Sexual abuse

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts in a multi-count indictment involving allegations of physical and sexual abuse by parents against their children.

The court reviews the legal principles governing similar fact evidence, including the need for the Crown to clearly articulate the evidence, issues, and purposes for which such evidence is proffered, and the requirement that its probative value outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The court also considers the timing and form of the Crown's application, the potential for collusion or inadvertent tainting among witnesses, and the appropriate instructions to the trier of fact.

Ultimately, the court finds that the probative value of the similar fact evidence is high and the prejudice is low, granting the Crown's application to admit the evidence across counts.

The appellant, L.B., was convicted of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and physically assaulting his adopted son over a lengthy period while they were children in his care.

He received a global 10-year sentence, less 6 months for pre-trial custody and harsh detention conditions.

On appeal, L.B. challenged the consecutive nature of the sexual exploitation sentence and the overall length of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis or conclusions, and held that the sentence was fit and proportionate given the aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the unusually harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention (lockdowns and triple-bunking) as a mitigating factor, relying on fresh evidence.

The Crown did not oppose the admission of fresh evidence but asserted the original sentence was fit.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and found it warranted a two-month reduction in the appellant's sentence for sexual abuse offences committed against his stepdaughter.

The Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking protection findings and disposition orders for three children.

The eldest child, M.W.W., disclosed sexual abuse by her stepfather, C.M., who was a respondent and self-represented.

The motion addressed C.M.'s procedural challenges regarding the Society's affidavit of documents and the admissibility of M.W.W.'s hearsay evidence.

The court admitted the hearsay evidence under the R. v. Khan test, found M.W.W. in need of protection due to sexual abuse, and the younger children (M.M. and W.M.) at risk of sexual abuse.

Deemed custody was granted to the mother, with no parenting time for C.M. with M.W.W., and supervised parenting time with the younger children contingent on C.M. completing a sexual offender risk assessment.

The Crown brought a mid-trial application (voir dire) to determine the admissibility of observations made by S.O., an aunt/caregiver, regarding the behaviour of four child complainants (M., G., L., and H.).

These observations were made months after the children were removed from their parents' care and after the father's arrest.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to allow the court to draw common sense inferences confirming the children's accounts of abuse.

The defence opposed, arguing the observations lacked a temporal nexus to the alleged abuse, were inadmissible hearsay/expert evidence, and were not relevant as narrative.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the observations were inadmissible as they lacked a sufficient temporal connection to the alleged abuse and did not qualify as narrative evidence without expert testimony to establish a causal link.

This class action concerned historical sexual abuse perpetrated by Ralph Rowe, an Anglican priest and Scout leader, against Indigenous boys in remote communities.

The court approved a $13.25 million settlement, which included a unique trauma-informed claims process with two tracks (simplified Schedule A up to $140,000, and more rigorous Schedule B up to $350,000).

The settlement also provided for apologies from the Anglican Church of Canada and Scouts Canada, and funding for counselling.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class members, emphasizing the benefits of timely resolution and the innovative, claimant-centric claims protocol.

The plaintiff sought default judgment arising from allegations of sexual abuse and breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants from 1978 to 1983.

The defendants failed to participate in the litigation process, leading to an uncontested trial on liability and damages.

The court found the defendants liable for sexual battery and breach of fiduciary duty.

Damages were assessed for general and aggravated damages, future care costs, and past care costs.

The court applied the "crumbling skull" rule, reducing the damage award by 25% due to the plaintiff's pre-existing psychological conditions from prior abuse.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

This endorsement addresses the sole remaining issue in a family law trial: whether to impose a publication ban and a sealing order on the court file, and whether to dispense with notice to the media.

The underlying proceeding was a motion to change brought by the father, involving allegations of sexual abuse against the children by a third party.

The court applied the three-prerequisite test from Sherman Estate v. Donovan to the open court principle, finding that court openness posed a serious risk to the children's privacy and dignity due to the sensitive nature of the sexual abuse details.

The court concluded that a sealing order and publication ban were necessary and proportionate, outweighing the negative effects on the open court principle.

The court also exercised its discretion to dispense with the requirement to provide notice to the media, emphasizing the children's best interests.

The appellant, A.R., appealed a 20-year prison sentence for 30 offences of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse against five of their six children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence proportionate and fit, falling within the range for extensive child abuse cases with a sexual component.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's application of the totality principle, which involved imposing individual sentences that added up to a fit total, consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed the mandatory revocation of his registration for professional misconduct (sexual abuse of a patient, his eventual spouse).

The appeal challenged the Court of Appeal's prior decisions in Leering and Mussani, arguing that the "zero-tolerance" policy and mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code infringed sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that sexual abuse is established by the concurrence of a health professional-patient relationship and a sexual relationship, and that mandatory revocation does not violate Charter rights, as economic interests are not protected by sections 7 or 12, and the penalty is not cruel or unusual.

The court also clarified the narrow scope of the spousal exception.

This appeal and cross-appeal concerned an order from a Case Management Master regarding a claim of negligent police investigation and failure to warn of a sexual predator.

The primary issue on appeal was the scope of solicitor-client privilege, specifically whether information conveyed by a client to counsel for legal advice, even if the underlying facts are not privileged, is discoverable.

The court upheld the Master's rulings on all other points but found the Master erred in ordering disclosure of whether non-privileged evidence was provided to Crown counsel for an opinion, affirming that such communication is privileged.

The plaintiff, a former high school student, brought an action for damages against her former music teacher, Royce Galon Williamson, for sexual abuse, and against the Trillium Lakelands District School Board (the School Board) for vicarious liability and direct negligence/breach of fiduciary duty.

Williamson did not attend the trial, and his statement of defence was struck.

The court found Williamson liable for sexual assault, battery, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The School Board was found vicariously liable for Williamson's conduct and directly liable for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty due to its inadequate response to the plaintiff's disclosure, including failure to provide support and immediately remove Williamson from the school.

Damages were awarded for general and aggravated damages, loss of competitive advantage, past and future care expenses, and punitive damages against Williamson.

The applicants sought a stay of criminal proceedings for sexual abuse charges, arguing that significant pre-charge delay amounted to an abuse of process and violated their Charter rights (sections 7, 11(b), 11(d)).

The charges stemmed from investigations in 2002-2004 that were closed without charges, but re-opened in 2017-2018 based on new disclosures from complainants.

The court applied the three-stage test for abuse of process from Piccirilli, considering prejudice to a fair trial or the justice system's integrity, alternative remedies, and a balancing of interests.

The court found no state misconduct or intentional delay, and accepted that the 2018 charges were based on new evidence.

It concluded that the interests of justice required the charges to proceed to trial, dismissing the applications for a stay.

A child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act in which the Catholic Children's Aid Society sought a temporary order placing a 14-year-old child in its care following the child's disclosure of sexual abuse by the step-grandfather.

The society had removed the child from the grandparents' care on January 10, 2020, but failed to serve the grandparents with the court documents for the hearing on January 15, 2020, claiming police requested non-service to protect their investigation.

The court ordered the society to immediately serve the grandparents with all documents, finding that respondents cannot meaningfully participate in proceedings without knowledge of the applicant's material and that police have no authority to prevent a society from fulfilling its legal obligations under the Act.

The prospective plaintiff sought an ex parte order to commence a civil action using a pseudonym or initials, and for orders preventing disclosure of his real name and sealing motion materials, based on allegations of sexual abuse by a former teacher.

The Master dismissed the motion orally, finding it should not have been brought ex parte and that the procedure for publication bans under the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction (CPPD) had not been followed.

The Master also found the evidence insufficient to displace the strong presumption of open courts, noting that the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans requires a "real, substantial and well-grounded" risk, which was not met by the solicitor's affidavit alone.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to re-bring it on notice with proper procedure and evidence.

D.C. was found guilty on two counts of sexual abuse against his younger half-sister, T., involving repeated acts of intercourse over 18 months while D.C. was in a caregiving role.

The offences occurred when D.C. was 18-19 and T. was 5-6 years old.

The court considered sentencing principles, including the primacy of denunciation and deterrence for child abuse, and aggravating factors such as breach of trust, the victim's young age, the invasive nature, and the repetition of the abuse.

Mitigating factors included D.C.'s status as a youthful first offender and his difficult background.

The court applied Court of Appeal guidance for a minimum sentence of five or six years for prolonged sexual abuse by an adult in a position of trust.

D.C. was sentenced to 4 years and 5 months imprisonment, after receiving 7 months credit for pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a 10-year weapons prohibition, a lifetime SOIRA order, a 20-year order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code, a $200 victim fine surcharge, and a no-contact order with the victim and her immediate family while in custody.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to permit three complainants (RF, GR, and RG) to testify by video link in a sexual abuse trial.

The accused, William Robert Metcalfe, consented to RF testifying by video link but opposed for GR and RG.

The court granted the application for RF and RG, but dismissed it for GR.

For GR, the court found that his willingness to travel and the relatively low cost did not justify video testimony.

For RG, the court balanced factors including his reluctance to attend, fear of job loss, and the limited value of in-person demeanour assessment, concluding that video link was appropriate to ensure the truth-seeking function of the trial without negatively impacting the accused's right to a fair trial.

The plaintiff sought to admit the evidence of Dr. Kerry Smith, a mental health clinician who provided therapy to the plaintiff in prison, as a participant expert in a civil action for damages for alleged sexual abuse.

The court ruled on the admissibility and scope of Dr. Smith's evidence, qualifying him as an expert and finding his evidence relevant to psychological harm and the occurrence of abuse.

The court applied the "participant expert" framework from Westerhof v. Gee Estate, allowing testimony based on observations, impressions, and treatment documented in his reports, but precluding opinions extending beyond these limits without compliance with Rule 53.03.

The maternal grandparents moved to be added as parties to a child protection application concerning their grandchildren, D.C. and E.C., and sought access.

The children had been removed from the mother's care due to severe sexual abuse by her boyfriend and deplorable living conditions.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society and the father opposed the motion, arguing the children were thriving with the father, adding parties would cause delay, and the grandparents lacked insight into the abuse.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that adding the grandparents was not in the children's best interests, would increase conflict, and their proposed plan was not realistic given the children's current stable placement with their biological father.