Judith Hupé

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa applied for an order placing a two-year-old Inuit child in extended society care with a view to adoption.

The mother struggled with long-standing addiction and mental health issues, lacked stable housing, and failed to consistently visit the child or engage with support services.

The father resided in Nunavut and was unable to care for the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm.

Applying the best interests factors under the CYFSA and the federal FNIM Act, the court ordered extended society care with a view to adoption, prioritizing placement with an Inuit family to maintain cultural continuity.

Access was granted to both parents at the Society's discretion.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking a final order granting joint decision-making responsibility of an Indigenous child to the mother and her former partner.

The father opposed the motion, arguing for shared decision-making and raising concerns about the child's exposure to her First Nations heritage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the proposed order was in the child's best interests, noting the history of domestic violence and the proposed caregivers' commitment to fostering the child's cultural identity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a six-month supervision order to return two children to the care of their mother, with scheduled contact for the father.

The mother and her new partner had taken significant steps to address addiction and child protection concerns, and the father, though unable to care for the children, supported their return to the mother.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the summary judgment, holding that returning the children to the mother and allowing contact with the father was in their best interests, particularly given their Indigenous heritage.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find the child in need of protection and to place her in extended Society care for the purpose of adoption.

The mother consented to the order, while the father opposed it.

The court found that the parents had a history of domestic violence and the father had not presented a viable plan of care.

Applying the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court concluded there was no genuine issue for trial, found the child in need of protection, and ordered her placed in extended care for adoption.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment in a status review application, seeking extended society care for three children and a supervision order for a fourth.

The respondent father had provided inconsistent evidence regarding whether the children identified as First Nations.

The court adjourned the motion, ordering the parties to provide further evidence clarifying the children's First Nations status and band identification, as this information is mandatory under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 before determining the appropriate disposition.

The children's aid society sought an order making a two-year-old child a Crown Ward.

The child was apprehended when the mother, who was fifteen at the time of birth, left her father's home and moved to a shelter.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's lack of parenting skills, failure to attend parenting programs, and the grandfather's interference with medical and childcare advice.

Finding no viable less intrusive options, the court ordered Crown Wardship without access for the mother or grandfather, concluding that access would not be meaningful or beneficial and could impair future adoption opportunities.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order of Crown wardship for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over two years.

The mother opposed the motion but filed no responding materials, while the father was noted in default.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing struggles with alcohol addiction and failure to complete recommended treatment programs.

The motion was granted, and Crown wardship was ordered with access provided to the mother on a regular basis, including attendance at cultural events.

The Children's Aid Society moved for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of two young children.

The parents were facing criminal charges based on allegations by an older sibling, which led to the children's apprehension.

The Society relied heavily on hearsay evidence from the older siblings and a foster parent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that summary judgment was not appropriate given the evidentiary deficiencies, the parents' inability to cross-examine the adult complainant, and the upcoming criminal trial.

The court ordered peremptory trial dates to be scheduled near the expiration of the statutory timeline for the children to be in care.

Child protection motion concerning the temporary care and custody of five children under the Child and Family Services Act.

The child protection agency sought an order placing the children in its temporary care for six months following allegations of domestic violence, physical discipline, and instability in the parental home.

The father opposed the motion and sought immediate placement of the children with him.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children would likely suffer physical or psychological harm if returned to the father and concluded that supervision orders would not sufficiently protect them.

The court maintained the children in the agency’s temporary care and appointed an independent psychologist to conduct a parental capacity assessment under s. 54 of the Act.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

Child protection motion concerning whether an individual previously declared the father of a child should be removed as a party after DNA testing established he was not the biological father.

The child protection agency sought to revoke the prior declaration of paternity and strike the individual from the proceeding under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the court accepted that the individual was not the biological father, it held he had been granted and exercised access to the child and therefore qualified as a “parent” within the meaning of s. 37(1)(e) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The evidence did not demonstrate that removing him from the proceeding would serve the child’s best interests or that any prejudice would arise from his continued participation.

The motion to strike him as a party was therefore dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to make a four-year-old child a permanent ward of the Crown.

The child's mother and father did not oppose the motion or present viable plans of care.

The paternal grandmother opposed the motion and presented a plan of care.

The court found that the grandmother had a long history of child protection involvement, lacked a relationship with the child, and failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the child's needs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered that the child be made a permanent Crown ward.

On a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the moving child protection agency sought permanent Crown wardship of two children who had been in foster care for an extended period.

The mother consented to the wardship, while the father sought custody or access and argued that factual disputes regarding his past involvement with the children required a trial.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the father had been largely absent from the children’s lives for several years and had not advanced a viable plan of care.

Considering the statutory time limits, the children’s need for permanency, and the father’s lack of meaningful involvement, the court determined the children were in need of protection and that Crown wardship was in their best interests.

Summary judgment was granted.

A child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act sought temporary care and custody of three children following their apprehension from the maternal grandmother’s home.

The society relied on concerns regarding unsafe home conditions, the continued presence of the grandmother’s adult son contrary to prior warnings, and developmental progress observed while the children were in foster care.

The court found the society met the statutory burden under s. 64(8) of the CFSA only in relation to the youngest child, whose health and developmental improvements and attachment in foster care demonstrated that remaining in care was in her best interests.

The evidence did not establish that the two older children’s best interests required continued placement in care, particularly given their lengthy residence with the grandmother and improvements to the home environment.

The court therefore ordered temporary care and custody of the youngest child to the society, while placing the two older children with the grandmother subject to supervision and conditions.