Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: 17412/11 DATE: 20130208

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

W.W. Applicant

– and –

X.X. and Y.Y. Respondent

Counsel: Donna-Marie Dorrington, appearing as agent for Lucia Mendonca, for the Applicant Michelle Flowerday, for the Respondent

HEARD: December 19, 2012

DECISION ON MOTION

hennessy J.:

[1] In this case, the applicant W.W. seeks a declaration of parentage and access to the child Z.Z., born to the respondent X.X. and conceived using W.W.’s donated sperm. In response, X.X. relies upon a document called the Donor Agreement, which was signed by herself and the applicant two years before the birth of the child. X.X. argues that W.W. agreed to have no involvement with or rights of access to any child born to X.X. from W.W.’s donated sperm.

[2] On March 28, 2012, an order was made with respect to the validity of the Donor Agreement. That order is the subject of this motion.

Case Background

[3] The child Z was born on […], 2010. On January 28, 2011, X.X. filed an Application seeking access to the child and a declaration of parentage.

[4] Following a case conference which took place April 21, 2011, a settlement conference was held on March 28, 2012 with Cornell J. presiding. Counsel for W.W. attended in person. Counsel for X.X. attended via telephone from a remote location. The judge’s endorsement after the settlement conference included the following:

The following admissions have been agreed to:

Order to go:

1. The Donor Agreement is invalid as there was no consideration.

2. The applicant is the biological father of the child, Z.Z.…

3. The sole remaining issue is what is in the best interest of the child given the absence of legislation in Ontario in disputes of this nature.

4. The applicant may bring a motion for interim access on April 18, 2012.

[5] The endorsement also included other terms relating to timelines for bringing any interim motions, filing of materials and the time limit for bringing a motion for intervener status.

[6] On this motion the respondent mother seeks to change the Order of Cornell J. by striking out paragraphs 1 and 3. Counsel relies on Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court to ensure procedural fairness.

[7] X.X. was the only respondent at the time of the original settlement conference. On the date this motion was heard, Y.Y., the spouse of X.X. was added as a respondent on consent.

Statutory Provisions of the [Family Law Rules](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-114-99/latest/o-reg-114-99.html)

[8] RULE 2(2) - PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

(2) The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2 (2).

RULE 2(3) - DEALING WITH CASES JUSTLY

(3) Dealing with a case justly includes,

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2 (3).

RULE 17(5) - PURPOSES OF SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE

(5) The purposes of a settlement conference include,

(a) exploring the chances of settling the case;

(b) settling or narrowing the issues in dispute;

(c) ensuring disclosure of the relevant evidence;

(c.1) settling or narrowing any issues relating to any expert evidence or reports on which the parties intend to rely at trial;

(d) noting admissions that may simplify the case;

(e) if possible, obtaining a view of how the court might decide the case;

(f) considering any other matter that may help in a quick and just conclusion of the case;

(g) if the case is not settled, identifying the witnesses and other evidence to be presented at trial, estimating the time needed for trial and scheduling the case for trial; and

(h) organizing a trial management conference, or holding one if appropriate. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 17 (5); O. Reg. 6/10, s. 7 (3).

RULE 17(19) - CONFERENCE AGREEMENT

(19) No agreement reached at a conference is effective until it is signed by the parties, witnessed and, in a case involving a special party, approved by the court. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 17 (19).

RULE 25(19) - CHANGING ORDER — FRAUD, MISTAKE, LACK OF NOTICE

(19) The court may, on motion, change an order that,

(a) was obtained by fraud;

(b) contains a mistake;

(c) needs to be changed to deal with a matter that was before the court but that it did not decide;

(d) was made without notice; or

(e) was made with notice, if an affected party was not present when the order was made because the notice was inadequate or the party was unable, for a reason satisfactory to the court, to be present. O. Reg. 151/08, s. 6.

Facts

The “Donor Agreement”

[9] The parties signed a document entitled “Donor Agreement,” in which W.W. agreed to provide his semen to inseminate X.X.. The parties were not represented by lawyers when they entered into this agreement. The Donor Agreement reads as follows:

I, W.W., hereby sign over any and all parental rights to any children created by using my donated semen. I understand that by signing my rights over I will have absolutely no rights, from this day forward, to see, visit, claim or request custody of any children resulting from use of my sperm. By signing this agreement I understand that my semen will be used to inseminate X.X., which will potentially result in children being conceived. As well as not having any rights to any children born of my donated semen, I will not be responsible at any time to pay support of any kind for all children conceived by using my semen. I further agree that at no time will I interact with the child(ren) without the consent of the mother. Also I will not tell any children, that I believe to be conceived with my semen, that I am their biological father. I agree that I will not interfere with the raising of children. This agreement is a legally binding contract and cannot be changed or revoked without the consent and agreement of the mother as well as the adoptive parent, if any.

Signed this 1st day of October 2008.

Donor: (signed by W.W.)

Recipient: (signed by X.X.)

[10] At the settlement conference, the presiding judge raised the issue of consideration and the validity of the agreement. By the end of the settlement conference, counsel for X.X. made the admission that the contract was invalid and consented to the order as set out earlier. X.X. now argues that this order was made without notice, without authority, without instructions, without any opportunity for counsel to communicate with her and in breach of a number of principles of procedural fairness.

Circumstances of the Settlement Conference

[11] Both counsel who attended the settlement conference filed affidavits on this motion attesting to their recollection of the circumstances of the conference. Ms. Sutherland, who was acting for X.X., is no longer retained. Ms. Mendonca, who was present at the settlement conference and still acts for W.W., arranged to have an agent appear on her behalf on this motion.

[12] In the days preceding the settlement conference there was email communication between X.X. and her counsel. X.X. had asked that her file be returned to her and indicated that she would be seeking new counsel. With respect to the settlement conference, the following was communicated:

I ask only that you ask for an adjournment so that I may try to find new council [sic]. I need time to do that so I would appreciate if you would do this last thing for us. (Excerpt from email dated March 27, 2008 from X.X. to her counsel.)

[13] The settlement conference was scheduled to take place in Timmins. Prior to the settlement conference, counsel for X.X. made arrangements to attend the conference via telephone as she was also scheduled to fly to Fort Albany, a northern coastal community, to attend court that day. The plane carrying the court party made a scheduled landing in Kapuskasing to pick up other members of the court party. There, the court flight was delayed due to inclement weather. Ms. Sutherland participated in the settlement conference by telephone from the airport. The conference lasted for approximately one hour.

[14] During the conference, according to Ms Sutherland, the other passengers from the court party and the crew were anxiously waiting for the weather conditions to improve enough to continue the flight. When the weather conditions did improve enough to allow the plane to depart, the other passengers and crew wanted to leave as quickly as possible in order to take advantage of the window of opportunity and communicated this urgency to Ms. Sutherland.

[15] Counsel for W.W. disputes some of the details as described by Ms. Sutherland, including whether court was cancelled, whether the judge was part of the court party and whether it was reasonable for Ms. Sutherland to have felt pressured. However, none of these details are germane to my assessment of what transpired during the settlement conference.

[16] Ms. Sutherland’s location was known to the judge and to counsel for the applicant, who were present together in a conference room in the Timmins courthouse. X.X. was obviously not present with her counsel at the airport. Unknown to counsel for W.W. and possibly to counsel for X.X., X.X. attended the courthouse and was waiting in the corridor during the settlement conference, unaware of precisely where it was taking place.

[17] As counsel for W.W. left the settlement conference, she saw X.X. in the corridor, handed her a copy of the endorsement and suggested that X.X. contact her lawyer. Shortly after the settlement conference X.X. terminated her retainer with counsel. X.X. filed an Intention To Act In Person on April 11, 2008. Sometime in the first half of April, counsel for W.W. drafted an order reflecting the endorsement. The order was in precisely the same form as the endorsement.

[18] The Order as drafted by counsel for W.W. noted on the form that the Order was “temporary”. Counsel for W.W. sent it to counsel for X.X. and to X.X. directly. Counsel for W.W. waited the requisite ten days pursuant to Family Law Rules, Rule 25(8) and on April 23 requested the court to sign the order without the approval of either X.X. or her former counsel. The order was entered by the Registrar on April 23, 2012.

[19] Ms. Sutherland filed two affidavits on this motion. She stated that the settlement conference judge strongly urged counsel to narrow the issues for the trial and in particular he gave his views on the validity of the agreement. She made three points in her affidavit:

• that she reluctantly agreed to the admission in para 1 of the order given the pressures of the moment;
• that she did not have instructions to make this agreement; and
• that she did not have an opportunity to consult with her client prior to making the admission.

Positions of the Parties

[20] X.X., the moving party, submits that this court has jurisdiction to provide the relief sought and relies on the Rule 25(19), which allows the court to change orders in certain circumstances. X.X. argues that the motion was made without notice, as neither the Application nor the settlement conference brief indicated that W.W. would be seeking such an order at the settlement conference.

[21] X.X. further submits that this court has inherent jurisdiction to correct breaches of procedural fairness and that the order was made in circumstances where there was a breach of procedural fairness.

[22] Finally, X.X. argues that a denial of her motion to change the Order would result in irreparable damage that could not be adequately compensated for monetarily in an action against her former solicitor. On the other hand, she argues, if the motion is successful, the case would simply revert to the status quo ante, as the responding party would be in the same position he was before the settlement conference.

[23] W.W. essentially makes two arguments in support of his position that the order should remain in place. Firstly, he argues that Rule 25(19) does not give a judge of the Superior Court of Justice jurisdiction to change an order of another judge of the same court. He argues that X.X. is effectively asking me to overturn an order of another Superior Court judge, a matter which should properly be dealt with on appeal. With respect to the notice provisions in Rule 26(19)(d) specifically, W.W. argues that the consent order was made with X.X. present in the courthouse and while she was represented by a solicitor. W.W. submits that there were no breaches of procedural fairness in the circumstances surrounding the making of this consent order.

[24] Secondly, W.W. argues that it is settled law that the court should not interfere with a settlement where the lawyer has the apparent authority of the client and the lawyer has not otherwise communicated any limits on their authority. Counsel must be entitled to rely upon ostensible authority that each has in order to provide the necessary certainty that settlements are final and unimpeachable. Where counsel agrees to a settlement outside the limits of their authority, the client has recourse against the solicitor.

[25] Finally, W.W. argues that if the motion is successful, then any client, at any time who is unhappy with an agreement reached by their lawyer could seek to change it and there would be no certainty in agreements reached in these conferences or in settlement negotiations, all of which is contrary to public policy.

Analysis

[26] Counsel for X.X. originally argued that the court had jurisdiction to change an order under Rule 25(19)(b), on the basis that there was a mistake in the making of the order, and Rule 25(19)(d), on the basis that the order was made without notice. However, in final argument, she relied primarily on Rule 25(19)(d).

Rule 25(19)(d) – Lack of Notice

[27] In the Application, W.W. sought orders for a declaration of parentage and access to the child Z.Z..

[28] The factual section of the application, at paras 3 through to 8, describes the circumstances preceding the signing of the Agreement. Para. 17 of the factual section reads in part: “He is wanting [sic] generous and liberal access to his son, contrary to the contract that he signed for the respondent mother. The applicant father signed the contract under duress and does not feel that the contract is valid.”

[29] There was no notice of motion ever filed in this case seeking a declaration with respect to the validity of the Donor Agreement.

[30] Counsel for the parties filed settlement conference briefs prior to the settlement conference. Counsel for the applicant W.W. concedes that the settlement conference brief did not include any offer to settle or any request for an order that the agreement be deemed to be invalid. It is common ground that the subjects of paragraph 1 and 3 of the order were not initiated by counsel for W.W.. Counsel for W.W. further agreed that the judge voiced a strong opinion on the status of the contract and proposed the consent order.

[31] While the factual section of the application makes the Donor Agreement a central issue in dispute and identifies a possible defence to the enforcement of the Agreement, I do not agree that the sentence in para. 17 can be construed as notice to X.X. that W.W. was seeking a ruling on the validity of the agreement. Prior to the settlement conference, on the basis of the material that had been filed by W.W., there was no reason for counsel for X.X. to advise her client that the agreement would be the subject of argument or judicial order, nor to seek instructions from her client in respect to making any concessions on the issue of the agreement. This is especially significant since the Donor Agreement was central to X.X.’s argument that the parties had come to a prior agreement with respect to the intention of the parties on the issue of the parenting any child born as a result of the sperm donation.

[32] Even though counsel know that temporary and final orders can be made at conferences pursuant to Rule 17(8)(b.1), the conferences are not meant to be adversarial proceedings which can result in orders adverse in interest to one party or the other.

[33] The purpose of notice in adversarial proceedings where litigants know that an order adverse to their interests can be made is to provide the parties with the opportunity to know the case they must meet, to hear the case against them and to respond. In the circumstances of a settlement Conference, the purpose of notice is to provide litigants and their counsel with notice of any settlement offers that will be made.

[34] Family Law Rule 14(9)(a) explicitly requires notice, prior to seeking relief in the form of Orders. This procedural rule is consistent with the overarching principle of the Rules to “deal with cases justly” and with the common law requirements for procedural fairness. I find that the order made on March 28, 2012 was made without notice and that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 25(19)(d) to change the order. While on the face of it, it might be difficult to reconcile the notion of a consent order with an order made without notice, the unique circumstances of this case lead only to this conclusion. It will be rare that these two circumstances coincide, an order made on consent and an order made without notice. However, as these reasons go onto to explain, the circumstances of this case were unusual.

Rule 25(19)(d)- Mistake

[35] Counsel for W.W. submitted that the case of Gray v. Rizzi, [2011] ONCA 436 supports their position that Rule 25(19)(b) cannot be used to change an Order on the basis of a error with respect to a substantive question before the court. From my reading of that case, the moving party sought to change an order based on arguments going to the merits of the decision. Boswell J. dismissed the motion, saying mistakes in law are appealable errors and not subject to correction under Rule 25(19). The Court of Appeal agreed and in its endorsement, said that the arguments of the moving party went the correctness of the order and that the correctness of the order is not the type of mistake that was contemplated by Rule 25(19)(b). The issue of non-compliance with procedural safeguards, including the notice provisions was not the subject of argument or comment in Gray v. Rizzi and therefore it does not apply to the issue of jurisdiction in the case before me. In this case the moving party has not challenged the correctness of the order.

[36] Given my finding with respect to the application of Rule 25(19)(d) it is not necessary to address further the application of Rule 25(19)(b). Nor is it necessary to rely on the court’s inherent jurisdiction with regards to procedural fairness.

The Law of Settlements

[37] W.W. submits that the law of settlements, and in particular the right to rely on the ostensible authority of solicitors to enter into settlements, should be determinative. His arguments rely on the general principle that where the retainer is not disputed, a settlement concluded by a lawyer acting within his or her apparent authority is binding upon the client, citing Fabian v. Bud Mervyn Construction Ltd., 1981 CanLII 1713 (ON SC), [1981] 35 O.R. (2d) 132 (Ont. Div. Ct); Belanger v. Southwestern Insulation Contractors Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 3205 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[38] W.W. also argues that there are public policy reasons to uphold settlements reached by counsel acting with the apparent authority of their clients. Among other things, he argues that failing to do so would foster secondary litigation to overturn settlements and create chaos in the settlement process (citing Marcel Equipment Ltd. v. Equipements Benoit D'Amours et Fils Inc., 1995 O.J. No 673).

[39] I do not find this line of reasoning persuasive, for two reasons: First, the parties were not involved in settlement negotiations. And second, there was no ostensible authority.

Negotiated Settlements vs. Settlement Conferences

[40] W.W. relied on the case of Walker v. Walker, 2006 CanLII 3288 (ON SC), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 209, at para. 20, where the court upheld the settlement reached by a wife’s former solicitor in negotiations in the context of matrimonial litigation. In that case the wife argued that her former solicitor did not have the authority he ostensibly exercised on her behalf in concluding the settlement, which she claimed was made to her detriment. Campbell J. found that the solicitors had reached an agreement, and that the solicitor for Mrs. Walker had ostensible authority to reach the settlement that he did. The court relied on Scherer v. Paletta, (1966), 1966 CanLII 286 (ON CA), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 532 (Ont. C.A.) to uphold the agreement. Further, the judge concluded that any real harm that Mrs. Walker may have suffered could be redressed by way of a claim against her former solicitor.

[41] What happened in the case at hand cannot be compared with a settlement negotiated between lawyers. In this case, the solicitor made an admission to the court on an issue raised by the court at a statutory conference. This conference was governed by procedural rules. No such rules govern settlement negotiations.

[42] The ‘agreement’ reached by counsel for X.X. and W.W. must be viewed within the statutory framework for conferences as set out in the Family Law Rules. Rule 17(15) requires that the litigants personally attend settlement conferences, and in appreciation of the significance of the decisions made in the context of family law disputes, Rule 17(19) mandates that parties must personally sign agreements that are reached at conferences.

[43] The requirement that parties personally attend conferences and personally sign agreements are hallmarks of a process intentionally designed to involve the litigants in every procedure and at every stage of the litigation. No agreement reached at a conference is effective until it is signed by the parties and witnessed. If W.W. intends to characterize this admission as something akin to a settlement made between solicitors for the purpose of fitting it within the law on negotiated settlements, then W.W. theoretically would also be bound by Rule 17(19) that requires that the agreement be signed by the parties before it became effective.

[44] However, in the case at bar, no minutes of settlement were prepared subsequent to the settlement conference. X.X. did not at any time sign an agreement to the effect that she consented to the order that was made at the settlement conference. As I indicated above, there is no similarity between what happened at this settlement conference and the negotiations that took place in Walker v. Walker or of the type of settlements contemplated by Rule 17(19).

Ostensible Authority

[45] There is a second reason why the law upholding settlements negotiated by solicitors with ostensible authority does not apply to this event. The ratios of the above-noted cases rest on express findings that the lawyers entering into the impugned settlement had ostensible authority.

[46] As I have found, W.W. did not give notice that he was seeking an order at the settlement conference with respect to the issue of consideration or the validity of the agreement. Counsel for W.W. was fully aware that the issue of consideration had not been raised or put in issue prior to the Settlement Conference. She also knew that that opposing counsel had not had any opportunity to consult with her client nor to receive instructions from her client once the judge had put the matter in issue. The circumstances of this case raise the question whether counsel for W.W. had objectively good reason to doubt the ostensible authority of the lawyer who entered into the settlement. Where there is objectively good reason to doubt the authority of the lawyer entering into an agreement, can the opposing lawyer turn a blind eye and suggest that the mere fact that a lawyer was present means that the lawyer had ostensible authority?

[47] With respect to the fact that counsel consented to the order, I consider the following circumstances of the settlement conference to be noteworthy:

• counsel for X.X. participated by telephone from a remote location;
• X.X. was neither present at the settlement conference nor with her lawyer; and
• that there was no notice that specific relief was being sought in the form of an order invalidating the agreement.

[48] Added to those objectively determinable facts is Ms. Sutherland’s assertion that she subjectively felt pressured to agree to the proposal urged upon her by the judge at the same time as she was being pressed to end the call to allow the crew and passengers to take advantage of a break in the weather to depart from the airport where they had been grounded

[49] When there is good reason to doubt the authority of counsel making an admission or agreement, opposing counsel cannot seek to rely on what has been called the ‘ostensible authority’ of counsel. The word ostensible implies that something is apparent, or in view. There was nothing apparent about counsel’s authority in this case. Counsel for W.W. knew that the solicitor was attending the conference by telephone from a remote airport, in the absence of her client and was faced for the first time with a request for major substantive relief. There was no affidavit or oral evidence on the issue of consideration. Therefore, I find that there were objectively good reasons to doubt the authority the lawyer who gave her consent to the Order.

[50] Again, I stress that this is a highly unusual situation. In addition to the issue of notice discussed earlier, it would be rare for counsel to find themselves in the position where an agreement made with opposing counsel was likely made without authority. However, the facts and circumstances of this case bring us to this conclusion. Counsel for W.W. cannot rely on the principle of ostensible authority. The admission underlying the consent order was not given with ostensible authority in any sense of the phrase.

[51] The circumstances of the settlement conference should have been a red flag for counsel for W.W.. While in this case the agreement was immediately made into an order by the presiding settlement conference judge, the spirit of the Rules should have informed the lawyer for W.W. with respect to how she then proceeded to take out the order.

[52] W.W. also relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Bachlow v. Jewish Family and Child Services [2006] O.J. No. 1826 in support of the argument that a consent order should be upheld where it was made by counsel. In Bachlow the court upheld a consent order made by the trial judge. The decision was based on the fact that the agreed statement of facts on which the judge relied was signed by the party, who was present with counsel when the consent order was made, and also that there was no evidence that counsel lacked authority to consent to the order. In other words, the circumstances bore all the ‘hallmarks’ of authority. Here, X.X. did not sign any agreement, nor was she present when the consent order was made. Bachlow is distinguishable on its facts and therefore cannot be applied to the case before me.

Conclusions

[53] Rule 17(19), which requires a party to sign a settlement reached at a settlement conference, does not explicitly refer to agreements that are subsequently turned into orders; however, I must consider this issue in the context of Rules 2(2) and 2(3), which set out the primary objective of the Family Law Act. The rules are intended to enable the court to deal with cases justly, which includes ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties and deals with cases in ways that are appropriate to their importance and complexity.

[54] I disagree with the argument made by counsel that there are public policy reasons to uphold this consent order. The public interest is served when parties know and follow the rules providing procedural fairness and can rely on a statutory scheme that is specially designed to take into account the specific characteristics of family law disputes. W.W. will suffer no prejudice if the consent to the order is now withdrawn. I was presented with no evidence to suggest that W.W. placed any reliance on this so-called consent, or any other basis for prejudice to him.

[55] Counsel for W.W. argued that the appropriate recourse for X.X. would be to seek redress against her former counsel for this action. I do not agree. X.X. would lose a significant evidentiary foundation for her claim that the circumstances leading to the birth of the child were part of an “intended family project” to which W.W. had turned his mind and signed an agreement limiting any parental rights, while at the same time achieving the promise that no claim for child support would be made against W.W.. The potential consequences of the order are not compensable in money damages.

[56] The objectives of the Family Law Act informed Kiteley J. in the case of Robinson v. Morrison [2000] O.J. No. 2973. There, the appellant sought to appeal an access order made at a “first appearance” court. Because the Family Law Rules do not provide for a “first appearance” court, Kiteley J concluded that the procedure should be considered as if it were either a case conference or a settlement conference. There was no argument that the order was made without consent, without any notice of motion, and without any affidavit or sworn testimony. Kiteley J. allowed the appeal, sent the matter back for hearing and stated at para. 12:

Before any substantive order is made, a litigant is entitled to notice of the case she must meet, entitled to an opportunity to respond to that case and entitled to an opportunity to be heard. This case was not fairly and fully heard when all of the elements of procedural fairness were not present. The appellant received no notice that an important order such as this would be sought…

[57] Fertility law, including the legal issues with respect to assisted reproduction, remains in the early stages of development. Counsel advised me that they know of no Ontario decision that has dealt with or determined a disputed claim for access and parentage in circumstances of assisted reproduction. It is not clear on the face of this matter what role the Donor Agreement will play in the ultimate determination of the matters in issue. However, it is obvious from the pleadings that this case raises new and complex issues. The Donor Agreement was central to the actions of and the positions taken by both parties. It should be before the court when the matter is fully heard.

[58] I am satisfied that this court has jurisdiction to change the order as requested in the motion before me. I find that the Order should be changed because it was made without notice, was based on a consent given by a lawyer without authority to do so, in circumstances where opposing counsel had good reason to doubt the authority to consent and where there will be no prejudice to the responding party if the order is changed and no effective compensation available to the moving party if the change is not made.

[59] Order to go in terms requested in the notice of motion. If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may make brief written submissions to me, no longer than three pages with attached bills of costs and any offers. Counsel for X.X., to file submissions within 21 days of the date of this decision. Counsel for W.W., to file reply submissions within 14 days after.

Madam Justice Patricia C. Hennessy

Released: February 8, 2013

COURT FILE NO.: 17412/11 DATE: 20130208

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

W.W. Applicant

-and-

X.X. and Y.Y. Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Hennessy J.

Released: February 8, 2013