Kathryn N. Feldman

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and encouraging others to act on a forged document, for which he received a four-year sentence and a restitution order.

He argued he was entitled to use investors' funds as he chose and raised procedural fairness issues regarding his self-representation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant misrepresented how funds would be held and used them for operational expenses.

The court also found the trial judge provided appropriate assistance to the self-represented appellant and did not unfairly restrict his cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for oral reasons delivered in open court.

The sentence appeal was adjourned to a later date to allow the appellant to make submissions.

The appellant's request for an extension of bail pending the sentence appeal was denied, as any potential reduction in sentence was unlikely to reduce his remaining day parole, and bail was revoked.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including a violent home invasion and robbery, and was sentenced to a further six years in custody after receiving credit for pre-trial custody and a four-year discount for acting as a police informant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence violated the 'jump' principle and that the informer discount was insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the significant violence involved and holding that there is no fixed tariff for informer discounts.

The court also declined to order state-funded counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that held it responsible for a back-charge of $64,955.92 for secondary electrical wiring on a construction project, and awarded costs of $93,604.17 to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the designer-built contract, finding the appellant was responsible for the wiring to the disconnect boxes.

The Court also upheld the costs award, noting it was influenced by an unaccepted Rule 49 offer and that both sides spent similar amounts of time on the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that they were required to reimburse the respondents for both the principal and interest on borrowed monies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no reversible error in the credibility assessment that formed the basis of the finding regarding the parties' true intentions.

Although the trial judge erred regarding the admissibility of a letter and the application of the contra proferentem doctrine, these errors were not material to the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice and using a forged document after presenting a fake letter at his trial for possessing stolen dealer plates.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge applied an improper burden of proof by asking if his evidence 'could reasonably be true' rather than applying the W.(D.) reasonable doubt standard.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in using the 'might reasonably be true' language at the second stage of the W.(D.) analysis, the error was not reversible because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's testimony and found the Crown's case overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants appealed an order striking out certain paragraphs of their statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the plaintiff's cause of action in fraud, which has a different measure of damages than breach of fiduciary duty.

As a result, the motion judge wrongly struck out relevant allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and only the portions of the defence relating to the plaintiff's profits were struck out, with leave to amend.

The appellants were awarded $3,000 in costs.

The appellant made an assignment in bankruptcy in 1994 and was discharged in 1996.

Years later, the trustee in bankruptcy learned the appellant may have failed to disclose an interest in real property and obtained an order reappointing the trustee.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the bankruptcy judge erred by deciding the matter in a summary proceeding given the conflicting evidence and credibility issues.

The appeal was allowed and a trial of an issue was ordered to properly determine the ownership of the property.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their defence and counterclaim due to outstanding undertakings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by refusing to hear from the appellants' counsel and by striking out the defence when the outstanding undertakings related only to the counterclaim.

Despite the lengthy delay in the proceeding, the appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and the plaintiff's motion was dismissed with no costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his employer and union for conspiracy and collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement.

Applying the Weber principle and the Labour Relations Act, the court held it lacked jurisdiction over the claims.

The court noted the appellant's proper recourse was to file an unfair representation complaint with the labour board.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $4,000.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial and in interpreting the contract.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or interpretation of the contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,500.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing despite being advised of the date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs of $6,000 to the respondents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breach of probation, theft over, and possession over, receiving an effective sentence of two years and two months.

On the same day, he pleaded guilty to unrelated charges of breach of probation and robbery, receiving a consecutive three-year sentence.

The appellant appealed the three-year sentence, arguing it should be reduced to two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the totality principle and the appellant's aboriginal status.

The sentence for the robbery and breach of probation was reduced from three years to two years.

The appellants' sailboat was seized and stored at the respondent's facility.

A bailiff provided a notice of lien that included amounts unrelated to the respondent's storage charges.

The application judge found the notice valid and awarded the respondent a lien and judgment for $29,920.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice was invalid because it overstated the redemption amount by including third-party debts.

Consequently, under s. 4(6) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act, the respondent's lien was limited to 60 days of storage charges ($1,200), and the judgment was set aside.

The Crown appealed a nine-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual assault, sexual interference, assault with a weapon, and simple assault against his stepchildren.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is rarely appropriate for sexual touching of children by adults in a position of trust, absent exceptional circumstances.

A twelve-month custodial sentence was substituted, with nine months' credit for the conditional sentence served.

The court also ordered a new hearing on the Crown's application for a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, as the sentencing judge gave no reasons for finding it grossly disproportionate.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to link the W.D. charge to the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the specific instruction on resolving conflicting evidence was not a model of clarity, the jury charge read as a whole left no misapprehension about the correct standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs of the appeal, fixed at $6,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit.

He argued the Board lacked jurisdiction due to a delayed hearing, the detention order was unreasonable, and the Board failed to address the hospital's refusal to grant off-ward privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board retained jurisdiction despite the delay, the detention order was reasonable given the appellant's risk to the public, and the Board implicitly addressed the privileges issue by reducing his security level.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous and long-term offender application and the sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge had ruled that a dangerous offender designation required the predicate offence to warrant a minimum two-year sentence, similar to the long-term offender provision.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error of law, as the dangerous offender provision contains no such requirement.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence, designated the respondent a long-term offender, and imposed a sentence of time served plus a further period of community supervision.