Lucia Mendonca

The father brought a motion for interim custody of the parties' two children, and the mother brought a cross-motion for interim sole custody.

The court addressed the father's "self-help" remedy of removing the children from the mother's care and taking them to Timmins.

The court determined that the children's primary residence should be with the mother, preserving the pre-August 2020 status quo, and dismissed both the father's motion for interim custody and the mother's cross-motion for interim sole custody, emphasizing that interim custody orders should be exceptional.

An Office of the Children's Lawyer order was also made.

A child protection proceeding involving four children with proceedings in two different jurisdictions.

The applicant society sought to transfer the matter from Kapuskasing to Woodstock, while the respondent mother sought interim custody of the children.

The court applied the "preponderance of convenience" test under section 48(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, considering the best interests of the children.

The court found that the matter should remain in Kapuskasing jurisdiction and granted interim custody to the respondent mother subject to supervision and conditions.

On a motion concerning interim custody, access, and child support, the father sought a temporary order reflecting recommendations made in an Office of the Children’s Lawyer investigation report and a reduction of ongoing child support.

The court held that while the factual evidence contained in an assessment report may be considered on an interim motion, the assessor’s recommendations should generally not be relied upon absent exceptional circumstances.

Applying that approach, the court declined to adopt the recommendations wholesale and instead fashioned an interim parenting arrangement maintaining the child’s primary residence with the mother while granting the father defined access, including summer and monthly school‑year parenting time.

The court also declined to reduce child support, imputing income to the father on the basis that he was not earning to his full potential.

The result was a temporary parenting and access regime with child support remaining unchanged.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a consent order made at a settlement conference that declared a sperm donor agreement invalid.

The mother's former counsel had consented to the order via telephone while the mother was not present, and without prior notice that the agreement's validity would be determined.

The court found it had jurisdiction under Rule 25(19)(d) of the Family Law Rules to change the order because it was made without notice and the mother's counsel lacked ostensible authority to consent.

The motion was granted and the order was changed.

In a family law proceeding involving access and a declaration of parentage following a sperm donation, the parties jointly sought an order protecting the privacy of the child at the centre of the dispute.

The requested relief included amending the title of proceedings to use initials, prohibiting publication of identifying information, and sealing the court file.

The court held that the sensitive and intimate nature of the information in the proceedings created a risk of future emotional or psychological harm to the child if identifying details entered the public domain.

Relying on analogous cases and statutory authority under the Courts of Justice Act, the court concluded that the proposed anonymity and sealing measures were necessary and would not impair public debate about the legal issues.

The requested orders were granted to protect the child’s privacy and best interests.

The biological father brought a motion seeking interim access to a child conceived through artificial insemination pursuant to a prior donor agreement in which he purported to relinquish parental rights.

The respondent mother opposed access and relied on the existing status quo in which the child had never met the biological father.

Applying the best interests test under s. 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court acknowledged the importance of biological relationships but emphasized the principle of maintaining the status quo on interim motions.

Given the child's young age and the proximity of the scheduled trial date, the court found that introducing the applicant at the interim stage risked confusion and potential harm.

The motion for interim access and related requests were dismissed.