Aggravated assault

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after allegedly slashing the victim's face.

The victim gave an unsworn audio-taped statement to the police identifying the appellant as the assailant, but left the country the next day and could not be located for trial.

The trial judge admitted the statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity and reliability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that no benefit would be served by cross-examining the victim, given evidence of possible animus, unsavoury character, and suspicious departure.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a fist fight at a football game.

He argued the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment to obtain a transcript for a section 11(b) Charter application, and in failing to apply the principles of R. v. W.(D.) when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the denial of the adjournment.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's reasons suggested she believed the Crown witnesses simply because she disbelieved the defence witnesses, contrary to the W.(D.) principles.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on an aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after striking the victim with a broken beer bottle.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 18 months, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the Gladue principles and committed no error in principle, concluding the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault for transmitting HIV to her husband through unprotected sex.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her belief that she was HIV-negative following a Canadian immigration medical assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence by one day to preserve the appellant's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly answered a jury question regarding available verdicts and adequately described the elements of aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm.

The sentence appeal regarding the length of the probation term was also dismissed, as the court found no error in principle.

The appellant appealed an eight-year sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding there was no hope for his rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was justified in taking a dim view of the appellant's rehabilitation prospects based on the pre-sentence report and his criminal record, and concluded the sentence was fit.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 35 months (plus 61 months pre-trial custody credit) for aggravated assault and use of a firearm.

He had used a handgun to threaten a 12-year-old boy who provided information to police, firing the gun and severely injuring the boy via ricochet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the prevalence of witness intimidation and by failing to properly consider his youth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the facts of the offence spoke for themselves regarding intimidation, and the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's youth against his extensive record and the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for aggravated assault and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to ensure he was represented by counsel and by inadequately assisting him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant, an experienced criminal litigant, had clearly chosen to represent himself and that the trial judge had provided adequate and fair assistance throughout the trial.

The court also upheld the 4.5-year sentence as fit given the violent nature of the offence and the appellant's substantial criminal record.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder and breach of probation.

The jury acquitted him of attempted murder but convicted him of aggravated assault.

The trial judge inadvertently instructed the jury on self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code instead of s. 34(2), despite agreement among counsel that only s. 34(2) applied.

The Crown conceded this was a serious legal error.

Additionally, the trial judge withdrew the breach of probation count from the jury and recorded the conviction himself, which he lacked jurisdiction to do.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside both convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent to wound, as well as his sentence of eight years and six months.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and in reviewing the theory of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the review of the defence theory was adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offence was a premeditated, unprovoked act of violence with a firearm causing life-threatening injuries, and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for aggravated assault arising from a violent neighbour dispute involving an iron bar.

The main issue was whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the trial judge charged the jury under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, the evidence also required an instruction under s. 34(2) because the appellant's version raised a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm.

The court further held that the jury should have been told that a mistaken belief about the degree of danger could still support the defence if based on reasonable grounds.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a group beating.

The Crown inadvertently failed to disclose four witness statements, though summaries were included in police occurrence reports provided to defence counsel during the trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown breached its duty to disclose relevant material, the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was not impaired.

The undisclosed statements would not have affected the reliability of the conviction, and defence counsel's lack of due diligence in pursuing the full statements after receiving the summaries was a significant factor in concluding that the overall fairness of the trial process was not compromised.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault against two different victims.

The Crown inadvertently failed to disclose a witness statement to the defence.

Applying the principles from R. v. Dixon, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the undisclosed statement did not affect the reliability of the conviction for the first assault.

However, for the second assault, the statement contained exculpatory evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the second assault.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose statements made by four individuals, although summaries were included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

Applying the principles from a companion case, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the undisclosed statements had very low materiality and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statements despite knowing of their existence.

Consequently, the failure to produce the statements did not affect the fairness of the trial process.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose a statement made by a witness, although a summary of the statement was included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from the companion case of R. v. Dixon.

The Court found that the undisclosed statement would not have affected the reliability of the conviction and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statement despite knowing of its existence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of aggravated assault and committing an offence while masked.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge took into account all the evidence presented and made no error of law in concluding he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a stabbing during a fight.

At trial, he admitted to punching the victim but claimed a third party committed the stabbing, and adduced evidence of the third party's prior violent acts.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the third party's criminal record was only relevant to credibility, and that the appellant's flight from the scene could be considered in reaching a verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that the third party's propensity for violence could support the defence theory, and by failing to warn that the appellant's flight was equally consistent with the admitted lesser offence of common assault.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that quashed the accused's conviction for manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal that the trial judge's conclusion that the accused inflicted the fatal injuries was not unreasonable.

The conviction for manslaughter and the conditional stay of proceedings for aggravated assault were restored.