McMurtry C.J.O.

The moving party sought to quash the appeal on the basis that the responding parties' factum sought to overturn the reasons for judgment rather than the judgment itself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the comprehensive Notice of Appeal governs the scope of the appeal.

The responding parties were granted leave to file a revised factum.

The appellant appealed his 15-month custodial sentence.

He had been denied bail on a second set of charges and refused a lifting of bail on his first charge.

The second set of charges was later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have considered the six months served on the withdrawn charges as relevant information under section 726.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court agreed with the 15-month sentence but granted 12 months of credit (at a 2:1 ratio) for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice and a subsequent costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had thoroughly canvassed the appellants' objections to a master's report and made no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $25,000.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence containing serious allegations regarding the conduct of the respondents' trial counsel.

The respondents' counsel, who also appeared on the appeal, failed to file a factum or responding material and sought an adjournment to challenge the fresh evidence, conceding his inexperience and lack of judgment.

Given the serious nature of the allegations, the Court of Appeal granted the adjournment and ordered the respondents to pay the appellants $2,500 in costs thrown away.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the comprehensive reasons of the trial judge.

The court found that the record supported the trial judge's factual findings and found no error in his application of the law to those facts.

Costs were fixed at $15,000.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting partition and sale of lands.

They argued there was an existing agreement for the purchase and sale of the lands.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the exchange of letters only committed the parties to a process and no binding agreement existed, as several terms had not been agreed upon.

The respondent's prima facie right to partition and sale was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the custody of children.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die to allow the Children's Lawyer to conduct further investigations into whether the best interests of the children would be served by granting custody to the appellant or the maternal grandmother.

The court also ordered a further assessment of one of the children by a doctor, with written submissions to follow the receipt of the new reports.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it owned a Porsche purchased from a third party who fraudulently claimed to have bought it from the respondent dealership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the dealership's act of registering the vehicle in the appellant's name provided prima facie evidence of the third party's authority to sell.

The appellant was declared the true owner, and a cross-appeal was allowed on consent, ordering the dealership to pay a specified sum to a credit company.

The appellant appealed an Order of Committal for Extradition.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no basis to interfere with the decision of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant purchasers entered into Agreements of Purchase and Sale with the respondent vendors to acquire farmlands for a golf course development.

The agreements were conditional on obtaining severance approvals for estate lots to be retained by the vendors.

The purchasers waived this condition and sought to close without the approvals, which the vendors refused.

The trial judge found the waiver clause ambiguous and held that the true intention of the parties required severance approvals prior to closing, declaring the agreements null and void and ordering the deposits forfeited.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and confirming that the purchasers' failure to perform the contract justified the forfeiture of the deposits.

The appellants appealed a judgment refusing to admit their affidavit evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applications judge made no error in refusing to admit the affidavit, and that even if it had been admitted, it would not have changed the result.

Costs were fixed at $3,000.

The appellant law firm appealed an order directing the assessment of all its accounts to the respondent, refusing to impose a solicitor's lien on a personal loan made to the respondent, and awarding solicitor and client costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no 'special circumstances' under s. 4(1) of the Solicitors Act to justify assessing accounts paid without objection more than six years prior.

However, the Court upheld the refusal to grant a charging order under s. 34(1) for a personal loan, as such orders must relate to legal services.

The costs award was also affirmed.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's conclusion regarding the threshold test in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the threshold test was not met until after February 1994.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $17,500.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing her application for judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decisions.

The Commission had declined to deal with her sexual harassment and discrimination complaints under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code, stating they were more appropriately dealt with under the Labour Relations Act through her union grievance.

The Court of Appeal found the Commission's decision patently unreasonable because the arbitrator had not actually dealt with the human rights issues, and the Commission failed to assess appropriateness on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also found the Commission misunderstood its reconsideration power under s. 37 by requiring new facts.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission.