Sexual abuse

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in writing for a consent judgment approving a proposed settlement on behalf of a minor who was allegedly bullied and sexually abused by a classmate.

The court declined to approve the settlement, citing non-compliance with Rule 7.08, discrepancies between the settlement amounts in the release and the draft judgment, insufficient evidence regarding the minor's prognosis, and a lack of justification for deviating from the presumptive requirement to pay settlement funds into court.

The court also directed counsel to address whether a sealing order should be granted to protect the minor's identity.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse, arguing the claim was barred by a prior settlement and consent order in Family Court.

The plaintiff argued she was a party under disability at the time and the settlement did not comply with Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prior settlement was not approved by a judge as required by Rule 7.08, was improvident, and lacked proper supporting materials.

The court held that strict compliance with Rule 7.08 is necessary to protect parties under disability, and therefore the prior order did not bind the plaintiff or bar her action.

The defendant Archdiocese moved to strike two paragraphs of the plaintiff's statement of claim, arguing they improperly pleaded evidence and similar facts regarding the abuser's conduct toward another victim.

The court found that pleading the history of charges and convictions was not pleading evidence, but rather material facts relevant to the institutional defendant's alleged failure to prevent abuse.

The court also held that pleading similar facts did not add undue complexity.

The motion was dismissed, save for a few words in one paragraph that improperly pleaded argument.

The applicant father brought an emergency motion to enforce an existing access order after the respondent mother arbitrarily withheld the child based on unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse.

The court found the mother's actions were motivated by spite and undermined the parenting order.

The court granted the father's motion, ordered the enforcement of the existing parenting order, dismissed the mother's emergency motion, and awarded costs to the father.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children, aged 7 and 2, following allegations that the mother's former partner sexually abused the 7-year-old.

The mother and paternal grandmother opposed the motion, seeking the children's return to their care.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm if returned to the mother or placed with the paternal grandmother, citing their failure to protect the children and abide by previous supervision conditions.

The court ordered the children to remain in the temporary care of the Society, with access at the Society's discretion.

The mother brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the children's aid society's protection application regarding her infant child.

The society alleged the child was in need of protection due to the father's history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and a prior judicial finding that he likely sexually abused another child.

The court found no triable issue regarding physical or emotional harm, as the mother had adequately cared for the child.

However, applying the cautionary approach to summary judgment in child protection matters, the court concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the mother could protect the child from the risk of sexual harm posed by the father.

The motion was dismissed.

The representative plaintiffs in three related class actions concerning the employment status of major junior hockey players sought approval of a $30 million settlement.

The court declined to approve the settlement because of an eleventh-hour objection raising concerns that the standard form release in the settlement agreement might bar class members from pursuing other existing class actions against the defendants for concussions, sexual abuse, and anti-competitive behaviour.

The court found that the release needed to be renegotiated to ensure it did not prejudice class members' rights in those other actions.

The Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the deemed custody of their maternal aunt.

The father opposed the motion, seeking a finding under a different subsection and an order placing the children in foster care.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the children in need of protection due to the father's substance abuse, domestic violence, and failure to protect them from sexual abuse.

The court gave significant weight to the children's strong and consistent wishes to remain with their aunt and ordered deemed custody to her, with access to the father and paternal grandparents subject to the children's wishes.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse and one count of threatening bodily harm against his daughter.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to use evidence of the appellant's prior convictions for assault of his wife to determine whether the wife testified out of fear, and second, that the trial judge's review of the appellant's evidence was brief and unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal found no error in either ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to commence an action using only his initials, alleging historical sexual abuse by a former teacher.

The plaintiff filed evidence from his treating psychotherapist indicating that using his real name would cause unnecessary harm and exacerbate his symptoms.

The defendants did not oppose the motion.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court granted the motion, finding that the salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle.

The appellant brought a claim under the Independent Assessment Process of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, alleging compensable sexual abuse under category SL1.4 when a nun touched his genitals over his clothing while he was a student at a residential school.

The Hearing Adjudicator denied the claim by erroneously importing a requirement of sexual intent not found in SL1.4.

All internal review levels upheld the denial, and the supervising judge at the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench ordered reconsideration.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal set aside that order, holding the supervising judge had exceeded his jurisdiction.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the reconsideration adjudicator's compensation award, finding that supervising courts have an ongoing duty to intervene where an adjudicator makes an unauthorized modification of the IAP, and that a gap in the IRSSA justified judicial intervention to ensure the appellant received the compensation bargained for.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the offences.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence from two adult nieces of the appellant who testified to similar inappropriate touching when they were children.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous admission of similar fact evidence due to collusion; (2) failure to properly address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and over-reliance on demeanour; (3) impermissible inference of guilt from rejection of the appellant's testimony; and (4) unsafe and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that four children were in need of protection due to the mother's continued relationship with a man who had sexually assaulted one of the children's friends and was alleged to have abused one of the children.

The mother provided sworn evidence that she had ended the relationship and had not exposed the children to the man for over a year.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the mother's intentions and actions raised a genuine issue of credibility that could only be resolved at trial.

A status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child who had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society.

The society sought a Crown wardship order with no access, while the respondent mother sought the return of the child to her care.

The court determined that a further order was necessary to protect the child and that the society had met its onus on a summary judgment motion to demonstrate there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court found that the mother had failed to address the risks to the child, had not consistently engaged with counselling services despite court orders, and had demonstrated significant ambivalence toward parenting through inconsistent access patterns.

The court granted the Crown wardship order with no access, finding that the mother had not satisfied the statutory test for access to a Crown ward.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's convictions for physical and sexual abuse and ordered a new trial.

The majority held that the appeal raised a question of law, namely whether the trial judge was required to self-instruct on the dangers of convicting based on frail complainant evidence from the distant past.

Agreeing with the dissenting Court of Appeal justice, the majority found no legal error by the trial judge.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored, with one justice dissenting on the basis that the dissent below raised only questions of fact or mixed fact and law, and thus the Court lacked jurisdiction.

A young person charged with six counts of sexual abuse against two male cousins applied for severance of the counts.

The accused sought to have three counts tried separately from the remaining three counts.

The court considered the criteria established in R v. Last, including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, complexity, and other factors.

The court found that a legal and factual nexus existed between the counts based on the age of the victims, their relationship to the accused, location, timeframe, and similarity of alleged acts.

The court rejected the severance application, finding that trying all counts together would be in the interests of justice and would not expose the accused to undue prejudice.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for Society wardship for six months.

The evidence demonstrated significant parent-child conflict, the child’s refusal to have contact with the mother, and prior sexual abuse occurring after the mother allowed an adult male to reside in the home and share a bedroom with the child.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the material facts were largely undisputed and the mother failed to rebut the Society’s prima facie case.

The court concluded that the child was in need of protection under ss. 37(2)(c), (f), and (g) of the CFSA and that continued Society care best served the child’s interests.

Summary judgment was granted and Society wardship ordered for six months.

A child protection society sought an order placing two children in the temporary care and custody of their mother subject to society supervision, with the father to have access at the society's discretion.

The father opposed the motion and sought the children be returned to both parents on a week-on, week-off basis.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children faced risk of sexual and emotional harm based on evidence of sexually inappropriate behaviour by both parents, the father's history of sexual violence convictions in Utah, allegations of domestic violence, and the father's lack of insight into protection concerns.

The court granted the society's motion, placing the children with the mother under supervision and ordering the father's access remain discretionary pending full disclosure of his criminal and therapeutic records.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of possession of a weapon dangerous.

On June 7, 2011, he robbed a bank teller and an innocent cyclist outside a bank while armed with a knife.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of approximately three years, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of time served with enhanced credit for pre-trial detention (19.5 months), suspended the passing of sentence, and placed the accused on probation for three years with conditions including psychiatric counselling, medication compliance, and no contact with victims.