Jacquie Chic

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing her application for judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decisions.

The Commission had declined to deal with her sexual harassment and discrimination complaints under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code, stating they were more appropriately dealt with under the Labour Relations Act through her union grievance.

The Court of Appeal found the Commission's decision patently unreasonable because the arbitrator had not actually dealt with the human rights issues, and the Commission failed to assess appropriateness on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also found the Commission misunderstood its reconsideration power under s. 37 by requiring new facts.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Commission.

The applicant sought review of an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an order for minimum wage and overtime pay.

The Officer had determined the applicant was a domestic servant and thus exempt from those provisions.

The Board found that the applicant, who cared for two young children for eleven hours a day, was employed as a nanny, not a domestic servant.

Applying a broad and generous interpretation to the legislation, the Board held that her extensive experience raising her own children and grandchildren satisfied the requirement of experience equivalent to formal training.

The appeal was allowed and the responding party was ordered to pay the agreed sum of $750.

The applicant sought a review of an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an order to pay, arguing he was an employee owed unpaid commissions or minimum wage.

The responding employer did not appear.

The Board found the applicant was an employee who worked exclusively at the employer's premises, meaning the commissioned sales exclusion from minimum wage did not apply.

The Board calculated the applicant was entitled to the greater of his earned commissions or minimum wage for hours worked, resulting in an order for the employer to pay $2,300 in unpaid wages plus administrative costs.

In an application for outstanding wages under the Employment Standards Act, the Adjudicator/Referee issued procedural directions regarding disclosure and particulars.

The applicant, representing an unidentified group of employees, was ordered to disclose the specific individuals it represents and the particulars of their claims, as it is not possible to proceed with the hearing without knowing who is claiming entitlement to the monies.

The responding parties were ordered to provide relevant documents pertaining to those individuals.

The subpoenas for the Employment Standards Officers were quashed, as their evidence would not be necessary once the employees and their claims were identified.

The applicant requested an adjournment of the hearing.

With the consent of the Ministry of Labour and no appearance by the employer, the Ontario Labour Relations Board granted the adjournment to December 18, 2000.

The applicant appealed the refusal of an Employment Standards Officer to issue an Order to Pay.

At the commencement of the hearing, the Ministry of Labour requested an adjournment, noting that evidence might show an individual not yet named as a party was the true employer and could be liable.

The applicant did not oppose the request, and the named responding party did not appear.

The Board granted the adjournment, added the individual as a responding party, and directed the Ministry to provide her with notice of the proceedings.

The applicant appealed an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an Order to Pay under section 68 of the Employment Standards Act.

The parties resolved the matter through Minutes of Settlement, agreeing that the employer would pay the applicant $2,107.75 in installments.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board terminated the application by consent in accordance with subsection 69.1(5) of the Act.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission referred a complaint to the Board of Inquiry but later discovered it had omitted the respondents' submissions from its referral decision.

The Commission argued this procedural defect rendered the referral a nullity and deprived the Board of jurisdiction.

The Board held that it does not lose jurisdiction due to a procedural error by the Commission, as only a supervisory court can declare a referral null and void.

The Board granted a temporary stay of proceedings to allow the respondents to seek judicial review of the Commission's referral process.