Julie Santarossa

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, and resisting a peace officer.

The defence admitted the actus reus of all three offences but contested mens rea.

The accused consumed three glasses of wine while taking Champix (varenicline), a smoking cessation medication, resulting in pathological intoxication characterized by extreme impairment, aggression, and memory loss.

Expert evidence established that the combination of Champix and alcohol can produce exaggerated intoxication effects at low alcohol levels.

The accused was unaware of this drug-alcohol interaction and could not reasonably have known of it.

The court found the presumption of voluntary intoxication was rebutted and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant challenged the reliability of co-conspirator evidence and argued that extradition would violate his Charter rights under sections 6(1) and 7.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal and dismissed the judicial review application, finding that the reliability of witness evidence is a matter for the receiving jurisdiction, that the possible sentence would not shock the conscience, and that the Minister's decision to defer to US proceedings was reasonable and justified under the Cotroni factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following a stabbing, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding residue on a gate and erred in finding certain evidence confirmatory of the victim's testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably relied on a police officer's opinion that the residue was blood.

Furthermore, the court found that the trial judge, who treated the victim as a Vetrovec witness, was justified in concluding that multiple independent items of evidence cumulatively confirmed the victim's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a 30-year history of predatory sexual offences against young males, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with a weapon and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the designation, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding his voluntary use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence would not have affected the result and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community given the voluntary nature of the medication.

The Crown appealed a 14-month conditional sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The respondent conceded that a conditional sentence was not legally available for this offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a sentence of incarceration was appropriate but, noting the respondent had already served 11 months of the sentence, his strong rehabilitative potential, and Gladue principles, varied the sentence to 11 months' time served plus 12 months' probation.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and breaches following his arrest on June 14, 2006.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and trial to determine whether the arrest was lawful and whether evidence obtained from a search incident to arrest should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused moved to exclude evidence based on alleged breaches of s. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, as the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds based on an unreliable confidential informant tip and minimal corroborating observations.

The court excluded the evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a designated long-term offender, was convicted of breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge intended to grant 1.5 days of credit for each day of pre-sentence custody but made a calculation error, resulting in 228 fewer days of credit.

The appellant appealed, seeking to have the 228 days applied to reduce the length of his LTSO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that despite the calculation error, the sentence actually imposed was fit.

The court noted that an LTSO continues to run during pre-sentence custody for breaches of the order, making enhanced credit less appropriate.

The appellant appealed his sentence for setting fire to a police cruiser during the G20 riots.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount and the trial judge adequately considered the appellant's personal circumstances.

However, the Court struck out the restitution order because the trial judge failed to inquire into the appellant's ability to pay, noting his addiction and sporadic employment.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to three years' imprisonment following a vicious assault on a defenceless victim.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant strides towards rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the trial judge but allowed the sentence appeal based on the fresh evidence, reducing the sentence to two years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed her sentence.

Based on fresh evidence regarding her excellent performance at the Vanier institution and her proposed living arrangements with her young son and cousin, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced her sentence to time served, leaving the probation order in place.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay serious charges against six police officers due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed the 56-month delay primarily to the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for five of the officers, finding the trial judge erred in attributing the delay to disclosure issues rather than the inherent time requirements of a highly complex case.

A new trial was ordered for those five officers.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the sixth officer, finding the delay in his much simpler case was unreasonable because the Crown unnecessarily insisted his trial follow the complex trial of his co-accused.