Kathryn N. Feldman

The appellant appealed a committal order related to drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the committal order, including direct evidence from two accomplices and circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the individual engaged in the trafficking.

The appellant appealed her convictions on three charges of fraud, seeking to withdraw her guilty pleas.

She argued that she had a potential defence of duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transcripts of the guilty pleas offered no support for withdrawal and that her alleged duress did not meet the requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, resulting in the victim falling and suffering a severe brain injury.

At trial, the judge refused to leave the defence of consent to the jury, instructing them that consent is not a defence to aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred, as consent is only vitiated if the accused both intended to cause serious bodily harm and actually caused it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought leave to appeal several convictions under a city by-law.

Her previous motions to extend the time to appeal had been dismissed.

She brought another motion to set aside the convictions but failed to appear on time due to a traffic delay, resulting in the motion being dismissed.

The Court of Appeal accepted her explanation for the delay but dismissed the application for leave to appeal, noting the motion was well beyond the time for appealing, earlier attempts were unsuccessful, and there was no fresh evidence to warrant interference.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 and failed to appear for her trial date.

The trial judge arraigned her in absentia and entered a not guilty plea, relying on a filed designation of counsel.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction, finding a violation of the accused's right to be present.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the designation of counsel made the accused legally present.

Furthermore, even if her physical presence was required, the curative proviso applied because the error was a procedural irregularity that caused no prejudice.

The appellant employer appealed a decision granting the respondent employee post-retirement health and welfare benefits.

The employee had worked for the employer for nearly 32 years, transitioning from part-time to full-time.

The employer's HR department had informed the employee in writing that her part-time service would be commuted and she would qualify for benefits if she worked an additional three years, which she did.

Upon termination due to restructuring, the employer denied the benefits, claiming the HR information was an error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a binding contractual agreement had been reached between the parties entitling the employee to the benefits.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not an 'owner' as defined in the Condominium Act and therefore lacked standing to bring the application.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings.

The motion judge had struck the pleadings due to the appellant's failure to pay a prior costs order, lack of diligence in providing financial disclosure, and failure to respond to the respondent's efforts to resolve the matter.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing an adjournment and striking the pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to pay the fees and disbursements of an equitable receiver.

A prior court order had provided that if the appellant paid the outstanding judgment by a certain date, any further equitable receivership costs would be to the account of another party.

The appellant satisfied the judgment by the deadline, but the order under appeal erroneously included costs incurred after that date.

The respondent agreed the order was in error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the relevant paragraph of the order, and referred the matter back to the motion judge for reassessment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering a death threat, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence and erred in applying the third stage of the W.D. analysis.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's boasting or the complainant's description of his post-assault behaviour.

The trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and accept the complainant's evidence to find the charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic intrafamilial abuse, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the credibility analysis failed to address contradictions and frailties in the complainant's evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to the complainant's psychiatric history, substance abuse, delayed disclosure, and conflicts with other witnesses, and properly differentiated between allegations that lacked confirmation and those that had some independent support.

The court further held that a partial admission to the complainant's mother was capable of providing confirmatory support, while other corroborative details were given only slight weight.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The moving party sought to review an order of Doherty J.A. that denied an extension of time to appeal an order refusing to set aside a default judgment for the sale of mortgaged property.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the previous decision, noting the moving party had not moved promptly after learning of the default judgment and the property had already been sold.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against the respondent bank regarding disability insurance coverage.

The appellant claimed he believed he had disability insurance through the bank when he obtained a mortgage loan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was not credible the appellant would have purchased disability insurance even if offered, noting he had declined other insurance, had no prior disability insurance, and the bank did not offer mortgage disability insurance at the time.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a declaratory order that effectively determined a golf club board made no finding of assault or battery by the respondent.

This was a central contested issue in the pending lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that a contested factual finding cannot be determined in advance of trial merely on the consent of some parties, as this would impermissibly sanction a collateral attack at trial on an existing court order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a property transfer and child support, arguing the trial judge erred in his conduct of the trial and in finding a separation agreement invalid.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge appropriately assisted the self-represented appellant and ensured a fair trial.

The Court also upheld the finding that the separation agreement was invalid under the Family Law Act and unenforceable because the appellant had not paid the required consideration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and dismissed the appeal.

A case management conference was held to determine the procedure for hearing motions for leave to intervene in the appeals.

The court ordered that all interested persons must bring a motion in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and set a timetable for the service and filing of motion records and factums, with the motions to be heard on June 28, 2012.