Impaired driving

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over the legal limit, resisting arrest, and assault with intent to resist arrest, following her arrest at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused was found behind the wheel of her vehicle after leaving a Christmas party.

The accused applied for Charter relief alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter applications but acquitted the accused on the impaired and over 80 charges, finding she had rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control and that no realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 following a police investigation.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 170 mgs obtained at a police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on three grounds: (1) the time of driving was not accurately recorded to satisfy the two-hour requirement; (2) the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable; and (3) the accused's right to counsel under the Charter was violated.

The court found no violations regarding the timing of the breath samples.

However, the court found that a police officer interrupted and curtailed the accused's consultation with duty counsel by making hurry-up gestures through a window, thereby violating s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath evidence as the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's protected right outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant brought a motion for mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after observing the trial judge reading from a document marked "Confidential Draft" during final argument.

The defendant argued that the presence of such a document indicated the judge had predetermined the outcome and that the judge's refusal to disclose the document's contents constituted bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that trial judges have no obligation to disclose their notes or preliminary rulings to counsel, and that preparing draft reasons prior to or during submissions does not constitute bias provided the judge remains receptive to counsel's arguments.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on November 26, 2016.

The Crown called two police officers and filed an expert toxicologist report.

The defence raised multiple Charter violations relating to the roadside breath sample procedure and the right to counsel.

The court found two Charter violations under section 10(b) but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the passenger seat of a vehicle in a ditch.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results obtained more than two hours after the alleged offence, thereby losing the statutory presumption of identity.

The Crown attempted to rely on expert opinion evidence to extrapolate the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the factual assumptions underlying the expert opinion and rejected the Crown's invitation to perform retrograde extrapolation calculations.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample after being found asleep in his vehicle on the shoulder of the 401 highway.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations at the roadside.

The accused testified he pulled over to take a nap due to fatigue and made good faith efforts to provide a breath sample but was unable to do so.

The court found three Charter breaches: loss of rough notes (section 7), failure to advise of reason for detention (section 10(a)), and placement in a cell without considering less restrictive alternatives (section 9).

Under section 24(2), the evidence was admitted.

The court acquitted on impaired driving due to reasonable doubt but convicted on refusing to provide a breath sample, finding the accused intentionally failed to blow into the Intoxilyzer despite multiple opportunities.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a 911 call reporting erratic driving.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results and statements to police, alleging violations of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9, but found a breach of section 10(b) when police made only a token effort to facilitate contact with the defendant's counsel of choice.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the defendant's statements but admitted the breath test results.

The defendant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a collision at a gas station.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment before and after arrest, breath sample analysis, and toxicological evidence.

The defendant raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, the demand for breath samples, interpretation services, and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts after rejecting all Charter challenges and finding compelling evidence of impairment based on the totality of circumstances.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug and breach of probation.

The accused was found sitting in his mother's vehicle in a farmer's field in the early morning hours.

Police observed dilated pupils, peculiar clothing, drug paraphernalia, and suspected drugs in the vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused's physical presentation, dilated pupils, and items found in the vehicle to establish impairment.

The defence argued that the evidence amounted only to possibilities without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while the accused's presentation was peculiar and possibly consistent with drug impairment, the absence of field sobriety testing, drug recognition expert evaluation, and chemical analysis of suspected substances, combined with limited evidence of actual incoordination, fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant brought a second application under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" due to unreasonable delay.

The first application was dismissed in August 2016 when the anticipated trial completion was under 18 months.

By the time of the second application in February 2017, the total delay had exceeded 22 months.

The court found that the Crown failed to disclose critical evidence (an audio dispatch recording) despite repeated requests over many months, and that this disclosure failure was the primary cause of delay beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown adduced no evidence of exceptional circumstances to justify the excess delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case was based on observations by paramedics of erratic driving, police observations at the scene, and breath sample readings.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, the demand for breath samples, and his detention.

The court found Charter violations: a breach of s. 8 regarding the "as soon as practicable" requirement for obtaining breath samples, and a breach of s. 9 regarding arbitrary detention (overhold).

The breath sample evidence was excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired operation based on the paramedics' and officers' observations of the defendant's driving and physical condition.

The defendant was acquitted of the Over 80 charge due to exclusion of the breath readings.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on delay.

The Information was sworn 15 months prior, and this was the third trial date.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the net delay of 15 months fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for the Ontario Court of Justice, the defence had demonstrated both a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The Crown failed to take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings, particularly when the assigned Crown was unavailable at the scheduled trial start time, resulting in the trial not being completed as scheduled.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample readings of 260 and 240 milligrams, approximately three times the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 9 were breached when police held him for a show cause bail hearing without reasonable grounds, contrary to the presumption of release.

The court found an arbitrary detention breach based on the accused's status as a resident alien with property in Florida, coupled with insufficient police investigation into his Ontario roots.

The breath sample readings were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the criminal charges but subject to a common law peace bond.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a breath demand contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant refused to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device on his driveway after being investigated by police for a possible impaired driving offense.

The defendant claimed he had a reasonable excuse for his refusal based on pre-existing anxiety and fear of police officers.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand, that the defendant's refusal was clear and unequivocal, and that the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing a reasonable excuse.

The court rejected the defendant's Charter arguments regarding unlawful search and seizure and the right to counsel.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found in a vehicle stuck in snow in a private driveway with signs of impairment.

The defence conceded that all technical requirements of both charges were met and raised the defence of necessity, arguing the accused drove while impaired to locate and assist an intoxicated co-worker who had left the cabin in cold weather.

The court found no air of reality to the necessity defence, as there was no imminent peril, reasonable alternatives existed (such as walking), and the harm of impaired driving outweighed any speculative harm to the co-worker.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired based on observations of his manner of driving (weaving, collision with median, continued driving on flat tire) and physical symptoms (glassy eyes, slurred speech, odour of alcohol).

The court found that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code, notwithstanding delays caused by police procedures and a technician error.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with count 2 conditionally stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on Wharncliffe Road North in London, Ontario.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample results and observations of the accused's behaviour at the scene and at the police station.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the timing prerequisites necessary to rely on the statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity under the Criminal Code, and therefore dismissed the over .80 count.

On the impairment count, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting inconsistencies in witness accounts, the accused's apparent ability to understand instructions, and the plausible explanation of weather and road conditions for the collision.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a traffic stop on December 18, 2010.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that he was arbitrarily detained when directed to sit in the police car during computer checks, finding that while the detention may not have been reasonably necessary, the evidence should not be excluded under the test in R v Aucoin.

The court also found that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and the breath demand based on observed signs of impairment.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought four to six months imprisonment, an 18-month driving prohibition, 12 months probation, and a DNA order.

The defence sought 90 days intermittent sentence, arguing the accused supported his parents and would lose employment.

The court imposed five months imprisonment, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount in drinking and driving cases, particularly where bodily harm resulted.

The court rejected the intermittent sentence despite the accused's otherwise positive circumstances, emphasizing the serious harm caused to the victim and his family.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit and breaching a probation order by driving without a valid license.

The charges arose from a RIDE spot check.

The court examined four key issues: whether police failed to wait 15 minutes for residual mouth alcohol to dissipate before using the approved screening device; whether the Intoxilyzer 8000C was an approved instrument; whether the defendant's blood alcohol level was over 80 at the time of the stop; and whether the Crown proved the probation breach beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the defendant guilty on both charges.