9 total
Drug evidence excluded due to unlawful warrantless arrest, arbitrary strip searches, and denial of right to counsel.
The accused brought a pre-trial motion alleging breaches of their rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter following a warrantless arrest and subsequent strip searches.
The police arrested the accused based on an uncorroborated tip from a confidential informant and conducted strip searches before allowing them to consult with counsel.
The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, rendering it and the subsequent strip searches unlawful.
The court also found a blatant violation of the right to counsel.
Concluding that the Charter breaches were serious and had a profound impact on the accused, the court excluded the seized drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.
The court overturned an impaired driving conviction because the Crown failed to prove the accused actually ingested the drugs found in his vehicle.
The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.
Police found the appellant asleep at the wheel of a running vehicle.
While there was overwhelming evidence of impairment, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment was caused by a drug.
The court found no evidence, other than labels on pill bottles, that the bottles contained the stated drugs or that those drugs were in the appellant's system.
The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was dismissed.
A plaintiff's notice of discontinuance does not abrogate a defendant's pre-existing motion to dismiss.
The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the action.
Subsequently, the self-represented plaintiff filed a notice of discontinuance before the close of pleadings, arguing this terminated the action and precluded the defendant's motion.
The court held that the defendant's right to proceed with the motion to dismiss was not abrogated by the subsequent notice of discontinuance, as ignoring this principle would prejudice the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to potentially re-institute the action.
The court allowed the defendant's motion to proceed.
Spousal support reduced after retirement but maintained due to recipient’s medical inability to work.
The respondent husband brought a motion to reduce spousal support following his retirement and significant reduction in employment income.
The court considered the parties’ financial circumstances, including the husband’s pension income, the earlier equalization of pension benefits, and the recipient spouse’s medical inability to work.
Relying on the principles articulated in Boston v. Boston, the court held that while the payor was entitled to some reduction in support after retirement, the recipient’s ongoing financial needs and lack of income remained significant.
Balancing these considerations, the court reduced the spousal support payable from $2400 per month to $1350 per month commencing January 1, 2014.
Non-consensual sexual touching and harassment constituted battery and intentional infliction of mental suffering.
Multiple plaintiffs brought a civil action for damages arising from assault, battery, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following repeated incidents of non-consensual sexual touching and degrading sexual harassment by a neighbour during social interactions.
The defendant did not defend the action and failed to appear at trial.
The court found that repeated non-consensual touching constituted battery and that accompanying degrading remarks and intimidation caused reasonable apprehension of further sexual battery, amounting to assault and intentional infliction of mental suffering.
Although several plaintiffs described psychological impacts, no expert medical evidence was presented.
The court awarded modest general damages reflecting the seriousness of the conduct but the limited evidentiary record and relatively short duration of events.
Faint hope application dismissed for double murderer lacking remorse.
An offender convicted of two counts of first degree murder applied for a reduction in the period of parole ineligibility under the faint hope provisions of the Criminal Code.
At the judicial screening stage, the court assessed whether there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would unanimously recommend a reduction in parole ineligibility.
Although the applicant had maintained relatively positive institutional conduct and was assessed as a low risk to public safety, he continued to deny responsibility for the murders and expressed no remorse.
Given the extreme violence, planning, and multiple-victim nature of the offences, the court concluded that a properly instructed jury would not likely reduce the parole ineligibility period.
The application was dismissed at the screening stage.
Late request for defence medical examinations denied after action already set down for trial.
The defendant insurer brought a motion seeking two defence medical examinations by an orthopedic specialist and an occupational therapist and production of the clinical notes and records underlying two expert reports recently served by the plaintiff.
The action arose from a 1994 motor vehicle accident and a dispute over termination of statutory accident benefits.
The court held that the defendant had previously obtained numerous medical assessments and had set the matter down for trial, indicating readiness to proceed on the existing evidence.
In the absence of evidence demonstrating a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, the defendant failed to meet the threshold required to reopen interlocutory steps.
The request for production of underlying clinical notes and records was also rejected.
Interim access denied to biological father pending trial to preserve status quo.
The biological father brought a motion seeking interim access to a child conceived through artificial insemination pursuant to a prior donor agreement in which he purported to relinquish parental rights.
The respondent mother opposed access and relied on the existing status quo in which the child had never met the biological father.
Applying the best interests test under s. 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court acknowledged the importance of biological relationships but emphasized the principle of maintaining the status quo on interim motions.
Given the child's young age and the proximity of the scheduled trial date, the court found that introducing the applicant at the interim stage risked confusion and potential harm.
The motion for interim access and related requests were dismissed.
Leave to appeal denied; amendment specifying negligence not a new cause of action.
The moving parties sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend a statement of claim to plead a specific act of negligence relating to an aircraft crash.
They argued that the amendment introduced a new cause of action that was statute‑barred.
The court held that the original pleading invoking res ipsa loquitur already raised an inference of negligence and that specifying engine failure due to fuel starvation or exhaustion did not constitute a new cause of action.
Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no conflicting authority warranting appellate review and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order.
Leave to appeal was therefore refused.
