Fraud

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States to face fraud charges.

The applicant argued that the Minister failed to properly weigh the Cotroni factors and his section 6 Charter rights, given that he was on the verge of pleading guilty to Canadian charges before they were stayed due to the extradition request.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister properly considered the unusual factual history and reasonably concluded that the United States had a significantly greater interest in prosecuting the case.

The appellant appealed a conviction for fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide if the conduct amounted to theft by conversion.

The Court held that making use of funds while being wilfully blind to their source constitutes dishonesty, satisfying the elements of fraud.

The appellant appealed a $56,000 restitution order imposed following a joint submission for his minor role in a fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the appellant's future ability to pay, noting he was an immigrant student with limited employment prospects who received little personal benefit from the fraud.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was set aside.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed his conviction for fraud.

At trial, he called the investigating officer as his own witness and elicited prejudicial opinion and investigative hearsay evidence.

The trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence and instead invited the jury to use it to support the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible only for a limited purpose and required a clear limiting instruction.

The curative proviso could not be applied, as the evidence provided a clear route to conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a lawyer who had power of attorney over a deceased client's affairs, was convicted of theft over $1,000 for failing to notify an insurance company of the client's death and continuing to collect annuity payments.

He appealed the conviction and the dismissal of his pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay, the total institutional and Crown delay of ten months fell within acceptable limits.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order finding that their debt to the respondents survived bankruptcy due to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant physician breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent patients by falsely assuring them their investment was safe.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but the costs awarded by the motion judge were reduced to exclude costs from related proceedings.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding costs and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's allegations in its defence and counterclaim did not amount to fraud or improper conduct seriously prejudicial to character or reputation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,000.

The appellant's home was fraudulently transferred to an impostor who then mortgaged the property to the respondent.

The respondent registered the mortgage without knowledge of the fraud.

The appellant sought to set aside the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal held that the Land Titles Act operates on the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

Because the respondent acquired its interest directly from the fraudster, it was an intermediate owner and its charge was invalid against the true owner.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgage was set aside.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to set aside a 1993 consent judgment and a 1997 order on the basis of alleged fraud and non-disclosure by the respondent.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and issued an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act prohibiting the appellant from commencing further proceedings without leave.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, agreeing that the fresh evidence of fraud lacked probative value and that the issues of financial disclosure were barred by res judicata.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a sentence imposed for failing to remit $750,000 in GST funds.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in rejecting unchallenged submissions regarding the appellants' financial circumstances without notice, a conditional sentence was not appropriate.

The court held that the massive fraud on the public ordinarily called for a penitentiary sentence, and although mitigating factors justified a reformatory sentence, general deterrence required a custodial term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended appraisal evidence, failed to consider his honest belief in the property's value, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the appraisals, correctly applied the elements of fraud, and imposed a demonstrably fit sentence given the breach of fiduciary duty and deliberate deception.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impersonation, fraud over $5,000, and failure to comply with a recognizance, and was sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment and eighteen months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of a serious medical condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's criminal record and the commission of the second offence while on bail.

The court also declined to reduce the sentence based on the fresh evidence, noting the institution's obligation to provide adequate medical treatment and the upcoming parole hearing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it owned a Porsche purchased from a third party who fraudulently claimed to have bought it from the respondent dealership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the dealership's act of registering the vehicle in the appellant's name provided prima facie evidence of the third party's authority to sell.

The appellant was declared the true owner, and a cross-appeal was allowed on consent, ordering the dealership to pay a specified sum to a credit company.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a $4 million fraud against his employer, driven by a pathological gambling addiction, and was sentenced to two years in penitentiary.

The trial judge also ordered full restitution of the $4 million, acknowledging it was purely symbolic and intended to save the employer civil litigation costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the restitution order, holding that such orders must bear some reality to the offender's means and should not be used merely as a substitute for civil proceedings, especially where it would impair rehabilitation.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision regarding its duty to defend the respondent insured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim against the insured for careless conduct was clearly separable from the fraud alleged against her, and was not derivative.

Furthermore, the exclusion clause did not squarely cover the claim, as it did not rely on care, custody, or control.

The court also rejected the appellant's notice argument, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents in relation to a complex tax loss scheme involving limited partnerships.

On appeal, they argued that evidence obtained during a joint investigation by Revenue Canada's Tax Avoidance and Special Investigations sections violated their Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that while the predominant purpose test from Jarvis might push back the date the Charter breach occurred, the evidence was inevitably discoverable and properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, finding the sentences fit for a massive $118 million tax fraud.

The appellant appealed a 15-month custodial sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had made $103,000 in restitution and had successfully served a 12-month conditional sentence for an unrelated fraud charge since the original sentencing.

Relying on the fresh evidence and the Crown's previous position that the appellant was a suitable candidate for a conditional sentence, the Court allowed the appeal.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, with ongoing restitution requirements.

The Crown appealed a two-year sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple serious and sophisticated frauds committed while on parole for similar offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting specific deterrence and held the original sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a fit sentence of five years was substituted, reduced to 43 months after accounting for pre-trial custody.

The plaintiff invested $145,000 in a non-existent company based on fraudulent representations by the defendant stock promoter.

The plaintiff obtained summary judgment against the promoter, his wife, and his corporation for fraud and unpaid loans.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment for fraud against the promoter and the corporation, finding the promoter's self-serving affidavits and failure to produce supporting documents did not raise a genuine issue for trial.

However, the Court set aside the summary judgment against the promoter's wife due to insufficient evidence of her involvement, and against the promoter for the loans due to conflicting evidence.