Katherine E. Swinton

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario summarily dismissing his complaint against the Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on mental disability, race, and country of origin, as well as threats of reprisal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was no evidence of discrimination or reprisal.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent transit authority's decision to enter into a contract for diesel multiple units for an air-rail link.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an electrification feasibility study and improperly accepting ministerial direction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to enter a commercial contract did not constitute a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act as it did not determine any legal rights.

Furthermore, the court held that the respondent acted within its statutory authority under its governing legislation.

The appellant purchased a nearly 100-year-old home from the respondent and subsequently discovered several defects, including water damage, unconnected plumbing, and electrical issues.

She sued for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation in Small Claims Court, but her claim was dismissed.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation and that the appellant, who had obtained a home inspection and negotiated a second offer, did not rely on any alleged misrepresentations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration board's decision imposing a first collective agreement under the Loi sur l'arbitrage des conflits de travail dans les hôpitaux.

The employer argued the board exceeded its jurisdiction by implicitly treating it and a related hospital as a single employer, and that the wage and benefit increases were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board merely used the hospital as a comparator for wages and benefits, which was within its jurisdiction.

The court also held that the board's decision on wages and benefits was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal a 'no costs' order made by a Deputy Judge of the Small Claims Court after successfully moving to dismiss the plaintiff's claim due to the expiry of a limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Deputy Judge made no error in principle and the costs award was not clearly wrong.

The court noted that leave to appeal costs orders should be granted sparingly and that the proposed appeal did not raise an issue of public importance, especially given the small monetary amount involved.

The applicant sought judicial review of a preliminary decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding its jurisdiction to hear a complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for prematurity, applying the principle that courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no exceptional circumstances and noted that the applicant could challenge jurisdiction on a full record after a decision on the merits.

The stay of proceedings was lifted.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that premises occupied by the Hospital for Sick Children Foundation were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings that the Foundation was a tenant under the Assessment Act and that there was no shared patrimony between the Hospital and the Foundation that would extend the hospital's tax exemption to the Foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of two arbitration awards dealing with return to work grievances following a strike by academic staff.

The arbitration board had concluded that the collective agreement's workload provisions did not apply and developed its own principles to award additional compensation.

The Divisional Court found the board's decision unreasonable, as it ignored the language of the Return to Work Protocol and the collective agreement, which did not confer jurisdiction to create new compensation criteria.

The application for judicial review was granted, the awards were quashed, and the grievances were remitted to a different arbitration board.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a decision by the City's General Manager of Parks, Forestry and Recreation to close an off-leash dog area in Ledbury Park.

The General Manager closed the area due to unresolved conflicts between park users and adjacent residents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision was reasonable and that the General Manager appropriately balanced competing community interests.

The court also held that the applicants were accorded adequate procedural fairness given the policy nature of the decision.

The moving party appealed a joint custody order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 110, finding little apparent merit to the appeal based on the deferential standard of review for custody orders.

Furthermore, the court noted that both parties sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding post-trial events, making a variation application based on a material change in circumstances a more appropriate remedy than an appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The Director had screened out a complaint regarding seized funds and confirmed a decision by the Hamilton Police Service not to proceed to a disciplinary hearing regarding allegations of excessive force.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside a criminal conviction or order the return of funds on judicial review, and that the Director's decisions were reasonable.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside the orders of a motions judge who had dismissed her motion to amend an application for judicial review and dismissed the application as moot.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, noting it was brought outside the four-day time limit and the applicant failed to identify any error of law.

The panel confirmed the motions judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion to amend pursuant to section 21(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant chiropractor sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a written caution issued by the College of Chiropractors of Ontario regarding the tone and language of a letter sent to a patient.

The applicant argued the Board failed to address a claim of reasonable apprehension of bias concerning a committee member who had co-authored an academic article critical of the applicant's treatment philosophy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no merit to the bias claim and concluding that the Board's decision to uphold the written caution was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained in an assault.

The Board found the assault was directly related to his activities as a drug trafficker and his injury was a foreseeable consequence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of proportionality principles or its admission of hearsay evidence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision denying him leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal had ordered the appeal to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as a panel appeal, noting that the appropriate route is to seek leave to appeal from a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

With the consent of the parties, the matter was converted to a motion for leave to appeal to be determined by one member of the panel sitting as a Superior Court judge.

Following an application for judicial review involving the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act and the Human Rights Code, the successful respondent sought costs of $47,506.45 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued for a lower quantum of $10,000 based on expectations in the labour relations community.

The Divisional Court found the respondent's request exceeded reasonable expectations but acknowledged the importance of the case, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $20,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The respondent Corporation sought costs following an application for judicial review of a labour arbitration award.

The court found the amount sought excessive, noting that the usual quantum for such applications is around $5,000.

The court declined to award higher costs based on the Corporation's choice to use out-of-province counsel and fixed costs at $5,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissing his complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The Board had dismissed the complaint on a prima facie basis without a hearing.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision was reasonable, as the union had conducted a reasonable investigation into the grievances.

The Court also dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness, bias, and language rights, finding no evidence to support these claims.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding it had discriminated against a former employee on the basis of disability.

The employer argued the employee's shoulder injury was not a disability, the Tribunal made factual errors, and the Tribunal was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's finding of disability was reasonable, the factual errors were immaterial, and the findings in favour of the employee did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario refusing its application for a liquor licence.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable because, although it correctly stated the onus was on the objectors to prove the licence was against the public interest, it failed to apply that test and balance the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.