Right to counsel

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.

The Law Society and the respondent lawyer brought separate appeals from a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Law Society Appeal Panel's order upholding a finding of professional misconduct and disbarment.

The Divisional Court had remitted the matter to a new hearing panel due to breaches of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

It held that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing a brief adjournment to allow the lawyer to be represented by counsel, and by proceeding immediately to the penalty phase without adequate notice.

The Court also upheld the Divisional Court's refusal to stay the proceedings for undue delay, binding the new hearing panel to the original findings on delay up to the start of the first hearing.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and advised of her right to counsel at the roadside, including the right to free legal advice 'right now'.

She declined to call a lawyer and was not re-advised of her rights upon arriving at the police station.

The trial judge convicted her, but the summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal, finding the roadside caution misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the use of the word 'now' properly conveys the immediacy of the right to counsel and does not require the officer to specify that the call will be made from the police station.

The appellant was convicted of arson after representing himself at trial.

He had been denied legal aid and his Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was dismissed by the trial judge, who held that such orders were reserved for cases posing unique challenges.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too stringent a test.

The case was complex, involving expert witnesses and similar fact evidence, and the appellant lacked the capacity to defend himself effectively.

The Court held that the erroneous denial of counsel resulted in an appearance of unfairness, constituting a miscarriage of justice without the need to prove actual prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after he asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found the appellant was eager to tell his story and only wanted to ensure his lawyer was available for his bail hearing the next day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant was not interested in consulting counsel before speaking to the police and therefore his rights were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction, arguing that a 15-minute delay before providing a roadside breath sample violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a 15-minute delay for the purpose of obtaining a proper breath sample is a justified limitation on the right to counsel, rendering the availability of cell phones irrelevant.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, which was initially investigated as a horse riding accident.

Fifteen years later, the police re-opened the investigation and the appellant confessed during a polygraph interview.

On appeal, the appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, the trial judge erred in not leaving manslaughter to the jury, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting an accidental death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breach, no air of reality to manslaughter, and that the fresh evidence failed the Mohan and Palmer tests.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing a breath demand.

He argued he mistakenly believed the demand was for an approved instrument and that he did not have to comply because he had not been informed of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary conviction appeal judge's decision, finding that a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter is not a reasonable excuse to refuse an approved instrument demand, though it may result in exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a seasonal worker and undischarged bankrupt, refused to accept a conditional legal aid certificate requiring him to make monthly payments of $300, believing he could not afford them.

The motion judge granted a Rowbotham order, finding the conditional offer tantamount to a denial of legal aid.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that the accused's refusal to accept the terms of the certificate did not equate to a denial of legal aid, which is a prerequisite for a Rowbotham order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based in part on DNA evidence and a statement he made to police.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police questioned him before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult his counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the police failed to hold off questioning after the appellant indicated he was still trying to reach his lawyer.

The court concluded the statement was conscriptive evidence that should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after stabbing his stepmother 30 times in a parking lot.

He appealed the conviction on several grounds, including the admission of his initial statement to police, the adequacy of jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, post-offence conduct, the intent required for murder, and the failure to give a complete W. (D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not detained during his initial police interview, and that while there were minor errors in the jury charge, they did not amount to a reversible error or cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine and attempted importation of cocaine.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including that his trial should have been held in Gatineau instead of Ottawa, that he was denied full answer and defence, that the trial judge erred in limiting the role of amicus curiae, that the jury was not exclusively francophone, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that Ontario courts had jurisdiction due to overt acts committed in Ontario, that the appellant was given adequate time and access to prepare his defence, and that the jury composition complied with the Criminal Code.

The accused appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned her acquittal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the summary conviction appeal court judge's order, and restored the acquittal.

The trial judge had found that the arresting officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights and implicitly found the officer stopped the accused selectively for an improper purpose.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the breath results.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana after police found a grow operation in a house.

When the appellant pulled into the driveway, an officer detained him and asked if he lived there without first informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel.

The appellant admitted he lived there.

The trial judge found a Charter breach but admitted the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to promptly inform the appellant of the reasons for his detention violated s. 10(a) of the Charter.

The admission of the conscriptive statement rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Criminal appeal from convictions arising from an armed robbery, where the principal issues were the admissibility of alleged confessions and the adequacy of the challenge-for-cause process.

The court held that the voir dire was infected by legal error and a failure to scrutinize all circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, including missing arrest records, lack of audio or video recording, allegations of assault, oppressive conditions, and right-to-counsel concerns.

The Crown failed to meet its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and one impugned statement was also inadmissible as bad character evidence.

The challenge-for-cause instructions were additionally found deficient.

Convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding an 82-year-old woman of over $1 million USD through a telemarketing scheme and was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months in prison.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment to retain new counsel, misapplying the burden of proof, and allowing cross-examination on a pre-trial Charter affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or unfair trial.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 4 years imprisonment due to the appellant's lack of a prior record and partial restitution.

The Crown's cross-appeal seeking a fine or restitution was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated.

The arresting officer made one attempt to contact the appellant's personal lawyer before connecting him with duty counsel.

The appellant spoke with duty counsel and voluntarily provided breath samples without further complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to meet the onus of proving a Charter breach as he appeared satisfied with duty counsel's advice at the time.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by a summary conviction appeal court on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The respondent had been stopped for erratic driving, admitted to being high on drugs, and gave an ambiguous response when advised of his right to counsel.

He subsequently failed a roadside screening device test and a breathalyzer test.

The Court of Appeal restored the trial judge's conviction on the over 80 charge, finding no breach of the respondent's right to counsel, and conditionally stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and firearm offences, arguing that the trial judge erred by not excluding evidence from an informal line-up due to alleged breaches of his ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights, and by misapprehending identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and noting that the trial judge did not rely on the line-up evidence.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was the shooter, as all witnesses agreed the shooter was the person pursued and beaten by the crowd, which matched the appellant.