Impaired driving

David Persaud appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had conducted a blended trial and Charter application, granting a s. 10(b) application but dismissing a s. 8 application, and then convicting Persaud.

The appeal court found that the trial judge conflated s. 8 Charter issues with the trial proper, provided insufficient reasons for conviction, and improperly used evidence admissible only for the Charter application to convict on the substantive charge.

The court dismissed grounds related to unreasonable verdict and a new ground raised on appeal.

Ultimately, the conviction could not stand due to significant flaws in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an order for a new trial on the impaired driving charge.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The trial judge erred by refusing to allow the Crown to call the Qualified Breath Technician (QBT) without a certificate and by dismissing the charges without hearing submissions.

The Superior Court found these to be fundamental errors in law, as the Crown is entitled to prove its case through viva voce evidence even without a certificate, and parties must be given an opportunity to make submissions.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new trial.

The appellant, Mr. Liu, appealed his conviction for impaired driving by alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of non-insane automatism and in finding that his impairment was due to alcohol rather than drugs.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-insane automatism is not a defence to impaired driving where drugs or alcohol are voluntarily consumed, regardless of the intent to drive.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly rejected the expert's opinion regarding drug-induced impairment due to a lack of factual basis for the amount of alcohol consumed by the appellant.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

Police found the appellant asleep at the wheel of a running vehicle.

While there was overwhelming evidence of impairment, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment was caused by a drug.

The court found no evidence, other than labels on pill bottles, that the bottles contained the stated drugs or that those drugs were in the appellant's system.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was dismissed.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" due to a 22-minute delay waiting to enter a police station sally port.

The trial judge relied on extensive experience to find the delay reasonable and not requiring specific explanation.

The Superior Court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court emphasized that the "as soon as practicable" standard does not require an accounting for every minute of delay, especially when the overall time is reasonable and within the two-hour statutory limit.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control and over 80.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that a "realistic risk of danger" is not a required element where the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control, in unreasonably finding a realistic risk of danger in obiter, and in assessing his evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's analysis of de facto care or control and that the findings were not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment.

Earl Hourihan was convicted of driving over 80 causing bodily harm, arising from a single motor vehicle accident where he struck a pedestrian on a push scooter.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9 to 15 months, while the defence proposed a 90-day intermittent sentence with probation.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior impaired driving conviction and the severity of the victim's injuries, and mitigating factors such as the offender's remorse, efforts to address alcohol problems, and community standing.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as predominant sentencing objectives for alcohol-related driving offences, particularly where bodily harm is involved.

A sentence of nine months imprisonment and a two-year driving prohibition was imposed, balancing rehabilitation with the need for strong public policy messaging.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80.

The respondent was involved in a single motor vehicle accident and was later arrested after registering a fail on an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control for the period between a tow truck's arrival and police arrival.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to the entire relevant time period, specifically the period of driving leading up to the collision.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Brian White, appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's finding that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care and control by lacking intention to exercise it, and the trial judge's finding that the vehicle was operable.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's conclusions on both the appellant's intention to set the vehicle in motion and the vehicle's operability were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

Allen Taylor appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's decision to exclude only the second breath sample under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The appellant argued both breath samples should have been excluded and that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in not excluding both breath samples, applying the principles from R. v. Pino regarding evidence obtained prior to a Charter breach.

However, the court upheld the impaired driving conviction, finding that even without the breath samples, the remaining eyewitness and police observation evidence was compelling and sufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Nishan Minhas, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" stemming from a RIDE checkpoint stop.

He alleged multiple Charter violations by the police officer, including errors in credibility assessment, acceptance of impairment evidence, handling of mouth alcohol, and the timing of the approved screening device demand relative to the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the reliability of the impairment indicia, or the handling of the mouth alcohol issue.

Crucially, the court held that the brief delay in providing the right to counsel during the roadside investigation, including the approved screening device test, was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant, Peter Bothwell, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to insufficient privacy during his calls.

At trial, the judge found no breach, concluding that Bothwell's concerns about privacy were remedied by him lowering his voice and that officers did not overhear his conversations.

The Superior Court, on appeal, upheld the trial judge's finding, determining that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that Bothwell had not met the burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities, and that the finding was not a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with a high blood alcohol content.

The trial judge rejected his defence that he intended only to sleep in the vehicle, finding he failed to rebut the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge also found a realistic risk of danger even without an intention to drive.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's factual findings and application of the law, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving over 80 mg of alcohol.

The trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the common sense inference against bolus drinking and the practical evidentiary burden on the respondent when breath samples were taken more than two hours after the alleged offence, despite finding no evidence of bolus drinking.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had found "bolus drinking" was in play, and excluded evidence of the respondent's weight, obtained without statutory or common law authority, under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings on bolus drinking and the s. 8 Charter breach, agreeing that compelling the respondent to be weighed without proper legal authority was a serious breach.

The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the need for police policy to be authorized by law and the importance of protecting a detainee's right against self-incrimination.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of impaired driving.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that his medication, Effexor, could explain some signs of impairment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding Effexor, as there was no expert evidence to support its effects on impairment-like symptoms, and speculated on its impact.

The trial judge also erred in applying the test for impaired driving by not considering alcohol as a contributing factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a dog track handler (Sgt. deRuiter) and a forensic toxicologist (Dr. Langille) in a criminal trial for impaired driving causing bodily harm and fail to remain.

The respondent objected to the scope and admissibility of the expert evidence.

The court applied the two-step inquiry for expert evidence admissibility, considering the Mohan criteria and the cost-benefit analysis from R. v. Abbey.

The court found both expert opinions relevant, necessary, and not subject to exclusionary rules, with qualified experts.

The probative value of the evidence, particularly given the lack of eyewitnesses and the injured party's memory loss, was deemed to outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The Crown's application was granted for both experts.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired driving and exceeding the breathalyzer limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that impairment was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that breath samples were not taken within the two-hour period mandated by the Criminal Code, as the exact time of the accident could not be established.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to consider witness evidence of impairment, erred in not convicting on the included offence of care and control, and failed to apply the presumption of identity.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings on witness credibility, rejecting the attempt to change the particulars of the offence to a later time of care and control, and affirming the proper application of reasonable doubt arising from a lack of evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a blood-alcohol offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appellant contended that a 7.5-month adjournment, characterized as neutral time by the trial judge, was in fact Crown-caused delay due to a belated expert report on a post-driving drinking scenario.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, finding that the total delay was 26 months and one week.

However, after attributing 9.5 months of delay to the defence (including the 7.5-month adjournment due to tactical choices and scheduling conflicts), the net delay was less than 16 months, falling below the 18-month ceiling.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no unreasonable delay.