ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2012-10-09

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – GREGORY CRICK Applicant

Paul D Larsh for the Crown
Philip K. Casey, for the Applicant

HEARD: by written application

The Honourable Mr. Justice Norman M. Karam

REASONS FOR DECISION

1The applicant Gregory Crick was convicted of two charges of first degree murder on April 8, 2000 at the City of North Bay, Ontario, and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years on each charge. This is an application brought by the applicant for a reduction in the number of years he is to be imprisoned without eligibility for parole pursuant to sections 746.61(5) and 745.63 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

2The procedure on such an application begins with an initial judicial screening by the Chief Justice of this court or her designate. If the applicant succeeds at the screening stage, the Chief Justice will empanel a jury to hear the application.

3The test to be applied at the judicial screening stage is set out in s. 745.61(1), which provides that the applicant must show on a balance of probabilities that there is “a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed”. In order for the application to succeed, a jury will have to unanimously decide that the number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced.

4Section 745.61(2) of the Criminal Code provides that for the purpose of determining whether the applicant has satisfied the onus, the Court shall consider the following criteria:

a. The character of the applicant;
b. The applicant’s conduct while incarcerated;
c. The nature of the offence or offences;
d. Information provided by any person defined as a victim; and
e. Any other matters that the judge considers relevant.

The nature of the offences

5Although the applicant maintains that the extent of his involvement in the murders was as an accessory after the fact, the facts upon which he was convicted can be gleaned from the Crown submissions, the applicant’s application record, reports provided by the penal institutions and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s judgment on appeal.

6The murders took place about seven months apart. It was alleged that the appellant recruited his sister’s two sons, Michael Laffrenier and Robert Goulet, aged 16 and 17 at the time, to kill Louis Gauthier, a man who had made homosexual advances toward Laffrenier. After the first murder was executed, Goulet began to disclose details of the murder to other people. The applicant and Laffrenier then murdered Goulet and buried his body.

7Two aspects which stand out with respect to both murders are the degree of planning involved in each and the extent of the violence used. The murders are best described as execution-style.

8Gauthier’s murder was carefully planned and conducted, including the manner used to reach the victim’s residence, which was in a rural setting, disabling his truck to prevent him from escaping, arranging for the murder weapons to be used, cutting the telephone line, preparing a plan of attack and setting up alibis. Although the two brothers actually killed the victim, by first bludgeoning him with a tire iron and a power bar while he was pleading for his life and then slitting his throat, the evidence at trial was that while this was taking place, the applicant was present, urging them on and directing their actions as they committed the murder. It is apparent even from the facts that are not in dispute, particularly the post mortem results, that the victim was murdered by very extensive blunt force trauma to the head and body as well as numerous stab and incised wounds to the neck and brain.

9Goulet’s murder was to some extent even more deliberate and cold-blooded, as it followed the first by over six months, and because the victim was a close relative. Judging from the records of telephone conversations obtained by police, the applicant and Laffrenier met and spoke several weeks before the murder, and began to plan how they would prevent Goulet from disclosing details of the Gauthier murder to police, who they knew were already suspicious. Injuries to Goulet’s body indicated that the murder was accomplished by bludgeoning the victim with a sledgehammer and stabbing him with a knife to the neck and head. Goulet’s body, along with the murder weapons, was then dumped into a grave, which had been prepared before the murder.

10Although the applicant continues to deny any complicity in the murders themselves, stating that his role in each case was simply as an accessory after the fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal in dismissing an appeal from his convictions described the Crown’s case as “formidable” (R. v. Crick 2005 12679 (ON CA), 197 O.A.C. 33 at para. 8). The Court cited Laffrenier’s detailed trial evidence, admissions made to friends and relatives, police-intercepted telephone conversations between the applicant and Laffrenier, and elements of the applicant’s own testimony at trial, which if rejected could have supported the Crown’s case.

11Although the section is not applicable to the case at hand, I believe it is worth noting from a policy perspective that the Criminal Code was amended effective January 9, 1997 to preclude individuals convicted of multiple murders from making applications for reduction in parole ineligibility. In R. v. Hunter [2009] O.J. No. 3174, 2009 CarswellOnt 4485, C.T. Hackland R.S.J. was faced with a similar situation to the one at hand (although the second murder was committed while the applicant was already imprisoned for the first). Justice Hackland said the following at para. 8:

The early parole of multiple murderers is likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute…. I acknowledge that subsection 745.6(2) of the Criminal Code does not apply in respect of a person unless at least one of the murders for which the person was convicted was committed after the section came into force. In other words, the amendment is not retro-active in its application. In the case of this applicant, both murders occurred prior to this amendment. Nevertheless, the amendment reflects the obvious necessity of maintaining public confidence in the parole regime and in the administration of justice.

The character of the applicant

12The applicant, who is now 48 years of age, had no previous criminal record at the time of his conviction.

13A pre-parole psychiatric examination was conducted on June 7, 2010 by Dr. Stephen Hucker, who stated in his report:

At our interview Mr. Crick was overtly pleasant and cooperative though he expressed a very cynical attitude towards the criminal justice and correctional systems and portrays himself as a victim, taking little or no personal responsibility for events that involve him. Underlying anger and resentment was clearly apparent and though he denied current suicidal thinking, a prominent depressive thread was also discernible in his responses. He stuck to his version of events that he played no direct part in the murders of the two victims though did not deny being an “accessory after the fact.” He showed no apparent regret or remorse for the deaths themselves.

Later in Dr. Hucker’s report, he stated: “Violent tendencies were not evident and there were few indications of antisocial attitudes.” He summarized in part as follows: “Based on his presentation to me I see little likelihood that his perspective with respect to his convictions will change and his adoption of the role as a victim both of the system and life circumstances generally will interfere with any therapeutic endeavours.”

14In R. v. Phillips 2011 ONSC 1914, O.J. No. 1687 at para. 20, I.V.B. Nordheimer J. of the Ontario Superior Court in denying the applicant’s faint hope application gave weight to the fact that the applicant did “not accept any responsibility for the offence nor has he expressed in any way remorse for the loss of life.”

The applicant’s conduct while incarcerated

15Since his conviction, the applicant has served his time in a number of penal institutions. He is presently being held at the Bath Institution, where he has been incarcerated since January of 2008. As evidence of the applicant’s conduct while incarcerated, the court has been provided with correctional plan updates, a pre-parole psychiatric report, and a decision allowing the applicant to be transferred to a minimum-security prison, as well as other documents, including an affidavit of the applicant.

14The applicant’s behaviour while incarcerated appears to have been relatively positive. The following are several relevant excerpts from the correctional update dated March 12, 2012:

The Correctional Intervention Board discussed this case at length and in the end, there was unanimous support for an overall rating of Minimum security with the ratings of Low Institutional Adjustment, Low Escape Risk and Low Risk to Public Safety.

Mr. Crick has participated in various psychological and psychiatric assessments and the most recent Psychological Risk Assessment provided an overall risk rating of low for general and violent re-offence. The same assessment was supportive of transfer to minimum security.

A review of Crick’s institutional behaviour does not indicate any concerns or incidents that are noteworthy or impact the nature or assessment of this report. Crick has not required any special management intervention since his previous Security Review.

15Essentially, it is evident that while the applicant has served his sentence up to this point without serious incident, he continues to refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the murders and expresses no remorse or regret for his actions.

16In R. v. Cofell [2007] O.J. No. 5682, 2007 CarswellOnt 9976, the applicant possessed a similarly “clean” behavioural record during incarceration, and participated with great success in an impressive array of educational, employment, and counselling activities. Nevertheless, L.C. Templeton J. wrote at paras. 160-161:

In my view, given the nature of the offences of which Mr. Cofell was found guilty, the number of lives he ended and the way he did so, the imposition of a less harsh penalty would not be justified under any circumstances notwithstanding the commendable personal growth and progress, Mr. Cofell has experienced and demonstrated while incarcerated.

I am also concerned quite frankly with respect to the absence of probative evidence concerning any remorse or anguish Mr. Cofell has demonstrably experienced regarding the pain and anguish these murders visited upon the families of the victims.

Information provided by any person defined as a victim

17A number of heart-rending and convincing victim impact statements have been provided to this court, objecting to the early release of the applicant and describing the emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the friends and family of the two victims as well as their grief and sense of loss.

Conclusion

18After applying the criteria to be considered as set out in s. 745.61(2), I do not believe that there is a substantial likelihood that a properly instructed jury would recommend a reduction in parole eligibility for the applicant. Notwithstanding the applicant’s good conduct while incarcerated and the conclusions reached by correction officials that he is a low risk to public safety, I believe that the appellant’s failure to acknowledge responsibility for the murders and his lack of remorse provide an insight into his character and would lead a jury to conclude that he is not sufficiently rehabilitated to be released into society.

19Furthermore, it is my view that the most important reason that a jury would refuse this application is the nature of the crimes and the circumstances surrounding their commission. Not only was the extent of the violence used in both murders horrific, but the planning and deliberation used to carry them out is shocking. Professional killers could hardly have been expected to carry out the tasks in a more callous and cold-blooded way. The fact that there were more than six months involved between the two murders and one of the victims was a close family member only supports that conclusion. I am therefore of the view that there is no prospect of a reduction of parole eligibility. Since the applicant has failed to satisfy the onus that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed, this application is therefore dismissed.