racial profiling

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a traffic stop and subsequent search, alleging arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and racial profiling.

The court found that the police lacked statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act and reasonable suspicion for investigative detention, rendering the initial detention unlawful.

Furthermore, the court determined that racial stereotypes about Black criminality and dangerousness tainted the police's treatment of the accused throughout the interaction, leading to breaches of his ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court concluded that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, particularly the racial profiling, and the severe impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, warranted the exclusion of all seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This criminal trial involved a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle following an arrest and detention related to a robbery.

The defendant argued that the initial arrest of a passenger and his own detention were unlawful, rendering the subsequent vehicle search and warrant invalid.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the passenger's arrest and the defendant's investigative detention, and that the warrantless search of the vehicle was a lawful search incident to arrest.

Consequently, the Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty of multiple firearm and drug trafficking charges, but not guilty of trafficking fentanyl, instead being convicted of simple possession of fentanyl.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, sought a stay of proceedings alleging racial profiling by CBSA and RCMP officers under sections 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that Border Services Officer Coughlin did not racially profile the applicant, but Superintendent Ryan did, by relying on a stereotype based on the applicant's national origin (Jamaican-born Canadian travelling to a non-Jamaica Caribbean country) as an indicator of criminality.

This reliance on immutable characteristics was deemed discriminatory.

Consequently, the court found violations of the applicant's s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and driving while prohibited, sought to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police officer's stop was a pretextual investigative detention, not a legitimate Highway Traffic Act stop, and that the officer's testimony was not credible.

The court identified multiple, deliberate breaches of the applicant's rights, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), failure to inform of reasons for detention (s. 10(a)), and eliciting incriminating information before providing right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

While racial profiling was alleged, it was not established on the evidence.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the state's Charter-infringing conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The accused, Fitzroy Allen, applied to exclude evidence in his criminal trial (possession for trafficking, flight from police, dangerous driving, and failing to comply with a release order).

He argued that the police violated his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights by conducting an unlawful traffic stop and subsequent search.

The Crown conceded a s. 9 breach but argued the evidence was lawfully seized due to an intervening act (flight from police) and that s. 8 was not breached.

The court found that the initial traffic stop was unlawful, not based on HTA violations but on a desire to conduct a criminal investigation due to the applicant's outstanding charges.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation.

It further found that the applicant's flight from an unlawful stop did not constitute an intervening event that legitimizes subsequent police actions, thus the subsequent pursuit, arrest, and search also violated ss. 8 and 9.

Applying the Grant inquiry, the court found the breaches serious and the impact on the applicant's Charter interests significant, outweighing the public interest in admitting the reliable evidence.

The application to exclude the physical evidence and post-breach police observations was granted.

The accused, Curtis Morrison, was charged with obstructing police, possession of cocaine, and various firearm offences after a search incident to arrest.

Morrison alleged racial profiling, arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), and unreasonable search (s. 8 Charter), seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found insufficient evidence of racial profiling.

However, it found that the initial arrest based on an unverified "tax warrant" from Quebec was unlawful, breaching s. 9.

Consequently, the subsequent search of his vehicle, which was not incident to a lawful arrest and lacked other legal authority, breached s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, leading to the exclusion of the gun and cocaine evidence.

In the alternative, the court also found that the Crown had not proven possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The applicant, Damaine Sitladeen, faced firearm and drug charges and brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 9 to exclude evidence.

He alleged unlawful arrest due to racial bias, an overbroad search incident to arrest, and an unconstitutional strip search.

The court found no Charter violations, concluding that the arrest was based on reasonable grounds (missing license plate), the vehicle search was incidental to arrest and reasonable (including for identification and after drug discovery), and the strip search was justified and conducted reasonably.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, Adrian Thomas, was charged with multiple offences, including assault with intent to resist arrest and various firearm-related charges, following a traffic stop and struggle with police.

The court found the initial traffic stop lawful and the prolonged detention not arbitrary.

However, it found that the police used excessive force during the arrest, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 7 Charter rights, and that there were unjustified delays in providing and facilitating access to counsel, breaching section 10(b) Charter rights.

While the search of the vehicle was deemed a lawful inventory search, the court applied the Grant analysis and determined that the serious section 7 violation necessitated the exclusion of the handgun evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty of all gun-related charges but guilty of resisting arrest.

The applicant, facing firearms charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to racial profiling during a police search and detention.

The court found that the safety search and subsequent search of his person, belongings, and vehicle were unlawful and tainted by unconscious racial bias, constituting breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

While the initial 10(b) rights during the Cannabis Control Act investigation were suspended due to brief roadside detention, the post-arrest delay in providing access to counsel was an unreasonable breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly given the serious nature of the racial profiling and the systemic issues it represents.

The firearm was excluded.

The accused, Tristan Armstrong, faced charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm and cocaine for trafficking.

In a blended Charter application and trial, the court considered the admissibility of evidence.

The defence argued violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police search of the vehicle and person was unreasonable under s. 8, influenced by racial profiling, and that the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights to be informed of reasons for arrest and to counsel were violated.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2), the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the racial profiling and disregard for Charter rights, outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, despite the seriousness of the alleged offences.

Consequently, the gun, ammunition, and cocaine were excluded from evidence.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (a handgun and statements) obtained during a police investigation.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the accused and unlawfully seized and searched his satchel, violating his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court rejected the claim of racial profiling but found the police conduct to be overzealous and egregious.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the charges.

Kafi Ali was charged with multiple firearms and drug-related offences.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search) and 9 (arbitrary detention), seeking the exclusion of incriminating evidence under section 24(2).

The court found no Charter breaches, determining that the investigative detention was based on reasonable suspicion and was not racially motivated, and the subsequent arrest and search were lawful.

The defence conceded the elements of most offences if the Charter application failed, but disputed the charge of possession of property obtained by crime.

The court ultimately found Mr. Ali guilty of all charges, including possession of property obtained by crime, concluding that the Crown had proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to exclude breath samples and test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on improper parking at an LCBO, admission of prior alcohol consumption, and detection of alcohol odour.

The screening demand was lawful and made within the immediacy requirement.

No racial profiling occurred.

The defendant was properly arrested and advised of her rights.

A conviction was registered.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and Criminal Code offences.

The case proceeded as a blended Charter proceeding and trial.

The court found that the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse to conduct a criminal investigation, thereby breaching the accused's section 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention.

Although the court found the police officers acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable, the seriousness and deliberate nature of the Charter breach, and its significant impact on the accused's rights, led to the exclusion of all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, with no evidence, the accused was found not guilty of all charges.

The accused brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized during a traffic stop, subsequent arrest, and search, arguing racial profiling and significant Charter breaches.

The evidence included a loaded handgun, ammunition, drugs, and cash.

The Crown opposed the application, denying racial profiling and significant breaches.

The court found a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to a six-hour delay in providing access to a lawyer while the accused was detained at a hospital, but found other alleged breaches unsubstantiated or minor.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court determined that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the minor nature of the Charter breach, the independent discovery of the real evidence, and the gravity of the firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Dale James, brought a motion for summary judgment against the Peel Regional Police Services Board and four police officers, alleging unlawful arrest, detention, harassment, and Charter breaches.

The claims stemmed from an arrest for breach of recognizance based on outdated CPIC information and a subsequent investigative detention.

The defendants denied liability, asserting the arrest was lawful and the detention justified.

The court, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the officers' knowledge regarding the recognizance, the reasonableness of the investigative detention, and allegations of racial profiling.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with "over 80" after being stopped for cell phone use while driving.

The trial judge found racial profiling, excluded breathalyzer readings, and acquitted.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence, failing to consider an innocent mistake as an alternative to racial profiling, and improperly drawing inferences from the police's failure to investigate the cell phone.

The trial judge's finding of "unconscious" racial profiling by an honest officer was deemed a stretch and difficult to substantiate.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff's action against the Toronto Police Service Board and Desjardins General Insurance for alleged harassment, racial profiling, and wrongful insurance cancellation was dismissed on the basis of the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to his claims by January 5, 2011, at the latest, but did not issue his Statement of Claim until July 28, 2014, well beyond the statutory period.

The plaintiff's argument of ignorance of the law, rather than facts, was rejected as a basis for extending the discoverability principle.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, reduced by half due to the plaintiff's self-represented status and financial burden.

The accused, Nosakhare Ohenhen, faced a retrial for seventeen offences including assault police, resisting arrest, firearm possession, and drug trafficking.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found the police officers' evidence to be neither credible nor reliable, noting numerous inconsistencies, lack of recall, and potential collusion in note-taking.

The court concluded that Ohenhen was arbitrarily detained without articulable cause, subjected to unreasonable searches of his person and vehicle without a warrant, and repeatedly denied his right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court deemed the Charter violations egregious and committed in bad faith, strongly favoring the exclusion of evidence.

Consequently, all evidence was excluded, and Ohenhen was acquitted of all charges.

The applicants, jointly charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop.

The court found that the police stop was a pretext based on racial profiling, constituting arbitrary detention (s. 9) and an unlawful search (s. 8).

Additionally, the applicants' rights to be informed of the reason for detention and to counsel (s. 10(a) and (b)) were infringed.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the serious Charter violations, particularly racial profiling, warranted the exclusion of all evidence obtained from the vehicle search and any subsequent utterances.