Right to counsel

Ashley Keenan, facing extradition to the United States for murder, brought a motion for extensive disclosure from various Canadian and foreign authorities.

The court, acting as a case management judge, emphasized the limited role of an extradition judge and the narrower scope of disclosure required for an extradition hearing compared to a trial.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the exception of disclosure related to Ms. Keenan's interactions with Toronto Police Service officers upon her surrender, specifically concerning the accuracy of her statements and potential Charter violations regarding her right to counsel.

The court found no air of reality to other broad disclosure requests or allegations of abuse capable of supporting a stay of proceedings.

This judgment addresses alleged breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) during an impaired driving investigation.

The court found a breach of the right against unreasonable search (s. 8) due to a warrantless vehicle search, a serious breach of the right not to be arbitrarily detained (s. 9) due to prolonged detention without considering release options, and a breach of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)) due to delayed notification and imposed duty counsel.

As a remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath readings, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly due to the arbitrary overholding.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of counselling to commit murder against his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

While incarcerated, the appellant agreed to pay an undercover police officer to kill the intended victims.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting an audiotape of a telephone conversation under s. 24(2) of the Charter, admitting his police interview under ss. 10(a) and (b), instructing the jury, and dismissing his entrapment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Charter rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that the police acted on reasonable suspicion without inducing the offence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that an untested informant tip and a brief, neutral observation of a meeting in a vehicle did not provide reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest, subsequent searches of the respondent, his vehicle, and his residence, as well as a breach of the right to counsel, were unconstitutional.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider the violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel when assessing whether his s. 8 right was violated during the collection of a DNA sample.

He also argued that the s. 10(b) breach tainted his consent to provide the sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge implicitly considered the s. 10(b) violation under s. 24(2).

Furthermore, the appellant's signed waiver and consent, obtained after a reiteration of his right to counsel, broke the connection between the earlier s. 10(b) breach and the giving of the DNA sample.

The applicants, family members of individuals whose deaths were investigated by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), sought a declaration that police officers involved in SIU investigations are not entitled to legal assistance in preparing their notes.

The application judge dismissed the application on grounds of standing, justiciability, and mootness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the applicants had public interest standing and the issues were justiciable and not moot.

Exercising its jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues, the Court held that the Police Services Act and the SIU Regulation do not permit police officers to have a lawyer vet or assist in the preparation of their notes, though they may obtain basic legal advice regarding their rights and duties provided it does not delay note completion.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible (NCR), appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a psychiatric hospital.

The amicus curiae argued the Board erred by failing to appoint counsel for the unrepresented appellant under s. 672.5(8) of the Criminal Code or by failing to provide adequate assistance during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly considered whether the interests of justice required appointing counsel and reasonably concluded the appellant could participate fairly.

The Court also held that the Board's decision to continue the appellant's detention was reasonable and supported by evidence of his lack of insight, substance abuse history, and risk of violence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, erred in a section 10(b) Charter ruling, and improperly handled evidence of the appellant's flight before trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly addressed the inconsistencies and made no errors in the Charter ruling or the treatment of the flight evidence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The moving parties, two not-for-profit corporations in receivership, sought an interim order allowing their boards of directors to retain counsel for an appeal and directing that the legal fees be paid from the corporations' assets.

The motion judge had previously ruled the boards could not retain counsel without leave of the court or the receiver's approval.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the boards' right to pursue the appeal would be hollow without counsel, and ordered that reasonable legal fees be paid from the corporations' assets.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after his trial counsel was removed from the record by an application judge due to unpaid legal fees.

The appellant was forced to represent himself for the remainder of the trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in removing counsel absent a fundamental disagreement, serious breakdown in communications, or ethical dilemma.

The removal violated the appellant's right to counsel, and actual prejudice was not required to order a new trial, though prejudice likely existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing a breath demand.

He argued he mistakenly believed the demand was for an approved instrument and that he did not have to comply because he had not been informed of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary conviction appeal judge's decision, finding that a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter is not a reasonable excuse to refuse an approved instrument demand, though it may result in exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his request for an adjournment to retain counsel was improperly denied.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge who initially refused the adjournment made four material factual errors regarding the procedural history of the case.

The trial judge subsequently adopted that erroneous decision.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to address these factual errors.

Because the refusal of the adjournment was based on an erroneous factual foundation and the appellant was forced to proceed unrepresented in a case where the Crown sought a custodial sentence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to exclude breathalyser results under s. 24(2) of the Charter and overturn the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that any breach was minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the accused suffered no prejudice as he spoke with duty counsel and was satisfied with the advice.

The Court concluded that excluding the reliable breathalyser evidence would do more harm than good to the administration of justice, and restored the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of recognizance.

On the scheduled trial date, the trial judge ruled that the appellant's counsel was no longer on the record due to a prior endorsement, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the prior endorsement and that counsel remained on the record.

The Court held that the appellant's right to be represented by counsel was violated, requiring a new trial without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The appellant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to give a special jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness confidence, and that his Charter rights were violated during the seizure of blood and breath samples.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instruction was unnecessary and the evidence was lawfully obtained.

The appellant's sentence appeal seeking a conditional sentence or reduced term from his 21-month imprisonment was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after causing the victim's death through severe internal injuries inflicted during a sexual assault.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement made to police at the scene, in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, in failing to limit the use of post-offence conduct, and in instructing on sexual arousal and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement was voluntary as the appellant was not detained or a suspect.

While the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that post-offence conduct could not be used to determine the level of culpability between murder and manslaughter, the court applied the curative proviso as the error caused no substantial wrong.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

The police officer asked the accused for identification, ran a CPIC check, and discovered an outstanding bail curfew condition.

The accused was arrested and searched, revealing cocaine.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the request for identification violated s. 8, there were no breaches of ss. 9 or 10(b).

The Court concluded the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer could have lawfully obtained the identification by ticketing the accused for a seatbelt violation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.