Joseph Addelman

Idres Ismail, charged with murder, sought permission to adduce evidence at trial regarding an alternate suspect.

The evidence included a threatening video found on the deceased's phone, viewed shortly before his death, featuring an unknown male who resembled the accused.

The court applied the "air of reality" test, finding that the temporal connection between the video and the death, coupled with the threatening nature, provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation to cast doubt on the accused's guilt.

The application to admit the alternate suspect evidence was granted.

The applicants, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the firearm would be located at the specified addresses.

The court found the ITO lacked any case-specific evidence linking the firearm to the residences, rendering the search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious state conduct of searching a private residence based on mere speculation outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The accused, a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police during a traffic investigation, brought a Charter application to exclude drug evidence found during a search incident to arrest.

The accused argued his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter were violated.

The court found that the accused was not detained until an officer directed him to stop moving his hands, at which point the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him based on the smell of marijuana and the accused's suspicious movements.

The court concluded the search was lawful as incident to arrest and that a brief delay in providing right to counsel did not violate s. 10.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant sought release from custody pending trial via a section 520 Criminal Code bail review, arguing a material change in circumstances due to his guilty plea to subsequent charges and an improved bail plan.

The court found that the guilty plea did not constitute a relevant or significant material change as the charges were considered in the initial bail denial.

Furthermore, the proposed bail plan, despite adding a second surety and increasing the bond, was deemed insufficient given the defendant's extensive criminal record, history of breaches, and drug use, and the associated risk to the public.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon (jailhouse shank), assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault following an altercation in the maximum security section of a detention centre.

The defence argued that two other inmates caused the complainant's injuries using pencils.

The court analyzed video evidence and found that neither inmate had a pencil.

The court concluded that the accused removed a wrapped object from his waistband, unwrapped it, and used it to slash the complainant across both cheeks, causing wounds.

The accused was convicted of all three charges.

John McRae was found guilty of second-degree murder of his son, Michael McRae.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, considering the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury's recommendation.

Aggravating factors included the abuse of a position of trust and the brutal nature of the murder.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age and health.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 12 years, balancing deterrence, denunciation, and the specific circumstances.

The applicant, accused of fatally stabbing his son, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from being adduced at trial.

He argued the dated record would cause undue prejudice and lead to improper propensity reasoning by the jury.

The Crown opposed, noting the applicant's credibility was central and he had already introduced parts of his record and attacked the victim's character.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's credibility was crucial and a properly instructed jury could use the criminal record for its limited purpose.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence to support a claim of self-defence analogous to battered spouse syndrome.

The proposed expert opined that the accused's actions fit the idea of a pre-emptive homicide as self-defence.

The court excluded this portion of the expert's opinion, finding it unnecessary, beyond the expert's qualifications, and liable to usurp the jury's function in assessing the accused's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

During a jury trial, the Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness claimed to have no memory of conversations and events that he had previously detailed in a police statement.

The court found the witness's claim of memory loss was not credible, noting he could recall other significant details from the same day.

The court granted the application, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement.

The accused was charged with three firearm offences arising from an incident at a shopping mall in Ottawa on October 2, 2017: careless handling of a firearm contrary to section 86(3) of the Criminal Code, possession of a prohibited/restricted/non-restricted firearm without a licence contrary to section 91(3), and knowing possession of a firearm without a licence contrary to section 92(3).

A fourth count of weapons dangerous was dismissed by the Crown.

The trial proceeded on the basis that the accused picked up a handgun during a violent altercation and removed it from the mall, subsequently abandoning it in the parking lot.

The central legal issue was whether the accused had a lawful excuse for his possession of the firearm under the public duty defence, and whether his disposal of the weapon constituted careless handling.

The accused was charged with assaulting a person with an imitation weapon, using an imitation firearm while attempting to commit an indictable offence of assault with an imitation firearm, and possession of an imitation weapon for the purpose of committing an offence.

The charges arose from events on November 25, 2016, following an altercation between the accused's friend and the victim's son.

The trial judge found significant credibility issues with the Crown's witnesses, including material discrepancies regarding the distance of the alleged threat, whether words were spoken, and the location of witnesses.

The judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused pointed the imitation firearm at the victim or that he possessed it for the purpose of committing an offence.

All three counts were dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing death after his minivan, which was positioned perpendicularly across the eastbound lane near the crest of a blind hill, was struck by a motorcycle.

The collision resulted in the deaths of the motorcycle operator and passenger.

The court found that while the accused's driving was objectively dangerous, the Crown failed to prove the requisite objective mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the accused's conduct amounted to a momentary lapse in judgment due to his unfamiliarity with the road and the lack of warning signs, rather than a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.

The applicant, a 73-year-old man charged with second-degree murder of his son, sought release on bail under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He had previously been granted bail but voluntarily returned to custody, causing his surety to revoke.

The Crown opposed bail on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found no material change in the sureties' ability to supervise the applicant and noted his compliance with previous bail conditions.

Applying the principles from St. Cloud and Antic, the court granted bail on the original terms with additional conditions regarding alcohol prohibition and surety visits.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 32.5 months, marginally exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The court deducted one month for defence delay (accused being a fugitive), resulting in a net delay of 31 months.

The Crown invoked the "transitional exceptional circumstances" exception, arguing reasonable reliance on pre-*Jordan* case law (*R. v. Morin* guidelines) and existing scheduling practices in Ottawa.

The court found that counsel and the court had reasonably relied on the previous regime for calculating s. 11(b) delay, and that staying a second-degree murder charge under these circumstances, where the *Jordan* ceiling was only moderately exceeded, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was dismissed.

The three accused, Ashton Larmond, Carlos Larmond, and Suliman Mohamed, pleaded guilty to various terrorism-related offences and other charges.

Ashton Larmond pleaded guilty to knowingly instructing persons to enhance terrorist activity, Carlos Larmond to attempting to leave Canada for terrorist activity, and Suliman Mohamed to conspiring to enhance a terrorist group's ability.

The Larmond brothers also pleaded guilty to offences committed in custody, including threats to correctional officers and inmates, and unlawful communication.

The court accepted joint sentencing submissions, emphasizing the gravity of "home grown" terrorism and the importance of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a collision on May 18, 2015, in Ottawa.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 168 mg% and 165 mg% at the time of testing, expert toxicological evidence regarding scientific impairment at 50 mg%, and police observations of alleged signs of impairment.

The defence raised the "last drink" doctrine, arguing the accused consumed alcohol approximately 13 minutes before driving, and challenged the applicability of general scientific impairment evidence to the specific accused.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought a sending order under s. 15(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to send business records seized from the respondents to the Kingdom of Belgium for a criminal fraud investigation.

The respondents opposed the order, arguing the seized materials contained trade secrets and that the Belgian investigation was a bad faith attempt to gain a competitive advantage.

The court granted the sending order, finding the search warrant was lawfully executed and there was no evidence of bad faith.

The court noted that concerns regarding intellectual property were addressed by the treaty's restrictions on unauthorized disclosure and were matters for the Minister of Justice, not the court.

The accused was charged with multiple aggravated assaults involving a hammer.

Police officers recognized the accused from a police broadcast containing video and still photos of a suspect.

The officers detained the accused for investigative purposes and, after confirming his identity against the broadcast photos, arrested him.

The accused challenged the legality of the arrest, arguing the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the officers had both subjective and objective grounds to arrest the accused, acting in good faith based on the broadcast and their observations.

The arrest was ruled lawful.