Jonathan Bryce Grayson Bell

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of King J. dated February 1, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.

The defendants (Moving Parties) sought an order for the issuance of two letters of request to judicial authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to compel the examination of two witnesses, Yasir O. Al-Rumayyan and Fahad Nasser Alarfaj.

The Moving Parties argued these witnesses had relevant evidence for their motion to set aside Mareva orders, particularly regarding alleged contradictory positions taken by the plaintiffs (controlled by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund) in this action versus unrelated U.S. litigation (LIV Golf Litigation) concerning PIF's independence from the KSA government.

The motion was unopposed by the plaintiffs.

The court found the proposed witnesses had prima facie relevant evidence and that the requirements under Rules 39.03 and 34.07(2) for examining non-parties and issuing letters of request for witnesses outside Canada were met.

The order for letters of request was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising" s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order regarding the admissibility and production of compelled evidence in a civil contempt motion arising from alleged breaches of a Mareva order.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the motion judge's decision that answers to undertakings and further document production could not be compelled while the contempt motion was outstanding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that evidence compelled prior to the contempt motion was admissible and did not violate sections 7, 11(c), or 13 of the Charter.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in prematurely ruling on the admissibility of future answers to undertakings and in deferring the production motion.

The court held that the obligation to comply with the Mareva order continues despite the contempt motion, and admissibility should be determined when the evidence is tendered, based on whether the contempt motion is predominantly coercive or penal.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of McEwen J. dated January 5, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court declined to award costs to the successful responding parties because they failed to file a Costs Outline.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign" thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

Sakab Saudi Holding Company and others brought a motion seeking access to a redacted "proffer" provided by Saad Al Jabri to the Attorney General of Canada for review under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Sakab argued that Al Jabri's assertion of litigation privilege over the proffer was an abuse of process designed to exclude them from the section 38 proceedings.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, holding that Sakab was not excluded from the process and could still make meaningful submissions on the relevance of the sensitive information without access to the redacted proffer.

The Court emphasized that the section 38 process is flexible and designed to ensure fairness while protecting national security information.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to assume jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a complex international fraud and conspiracy case.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that a Toronto resident orchestrated a scheme to misappropriate billions of dollars from Saudi Arabian corporations and dissipate them globally, with the assistance of family members and various corporate entities.

The appellants (foreign defendants) challenged Ontario's jurisdiction, arguing a lack of real and substantial connection.

The motion judge found jurisdiction based on contracts made in Ontario (including a gift deed central to the alleged scheme), property located in Ontario, and the tort of conspiracy being committed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding factual errors or legal errors in applying the Van Breda test for jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant, Dr. Saad, sought a declaratory order that evidence he would provide in support of a renewed motion to stay the action would be inadmissible in a pending contempt proceeding against him, relying on the s. 13 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the evidence was not compelled and the proceedings were not "other proceedings." The court dismissed Dr. Saad's motion, holding that his evidence on the stay motion was not statutorily compelled, and therefore s. 13 of the Charter was not engaged.

The court clarified that the proper time to seek use immunity would be at the contempt hearing itself.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The defendants and plaintiffs both brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding the admissibility of evidence in a civil contempt proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on four issues concerning the application of sections 7 and 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to evidence compelled pursuant to a Mareva order and undertakings.

The court directed that the defendant be the appellant and the plaintiffs be the cross-appellants.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt against the defendants, alleging they breached a Mareva injunction by using frozen assets to pay for living and legal expenses.

In response, the defendants brought several procedural motions.

Dr. Saad moved to strike compelled evidence from the plaintiffs' contempt motion record, arguing it violated his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that a contempt motion is not 'other proceedings' under s. 13 and that ss. 7 and 11(c) did not apply to previously compelled evidence.

Dr. Saad also moved under Rule 21 to exclude prior judicial rulings made in the civil action from the contempt motion.

The court granted this motion, holding that findings made on a civil standard are inadmissible in a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to answer undertakings and produce documents.

The court ordered Dr. Saad to answer undertakings but ruled the answers could not be used in the contempt motion, and declined to order further document production that would conscript the defendants to assist in their own prosecution.

The court also limited the plaintiffs' disclosure obligations to the alleged breach, refusing broad discovery on the underlying fraud.

Finally, the court dismissed Mohammed's motion to stay the contempt proceedings pending his appeal on jurisdiction.

The moving party defendants brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay the action against them, arguing the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs alleged a massive international fraudulent scheme involving the misappropriation of $3.5 billion USD, with funds allegedly traced to the moving parties.

The court applied the Van Breda test and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario based on contracts formed in the province, property located in Ontario, and the necessity of hearing the claim as a whole in a single jurisdiction.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiffs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in a brief endorsement.

The moving party was ordered to pay costs to the responding parties in the agreed amount of $10,000.

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The appellants, including a provincially constituted lottery authority, sought to strike a class action claim brought by respondents who alleged that video lottery terminals were inherently dangerous and deceptive, and sought a gain‑based award quantified by the authority's profits.

The majority held that none of the three pleaded causes of action — waiver of tort as an independent cause of action, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment — disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The majority definitively rejected "waiver of tort" as an independent cause of action for disgorgement in Canadian law, holding that disgorgement is a remedy for established wrongful conduct and not a freestanding cause of action.

The majority further found that the breach of contract claim could not support disgorgement or punitive damages on the pleadings as framed, and that a valid contract between the parties constituted a juristic reason defeating the unjust enrichment claim.

In partial dissent, four justices would have allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed to certification on the common issues of breach of contract, punitive damages, and the appropriateness of disgorgement as a remedy.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its action for delay.

The motion judge found the appellant's delay of over nine years was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the presumption of prejudice to the respondents was not rebutted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles and holding that her discretionary decision was entitled to deference.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a U.S. resident with no assets in Ontario, in a complex family dispute over trust funds.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity and that his action was not devoid of merit.

The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated impecuniosity with sufficient financial disclosure and that, while the merits were not decisive, they favored granting security due to prior releases.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs totaling $130,000 on a partial indemnity scale, balancing the plaintiff's access to justice with the defendants' protection against an unenforceable costs award.

The plaintiffs, two major banks, sued to recover funds wired to the defendant money services business as a result of a fraud perpetrated by third parties.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it received the funds without knowledge of the fraud and changed its position in good faith by arranging equivalent payments in Chinese yuan to a foreign account.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the defendant actually changed its position in good faith, given conflicting expert evidence on its anti-money laundering compliance and the lack of direct evidence regarding the foreign exchange transactions.