Fraud

The appellants purchased a house from the respondent vendors and subsequently discovered defects.

They sued the vendors for fraud and the home inspector for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against all defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellants' expert evidence was insufficient to ground a fraud claim against the vendors, and that the home inspector's report clearly identified defects and limitations.

The court also rejected the appellants' claim of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to unreliable bookkeeping by a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bookkeeping irrelevant to the fraud finding.

The trial judge was entitled to rely on other witness evidence and the defence's admission that the appellant received the money from the joint venture.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded a remedy based on misrepresentation.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred by making findings of fraudulent misrepresentation after the respondents' counsel expressly stated at the outset of trial that they were not claiming fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a remedy could not be based on fraud, the trial judge properly characterized the misrepresentations as negligent, which fully justified the remedy awarded.

The appellant was duped into mortgaging his father's properties and the funds disappeared.

The respondent lenders sued, obtained a Mareva injunction, and $250,000 of the appellant's lottery winnings were paid into court.

The respondents obtained default judgment.

The appellant moved for payment out of court of the frozen funds to pay for legal and living expenses, including defending related criminal charges.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that once default judgment was granted, the Mareva injunction was spent and the funds were subject to the Creditors' Relief Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that without a motion to set aside the default judgment demonstrating a meritorious defence, there is no principled basis to allow a defendant to deplete funds available to judgment creditors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to find he had a colour of right defence.

The trial judge found the appellant forged time sheets to obtain payments from a company, despite the appellant's honest belief that the company was liable to him in damages for breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the mens rea test for fraud from R. v. Théroux.

The Court held that the appellant's personal belief of entitlement to damages did not negative the mens rea, as he intentionally committed a deceitful act knowing it could cause deprivation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty in several real estate transactions with the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on most transactions, including orders for disgorgement of profits based on knowing receipt and conspiracy with a fiduciary.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the King's Highway 2A property, finding no basis for disgorgement where no fiduciary breach or damages were proven.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed in part, holding a former employee jointly and severally liable for a $300,000 improper price abatement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for participating in three fraudulent schemes, arguing the trial judge's conclusions were unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding substantial evidence that the appellant deliberately participated in the schemes.

The appellants appealed an order striking out portions of their statement of claim.

The struck portions alleged that the respondent bank owed a duty of care to the appellants, who were not its customers, to inquire into its customer's activities to ensure the accounts were not used for fraudulent purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the facts pleaded did not give rise to a recognized duty of care, nor did they warrant recognizing a new duty of care under the Anns/Kamloops principles.

The moving party brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal under rule 61.06(1).

The responding party, who had made a consumer proposal in bankruptcy, was appealing a decision that refused to set aside a consent order converting a default judgment into a judgment in fraud.

The responding party argued he consented to the order due to his former solicitor's misunderstanding and failure to explain the consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that although the responding party was impecunious, his appeal was not plainly devoid of merit and he should not be deprived of the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for a declaration that sections 7(3)(d)(i) and 7(3)(h.2) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) violate section 8 of the Charter.

The Royal Bank of Canada had obtained information from the Toronto Dominion Bank regarding fraudulent mortgage transactions involving the appellants' trust accounts, which it used to obtain a Mareva injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that PIPEDA regulates private organizations and does not transform them into state agents, thus section 8 of the Charter was not engaged.

Furthermore, the appellants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for fraud.

They argued that a statement made during a vehicle stop should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 10(a) breach but found the statement admissible under s. 24(2), noting the breach was not serious and the officer acted in good faith.

The court also found no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches.

The statement was admissible against the co-accused as an adoptive admission by silence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the court agreed a conditional sentence was unwarranted but reduced the custodial sentences to six months imprisonment to better reflect specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

Restitution orders were maintained but clarified as joint and several.

The appellant bank appealed a summary judgment requiring it to honour three certified cheques.

The cheques were purchased using funds derived from a fraudulent mortgage scheme.

The motion judge had found no evidence that the respondent payee participated in the fraud and held that the bank was obliged to pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge misapplied the burden of proof under the Bills of Exchange Act.

Because the bills were affected by fraud, the burden shifted to the respondent to prove he was a holder in due course.

Given the suspicious circumstances and credibility issues, there were genuine issues for trial.

The appellant, a former foreign exchange trader, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for fraud and breach of contract, and dismissing his counterclaim for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant had executed multiple unauthorized foreign exchange trades resulting in approximately $5.4 million in losses, which he concealed using fictitious credits.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, applied the wrong standard of proof for fraud, and erred in finding the employer could rely on his misrepresentations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the correct standard of proof applied, and that the employer's alleged carelessness was not a defence to fraud.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for accepting a secret benefit under s. 426(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the offence is established by proof that an agent accepted a secret benefit and placed themselves in a conflict of interest without alerting their principal, regardless of whether the benefit actually influenced their conduct.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the offence as a well-planned fraud upon the public purse.

The Court set aside the term of imprisonment and imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's lack of prior record, full restitution, loss of career, junior role, and cooperation with authorities.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and the resulting sentences, including a restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the identity of the vehicles involved, nor any inconsistency in the verdicts.

The court held that misrepresentations in insurance documents justified the fraud conviction and upheld the restitution order as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for breach of trust against his employer and fraud involving identity theft of credit card holders.

The trial judge noted the significant disruption to victims and financial institutions, and although the actual loss was limited to $40,000 due to early detection, the potential for greater loss existed.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant mistakenly sent a wire transfer to the respondent's bank account.

The respondent, believing the funds were repayment of a loan from a third-party fraudster, subsequently advanced another loan to that third party.

The appellant sued for unjust enrichment based on mistake of fact.

The trial judge found the respondent had a valid defence of change of position.

On appeal, the appellant argued the unusual circumstances of the transfer triggered a duty of inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty to inquire arose because a similar transaction had occurred a week prior and the third party had provided a plausible explanation.

The appellant employment agency placed an employee with the respondent without checking her references.

The employee subsequently defrauded the respondent.

The respondent obtained a civil judgment against the employee and then sued the appellant for negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the appellant liable but reduced damages by 50 percent due to the respondent's contributory negligence in failing to supervise the employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation, apportionment of liability, or the prevention of double recovery.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he defrauded the respondent in the sale of a business and awarding damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability and the valuation of the business.

The Court also upheld the award of $402,000 in consequential damages for wasted expenses incurred by the respondent in attempting to salvage the unviable business.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a minor clarification in the formal order to prevent double counting of damages.