Pamela Barron

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The moving party father brought a motion for contempt against the responding party mother, alleging she intentionally obstructed his parenting time with their two teenage children on four occasions.

The mother argued she was minimally involved in the exchanges and the children themselves refused to attend.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother engaged in deliberate conduct to breach the parenting order, noting that passivity does not equate to intentional obstruction.

The parties submitted a consent order on a Motion to Change child support and parenting terms.

The court required clarification on whether the order was made under the federal Divorce Act or provincial legislation, as the new Family Law Rules Form 25 requires the legislation to be specified.

After reviewing the historical pleadings and previous orders, the court determined that the original 2013 final order was made under the Family Law Act and Children's Law Reform Act because it predated the divorce order.

The court amended the 2013 order nunc pro tunc to reflect this and signed the new consent order specifying the provincial legislation.

In a child protection trial, the father served a summons to compel the 12-year-old child to testify.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash the summons, supported by the applicant society and the mother.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that compelling the child to testify posed a significant risk of emotional harm and that the father's primary purpose was to impeach her credibility rather than prove material facts.

The court also ruled on the father's request to introduce the entirety of the child's police interview video, holding that only specific prior inconsistent statements relating to substantive issues, and not collateral facts, could be admitted.

In a child protection application, the applicant sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the child to child protection workers and a counsellor for the truth of their contents.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the threshold reliability of these hearsay statements.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court evaluated the circumstances under which the statements were made, including the child's spontaneity, the absence of leading questions, and the timing of the recordings.

The court found that the majority of the statements met the threshold reliability test and were admissible, with the exception of one response to a directive question.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding a previous default order made while the respondent was in pre-trial custody on criminal charges that were later dismissed.

The respondent sought to vary child support and vacate a restraining order, while the applicant sought to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant and impute income.

The court found the previously imputed income was unrealistically high given the respondent's circumstances, reducing the imputed income to $25,000 and child support to $200 per month.

The court declined to vacate the restraining order and dismissed the applicant's other requests, ordering strict compliance with existing disclosure and cost orders.

On competing interim motions in a custody dispute concerning a four‑year‑old child, the court considered whether to alter the existing parenting arrangements following a period during which the child had primarily resided with the father.

Applying the Children’s Law Reform Act and the principle that interim orders should generally preserve the status quo absent compelling evidence, the court examined stability, parental capacity, and recent changes in the mother’s circumstances.

Evidence included frequent moves by the mother, concerns about drug use, and the father’s stable home environment and childcare arrangements.

The court concluded that the child’s best interests were served by maintaining primary residence with the father while preserving meaningful parenting time for the mother.

Joint interim custody was ordered, with the father having decision‑making authority over health and education.

Following a family law motion concerning imputed income, child support, spousal expenses, and access terms, the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after being substantially successful.

The court considered the parties’ offers to settle, noting that the result was nearly identical to the respondent’s offers except for a lower imputed income amount.

Because the result did not equal or exceed the offers, the court declined substantial indemnity costs and instead awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also considered proportionality and the similarity between the parties’ legal bills.

Costs were ordered payable by the applicant to the respondent.

Following a motion regarding parenting time for an infant child, the court determined costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party father had sought a rapid progression to a 50/50 access schedule, while the responding mother sought a gradual increase in parenting time.

The court found the mother was largely successful on the motion because the ordered access schedule closely resembled her proposal.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, the complexity of the matter, and proportionality, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful party.