaneous, candid and incisive information. The affiant states that this information is not readily available through other investigative means.

[48] Mr. Webber submits that these statements amount only to assertions that a wiretap is the most efficacious way of getting the information, and not that it is the only way to get the information. However, it seems clear to me that the affidavit as a whole demonstrates that it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada would not be obtained without the warrant. In addition to the explanations provided by the affiant, the information from Source 2 establishes that Mr. Alizadeh was surveillance-conscious, and was careful in who he trusted and how much information he disclosed. Before discussing his trip to Afghanistan with Mr. Peshdary, Mr. Alizadeh asked Mr. Peshdary to remove the battery from his cell phone. Furthermore, when Mr. Peshdary expressed concern regarding potential trouble or attention from Canadian authorities, Mr. Alizadeh calmly advised Mr. Peshdary that, due to potential scrutiny on the part of Canadian authorities, they must remain diligent and careful.

[49] Furthermore, the affidavit disclosed that Mr. Alizadeh was planning to recruit new individuals in Ottawa to assist his cause, and that he had a sympathetic group of “brothers” in Winnipeg. Information concerning his recruitment activities and the persons involved would not likely have been obtained by employing the services of Source 2 more extensively. This is important information with respect to a threat to the security of Canada, given the serious nature of his recruitment plans and Mr. Alizadeh’s stated intention to recruit people to conduct attacks within Canada.

Conclusion on the Facial Challenge

[50] I find that on the face of the ITO, there was sufficient reliable information to justify the issuing justice’s decision to issue the warrant. On these facts, I find not only that the justice could have issued the warrant, but also that this was the correct decision.

Sub-Facial Challenge to the Necessity Criterion

[51] For the purposes of the sub-facial challenge, the applicant also relies on some additional information made available from my previous production order. This additional information is a CSIS record indicating that Source 2 advised CSIS that Mr. Alizadeh would be interested in meeting with Source 2 and that Source 2 would be willing to become part of Mr. Alizadeh’s network, should the opportunity arise. The report also notes that while Source 2 felt uncomfortable with meeting Mr. Alizadeh, he understood the potential threat to Canada’s public safety and remained dedicated to assisting CSIS. The evidence discloses that a meeting between Source 2 and Mr. Alizadeh did eventually occur.

[52] Mr. Webber argues that the amplified record discloses that an investigative alternative to obtaining the warrant existed, namely, a meeting between Mr. Alizadeh and Source 2. In response to this argument, I adopt my observations at paras. 53 and 54 of my Reasons for Decision with Respect to an Application to Cross-Examine the CSIS Affiant, reported at 2014 ONSC 1624. I find that even if the possibility of and eventual occurrence of a meeting between Source 2 and Mr. Alizadeh had been disclosed to the issuing justice, this information would have been immaterial and the issuing justice both could have and should have issued the warrant.

Conclusion on the Sub-Facial Challenge

[53] For these reasons, I find that the issuing justice could have issued the warrant, even in light of the amplified record.

Disposition

[54] For the reasons stated above, the application is denied.

Mr. Justice C. McKinnon

Originally released with publication ban: March 25, 2014

Released without publication ban: September 18, 2014

COURT FILE NO.: 10-30345
DATE: 2014/09/18

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

– and –

HIVA ALIZADEH
Applicant

– and –

MISBAHUDDIN AHMED
Applicant

REASONS FOR decision
on the garofoli application

C. MCKINNON J.

Originally released with publication ban: March 25, 2014

Released without publication ban: September 18, 2014