Margaret Leighton

The applicant sought judicial review of a Social Benefits Tribunal decision that upheld the termination of her ODSP benefits and established an overpayment of over $22,000 due to undisclosed assets.

The applicant had a statutory right to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Divisional Court but failed to do so, instead bringing an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review is a discretionary remedy not available where an adequate alternative remedy exists, and the applicant demonstrated no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory appeal process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which summarily dismissed his discrimination complaint against the respondent housing corporation regarding his eviction for rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it to be an abuse of process as the applicant sought to relitigate his employment termination and eviction, which had already been settled or decided.

The court held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and entitled to deference.

The applicant was ordered to pay costs of $2,644.55 and barred from bringing further applications without paying outstanding costs and obtaining leave.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario refusing to dismiss a human rights application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent had alleged racial profiling during a traffic stop, an issue previously raised and dismissed in a criminal proceeding before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court found exceptional circumstances to review the interlocutory decision and held that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable.

The Tribunal failed to properly apply the principles of issue estoppel and fairness as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, relying instead on generalized public policy concerns rather than a case-specific analysis.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a judge's decision refusing to strike the respondent's documents or order costs and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent acted reasonably in filing its documents one day after the applicant filed his Certificate of Perfection, causing no prejudice.

The court also noted that damages cannot be ordered in a judicial review application and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The self-represented applicant appeared before the Divisional Court for a judicial review application and indicated he was unwell.

Although he did not request an adjournment and accused the panel of bias, the court decided to adjourn the matter to a fixed date to ensure the applicant was capable of fully presenting his arguments.

The respondent's request to proceed was denied.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his complaint that s. 10(5) of the Coroners Act discriminates against migrant farm workers by denying them mandatory inquests into workplace deaths, a benefit extended to mining and construction workers.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal reasonably applied the two-step Kapp test for discrimination and reasonably concluded that the exclusion of migrant farm workers from mandatory inquests did not violate s. 1 of the Human Rights Code, given their lower risk of fatal workplace injury and lesser variety of hazards compared to construction and mining workers.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's responding materials on a judicial review application, arguing they were filed outside the 30-day time limit prescribed by Rule 68.04(4).

The respondent had waited to file its materials until the applicant perfected his application, acting on advice from the Divisional Court office.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the respondent's conduct was reasonable, responsible, and in good faith, and that the applicant suffered no prejudice from the delay.

The appellant School Board appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's finding that it failed to accommodate the respondent employee's disability and ordering her reinstatement.

The employee had developed a psychiatric impairment due to the stress of her position and was unable to return to her previous role.

The Tribunal found that the School Board failed to accommodate her by not placing her in available alternative positions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decisions on both liability and the remedy of reinstatement were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her former co-operative housing provider, its lawyers, a court employee, and a Landlord and Tenant Board member.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an attempt to re-litigate her eviction and rent subsidy proceedings, and that the claims against the lawyers, court employee, and Board member were bound to fail due to lack of duty of care and statutory immunity.

Following a judicial review application where the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Child and Family Services Review Board, the parties sought costs against the tribunal for both the tribunal hearing and the judicial review.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs for the proceeding before the administrative tribunal.

Furthermore, the court declined to award costs of the judicial review application against the tribunal, finding its participation was not adversarial and its conduct did not rise to the exceptional level required to justify such an award.

The self-represented parties' alternative claim for costs against the children's aid society was also dismissed as they were unsuccessful in the application.

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The applicant, a teacher whose employment was terminated after unsatisfactory performance evaluations, sought judicial review of several decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The HRTO had dismissed his numerous complaints against his former employer, his union, various legal counsel, and several administrative bodies, finding no evidence of discrimination based on race or colour.

The HRTO also declared him a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found no error in the HRTO's decisions, noting that the applicant failed to establish any link between his dismissal or the subsequent administrative decisions and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The applicant, a young African-Canadian man, filed a human rights complaint alleging racial profiling after being stopped by police.

The Commission and the police settled the complaint, agreeing to a limited data collection project, but the applicant sought broader systemic remedies, including data collection for pedestrian stops.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the applicant's request without a full hearing, deferring to the settlement and finding it lacked jurisdiction to order remedies for pedestrian stops.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, holding that while the summary process was procedurally fair, the Tribunal's conclusions on jurisdiction and its complete deference to the Commission's settlement were unreasonable.

The applicants sought judicial review of interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which declined to dismiss human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicants argued that prior proceedings under the Police Services Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act should bar the human rights complaints based on issue estoppel and finality principles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Tribunal reasonably applied the Supreme Court's fairness principles from Penner to conclude that it would be unfair to dismiss the human rights applications, given the different purposes, lack of financial stakes, and statutory contexts of the prior proceedings.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against three Muslim employees by requiring them to taste pork, failing to accommodate religious holidays, and engaging in reprisals.

The applicants argued the Tribunal made unreasonable findings of fact, erred in its treatment of s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, and improperly ignored unsworn willsay statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's fact-finding was reasonable, the s. 45.1 argument was not raised before the Tribunal, and willsay statements of uncalled witnesses are not evidence.

The applicants, suppression firefighters, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed their age discrimination applications.

The applicants challenged the mandatory retirement age of 60, arguing the employer failed to accommodate them by not engaging in individualized testing for cardiac risk.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably relied on established precedent that mandatory retirement for firefighters is a bona fide occupational requirement, and that the applicants failed to provide the necessary individualized medical evidence of extremely low cardiac risk to trigger the narrow exception for accommodation.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding it discriminated against an employee by failing to accommodate her disability and ordering her reinstatement with damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions on liability and remedy were reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination and harassment.

The complaint arose from sexist blog posts made by a union president during a labour dispute.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the blog posts were not made 'in the workplace' and that the Tribunal appropriately considered the union president's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association when determining the posts did not constitute discrimination with respect to employment.

The applicant children's aid society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had overturned the society's refusal of an adoption plan proposed by the children's paternal aunt and uncle, who resided in another province, and ordered the children placed with them primarily to preserve their native cultural identity.

The society argued the decision was unreasonable as it ignored the children's strong attachment to their foster parents of three and a half years and the oldest child's explicit wish to remain.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Board made palpable and overriding errors by giving undue weight to the cultural heritage factor while ignoring the children's overall best interests, stability, and the negative assessments of the proposed adoptive home.

The court quashed the Board's decision and reinstated the society's approval of the foster parents' adoption plan.