Tina Kaye

The applicant purchased a property in 2018 with title held 99% in his name and 1% in the names of the respondents (the parents of his fiancée).

The applicant paid the entire down payment of $430,000 and deposit of $20,000.

The respondents co-signed the mortgage and paid the monthly mortgage payments, while the applicant paid property taxes, utilities, and insurance.

After the relationship between the applicant and the respondent's daughter ended in 2020, the property was sold in 2022.

The respondents claimed either an agreement existed for a 50/50 split of proceeds or that unjust enrichment applied.

The court found no agreement existed and that unjust enrichment did not apply, ordering the proceeds to be distributed according to title (99% to the applicant, 1% to the respondents).

The appellants appealed decisions of the Capital Markets Tribunal finding they engaged in a course of conduct that perpetrated a fraud on investors by raising funds for a specific real estate project and diverting them for other purposes.

The Tribunal ordered administrative fines, disgorgement, costs, and permanent market bans with a limited carve-out.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law in the Tribunal's liability findings or sanctions.

The Applicants sought the appointment of a receiver over several respondent companies, including those jointly owned and those solely controlled by one of the individual respondents, due to alleged misappropriation of funds, mortgage defaults, and corporate oppression.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory bases for appointing a receiver (Courts of Justice Act, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Business Corporations Act) were not met.

The court determined there was no underlying action for interlocutory relief, no irreparable harm shown given the sufficient value of the secured property, and the request for relief against solely-owned companies was brought too late.

The applicant developer brought a motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce a purported settlement agreement regarding a land dispute that was blocking a subdivision development.

The applicant argued that the parties had agreed on the essential terms of a land sale in exchange for the withdrawal of the respondents' objection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no mutual intention to be bound because several terms proposed by the respondents in a counteroffer, including the closing date, right of assignment, and registration of the agreement, were never accepted by the applicant.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendants, Paul Kennedy and Leanne Kennedy, to set aside a prior judgment.

The court found the defendants' motion to be vexatious, based on manipulation of facts, regurgitation of previously rejected issues, and defiance of court orders.

Citing a long history of such litigation conduct, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, emphasizing that such costs serve as a chastisement and deterrent for improper and unnecessary litigation.

The court ordered the Kennedys to pay $70,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The Kennedys (Defendants) brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside a default judgment rendered nearly 11 years prior, arguing that their former representative, Trent Bridger, sabotaged their defense through misrepresentation and that the damages calculation was faulty due to the Plaintiffs' incomplete disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Kennedys were aware of Bridger's communications, that Justice Frank had already rejected the "stolen records" excuse, and that the significant delay in bringing the motion was unjustified.

The court also held that the Kennedys could not now demand a full accounting given their persistent failure to comply with prior disclosure orders.

Following a finding that the respondents perpetrated a securities fraud by misapplying $10 million in investor funds raised for a real estate project, the Capital Markets Tribunal determined the appropriate sanctions.

The Tribunal ordered permanent market participation bans with a limited trading carve-out for the individual respondent, disgorgement of $7.63 million, administrative penalties of $500,000 per respondent, and costs of $206,769.34.

The respondents raised $10 million from investors through secured debentures, representing that the funds would be used exclusively to finance a specific real estate project (Bayview Creek).

Instead, the respondents diverted approximately $3.39 million of the proceeds back to the corporate respondent and to other real estate projects controlled by the individual respondent.

The Capital Markets Tribunal found that the respondents engaged in a course of conduct that they knew perpetrated a fraud on investors, contrary to s. 126.1(1)(b) of the Securities Act.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for defamation and misfeasance in public office, the successful defendants sought their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court applied the principles from Apotex and Rule 57.01, noting the serious allegations made, the complexity of the 10-year litigation, and the plaintiff's reasonable expectations.

The court found the defendants' reduced costs requests to be fair and reasonable, ordering the plaintiff to pay $280,000 to one defendant and $250,000 to the remaining defendants.

The plaintiff, a general surgeon, sued the hospital, its chief executive officer, and its chief of staff for defamation and misfeasance in public office after losing his hospital privileges.

The plaintiff alleged that the chief of staff defamed him in a letter and in oral statements, and that the defendants acted in bad faith to oust him from the hospital.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the oral defamatory statements were not proven and that the letter was protected by qualified privilege.

The court held it had jurisdiction to hear the misfeasance claim but dismissed it, finding no evidence of unlawful acts, malice, or improper purpose by the defendants.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellants appealed an associate judge's order dismissing their action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The delay was primarily caused by the appellants' trial counsel inadvertently missing the mandatory mediation requirement, which prevented the filing of the trial record before the five-year deadline.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the associate judge committed palpable and overriding error by treating the missed mediation as a mere technical misstep and failing to consider the overall justice of the case, especially given the lack of prejudice to the respondents and the fact that the action was brought to enforce a $12,000,000 default judgment.

A case conference was held after a scheduled 10-day trial was adjourned due to a lack of judicial resources.

The defendant hospital sought leave to bring motions for partial summary judgment and security for costs.

The court denied leave for the summary judgment motion, noting it should have been brought before the action was set down for trial, and directed that any motion for security for costs proceed through regular channels rather than on an urgent basis.

The court also ordered further discovery on the plaintiff's loss of income claim and directed counsel to select a trial date in 2022, emphasizing the unacceptability of further delaying a 10-year-old case.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to extend the deadline for setting the action down for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014 to enforce a 2013 default judgment, had seen no steps taken by the plaintiffs for 30 months between 2016 and 2019.

Applying the conjunctive test for delay, the Master found that while the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice, the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay.

The action was dismissed for delay.

Hasibullah Sakhiyar, charged with firearm offences, applied for a review of a bail decision that detained him in custody.

The application was a reverse onus bail hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the bail justice did not err in law by failing to apply the "ladder principle" (which is inapplicable to reverse onus hearings), that the original decision was not clearly inappropriate in its weighting of detention grounds, and that the proposed new release plan did not constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol and driving impaired on December 12, 2014, with the information sworn on December 30, 2014.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial was 24.5 months.

After deducting defence delay totalling 12.5 months, the net delay was 12 months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the net delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge applied a different standard of scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant compared to his own testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the stringent standard for establishing uneven scrutiny was not met and that the trial judge's findings were available on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand and obstructing a peace officer by falsely identifying himself.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding no breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct, including a late disclosure motion and shifting defence strategy, and reasonably concluded that the overall delay did not violate the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, as police attempted to contact counsel of choice and the accused was permitted to consult duty counsel while awaiting a potential return call.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an “over 80” impaired driving charge following the exclusion of breath sample evidence for an alleged breach of the accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge held that police were required to permit the detainee to re-consult counsel after he repeatedly requested to speak with his lawyer during the breath testing process, despite already speaking with duty counsel.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to make positive factual findings establishing an objectively observable change in circumstances required under the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy in R v. Sinclair, R v. McCrimmon, and R v. Willier.

The court found there was no change in jeopardy and no objective indication the detainee misunderstood his rights.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The defendant sought Charter relief following his arrest for care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs, possession of Ketamine, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under s. 9 of the Charter, the delay in informing him of the reasons for arrest under s. 10(a), and the legality of a Level 3 strip search conducted at the police station under s. 8.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the s. 10(a) delay was brief and non-prejudicial, the strip search violated s. 8 rights as it lacked the requisite justification under the Golden test.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, finding that no remedy was appropriate in the circumstances.