John Pearson

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault involving two child complainants, as well as a subsequent conviction involving a third child complainant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered new trials.

In the first trial, the court found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury about the opportunity for innocent collusion between the complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

Furthermore, the Crown's inflammatory closing address deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

In the second trial, the judge erred in law by holding she was bound by the jury's verdict in the prior case when assessing similar fact evidence.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge's instruction on corroboration was an error requiring a new trial, in light of the defence's closing argument.

Based on this concession, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his alleged sexual assault on the victim's best friend and the victim's ante mortem statements expressing hostility toward him.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a witness's relationship with an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the bad character and hearsay evidence, concluding the probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

The application to admit fresh evidence was denied as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife fell to her death from a cliff.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on motive (an ongoing affair), opportunity, and the appellant's statements and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends about her fear of the appellant, and in instructing the jury on the use of his out-of-court statements and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the hearsay evidence under the principled approach, and concluding that the jury instructions were adequate and fair.

The appellants were convicted of numerous firearms offences after police seized over 200 firearms and 20,000 rounds of ammunition from their home.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the firearms legislation violated their constitutional right to possess firearms for self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, confirming that Canadians do not have a constitutional right to bear arms.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the mandatory minimum sentences and the 18-month global sentence as fit and not constituting cruel and unusual punishment.

The respondent was charged with offences under the Ontario Water Resources Act.

At his second trial, the trial judge stayed the proceedings and awarded costs against the Crown, finding that the Crown had engaged in egregious prosecutorial misconduct amounting to an abuse of process and a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld this decision.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the stay and costs award, and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of prosecutorial misconduct was tainted by palpable and overriding error and that many of the Crown's actions were sanctioned by court order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding party liability as an aider could have left the jury with the erroneous impression that the appellant could be convicted for merely standing by.

This concern was heightened by irreconcilable verdicts on the firearm counts.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the robbery count, and an acquittal was entered for the firearm count due to a lack of evidence.

The appellant, convicted of a designated sexual offence, challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law, which mandates that sex offenders register with police.

He argued the law was ultra vires the province, rendered inoperative by federal paramountcy, and violated his rights under sections 7, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power aimed at community safety, did not conflict with federal law, and did not constitute punishment.

The court also held that the law did not violate section 7, as its requirements were not overbroad or grossly disproportionate to the objective of protecting the public.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, following a motor vehicle collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly inferred guilt from his post-offence departure from Canada, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in using the departure evidence to infer guilt, but applied the curative proviso given the overwhelming evidence of erratic driving and impairment.

The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, reducing the sentence by one year to account for two-for-one pre-trial custody credit, which the trial judge had improperly denied based on the erroneous flight finding.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant had a history of violent behaviour and there were concerns for witness safety, justifying detention on the secondary ground.

Furthermore, the tertiary ground was met as the combined effect of the strength of the Crown's case and the circumstances of the offence made detention necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was acquitted of murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, evidence was admitted that the deceased had 39 ecstasy pills sewn into his underwear, on the condition that the defence would not use it to suggest the deceased had a violent disposition.

However, in his closing address, defence counsel rhetorically asked the jury to link the drugs to violence, implying the deceased was the aggressor.

The trial judge refused the Crown's request for a corrective instruction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in failing to correct the impermissible propensity reasoning invited by defence counsel.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, disguise with intent, and possession of an imitation firearm, and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine his mother, an alibi witness, on a prior false police report, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination was generally permissible but the jury instructions were inadequate.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day to reflect the youthful offender's excellent prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving, obstructing a peace officer, failing to stop, and public mischief after causing a collision on Highway 401 and falsely reporting her vehicle as stolen.

She appealed her convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's prior inconsistent videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, the error did not warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence against her.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the conviction for obstructing a peace officer, as it arose from the same false report as the public mischief charge.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed the refusal of a Superior Court judge to grant an order under section 37.1(1)(a) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The appellant sought disclosure of the existence or absence of a criminal record of a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that such disclosure might enable the accused to determine the identity of the confidential informant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the failure to obtain a vaginal sample from the complainant constituted unacceptable negligence under the Bero analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of the evidence and upholding the trial judge's finding that the failure to collect the sample was not unacceptable negligence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice and using a forged document after presenting a fake letter at his trial for possessing stolen dealer plates.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge applied an improper burden of proof by asking if his evidence 'could reasonably be true' rather than applying the W.(D.) reasonable doubt standard.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in using the 'might reasonably be true' language at the second stage of the W.(D.) analysis, the error was not reversible because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's testimony and found the Crown's case overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical child sexual abuse.

At trial, the defence called a psychiatrist to testify that the complainants' allegations were the result of false memory syndrome.

The trial judge accepted the expert's qualifications in psychiatry but ultimately found the complainants had a reliable core memory of the abuse.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of the expert evidence and misapprehended evidence regarding his expressions of remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence or the appellant's credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the sentence of two years less a day.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a high school altercation where a fellow student was stabbed.

The appellant testified he did not have a knife and could not explain the injury.

The trial judge convicted the appellant after finding his explanation was not more plausible than the Crown's theory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof to the accused and failed to consider whether the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of house-breaking instruments contrary to s. 309(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge quashed the indictment, finding the section violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 309(1) does not create a reverse onus and does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, as the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant operated a telephone sales 'boiler room' in Toronto, fraudulently inducing United States residents to purchase worthless shares in Central American mining companies.

The victims sent their money to Central America, and the appellant brought a portion of the proceeds back to Canada.

The appellant challenged his committal for trial on the basis that the essential element of the fraud (the deprivation) occurred outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing that Canadian courts have jurisdiction over transnational offences if there is a 'real and substantial link' between the offence and Canada, which was satisfied by the scheme being devised and operated in Toronto.