John Macdonald

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment enforcing a settlement allegedly accepted by the self‑represented plaintiff.

The underlying action concerned allegations by a former Ph.D. student that his academic supervisor and the university engaged in harassment and misconduct that prevented him from completing his studies and caused psychological harm.

The court reviewed extensive settlement negotiations conducted by email and found that the defendants made a formal settlement offer which the plaintiff unequivocally accepted.

The plaintiff argued that there was no meeting of the minds, citing mental health issues, limited English proficiency, and alleged duress arising from financial pressure and the potential termination of health benefits.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the plaintiff had the capacity to contract, understood the terms including the requirement of a full and final release of all claims, and freely accepted the offer.

The settlement was enforced and judgment granted in accordance with its terms.

Following the dismissal of two libel actions arising from statements made during a municipal election campaign, the successful defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

They argued the actions were strategic lawsuits against public participation and constituted an abuse of process intended to interfere with the political process.

The court rejected the abuse of process allegation, finding the plaintiff was entitled to pursue legal remedies during an election campaign and that the evidence did not establish a political motive or distortion of the electoral process.

Adverse credibility findings against the plaintiff and litigation conduct did not justify elevated costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, emphasizing proportionality, the public interest issues involved, and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The applicant sought to quash a municipal by-law repealing a heritage designation affecting its hotel property and sought related relief concerning heritage property tax rebates.

The municipality had approved demolition of the original designated heritage building in 1996 but did not repeal the designation by-law until 2012, when it enacted a repealing by-law retroactive to the demolition approval date pursuant to the Ontario Heritage Act.

The applicant alleged illegality and bad faith, arguing that the municipality failed to provide prior notice and enacted the repeal retroactively to defeat its tax rebate claims.

The court held that prior notice was not required where the Act mandated repeal following approval of demolition, and that the retroactive repeal was a reasonable step to comply belatedly with statutory requirements.

The applicant failed to establish bad faith or illegality, and further failed to meet additional eligibility criteria for the heritage tax rebate program.

The plaintiff sued for libel arising from an open letter delivered by the defendant, then a municipal council candidate, to Toronto councillors and the Mayor concerning alleged influence over a controversial City lease and related election finance questions.

The court held that the letter was defamatory and referred to the plaintiff, but found that the occasion of publication attracted qualified privilege and that portions of the letter also constituted fair comment on matters of public interest.

The court rejected the defence of responsible communication as unavailable on these facts, but held the plaintiff failed to prove express malice sufficient to defeat qualified privilege or fair comment.

The action was dismissed, with contingent general damages assessed at $22,500.

The plaintiff brought a libel action against a municipal councillor arising from statements made to a newspaper editorial board concerning an untendered municipal contract awarded to a corporation associated with the plaintiff.

The court held that although the statements could in law be capable of referring to the plaintiff, the reasonable reader would not conclude that they did so.

The defendant spoke only about the corporation and repeatedly stated he could not accuse anyone or pinpoint wrongdoing.

The court further found that the statements expressed suspicion of corruption without factual assertion and, when read in context, did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish two essential elements of defamation: reference to the plaintiff and defamatory meaning.

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike portions of an amended statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal action under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The impugned pleadings related to claims for aggravated damages ("Keays damages") and punitive damages based on alleged bad faith in the manner of dismissal and alleged reprisals for whistleblowing concerning marketing practices.

The court held that it was not plain and obvious that the allegations failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, emphasizing that damages for mental distress and punitive damages may arise from bad faith conduct in dismissal even where termination is without cause.

However, several paragraphs were struck for being unclear and unintelligible, with leave granted to replead them in plain language.

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the action against a settling defendant following a partial settlement in a copyright and passing off action between two artists and an art gallery.

The non-settling defendant opposed dismissal unless the court imposed a term requiring the plaintiff to undertake damages for alleged interference with the defendant’s contractual relationship with the gallery.

The court held that partial settlements must be reviewed for fairness and potential prejudice to non-settling defendants, even if formal approval is not required.

On the evidence, the settlement term restricting the gallery from selling certain works did not prejudice the non-settling defendant because the gallery had already ceased selling those works prior to the settlement due to the allegations in the litigation.

The court dismissed the action against the settling defendant and refused to impose the undertaking sought by the non-settling defendant.

The defendants moved to strike parts of the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought damages for the delay in marketing its generic drug caused by the defendants' actions under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

The plaintiff claimed damages under s. 8 of the Regulations, unjust enrichment, and the Trade-marks Act after the defendants' patent was declared invalid.

The court dismissed the motion to strike these claims, finding they had a reasonable prospect of success and raised unsettled legal questions, but struck a bald claim for remedies 'otherwise available at law'.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Region's decision to consent to the sale of a non-profit housing co-operative to the Region's social housing arm.

The Co-op was in receivership due to financial difficulties and need for capital repairs.

The Region consented to the sale without notifying the Co-op's board or members.

The Divisional Court held that the Region's decision was judicially reviewable and that the Region breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

However, given the urgent need for repairs, the court declined to quash the consent and deferred the matter to the Commercial List where the sale motion was pending.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision that directed MPAC to bring a complaint to correct palpable errors in the assessment roll for two severed parcels.

The Board limited the complaint to apportioning the existing $773,000 assessment between the parcels, precluding MPAC from seeking an increased current value assessment of $1,650,000 due to MPAC's delay and resulting prejudice to the taxpayer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly and reasonably exercised its discretion under section 40.1(b) of the Assessment Act.

The applicant insurer sought leave to appeal an order that reopened a dismissed class action certification motion to allow the plaintiffs to file fresh expert evidence.

The motion judge had previously dismissed the certification motion because the plaintiffs' expert evidence was inadmissible.

The motion judge then allowed the motion to be reopened, finding that the strict test for fresh evidence from Sagaz did not apply to procedural motions under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and conflicting decisions regarding the application of the principle of finality to procedural orders.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their motion to strike a summons to witness.

The respondent had issued the summons to examine a representative of the applicants in connection with a pending motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the evidence was potentially relevant, and concluding that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance.

The applicant, Kenora Prospectors & Miners, Limited, sought leave to appeal an order made at a trial management conference that denied it leave to bring a motion to be removed as a party to a family law proceeding.

The applicant argued it was denied the right to be heard on the merits of its request for leave.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the applicant was seemingly denied the opportunity to present its case, and concluding that the right to be heard and the proper conduct of trial management conferences are matters of systemic and public importance.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of neglect of duty for delaying a detainee's right to counsel for 90 minutes after the initial justification for the delay (officer safety) had passed.

The Hearing Officer imposed a reprimand, but the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services substituted a six-month reduction in rank.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable, as it failed to consider mitigating factors and wrongly concluded that a reprimand was an unavailable penalty for a Charter breach.

The appeal was allowed and the reprimand restored.

The appellant tenant brought a motion to set aside an order that had set aside his Certificate of Perfection and dismissed his appeal from a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal.

The Divisional Court found no basis to set aside the order regarding the Certificate of Perfection, as it was filed late.

Although the motion judge erred in dismissing the appeal for improper perfection while a motion to extend time was pending, the Divisional Court upheld the dismissal because the appeal raised only factual issues, contrary to the requirement under s. 196 of the Tenant Protection Act that appeals be restricted to questions of law alone.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought declaratory or prerogative relief regarding whether she had elected to receive WSIB benefits and whether such an election was valid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal had not yet decided these issues.

The Court emphasized that the Board should provide election forms to workers as soon as it becomes aware of an illness to ensure they seek legal advice promptly.

The appellants appealed a Motions Court Judge's decision refusing to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The respondents had claimed a remedial constructive trust based on alleged unconscionable conduct following the termination of a contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the CPL, finding no evidence of unconscionable conduct by the appellants and noting that the respondents' claim was essentially for breach of contract rather than an equitable cause of action.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary child support and rescind over $20,000 in arrears.

He argued that his income had severely diminished due to depression and that the motions judge erred in imputing an annual income of $40,000 based on his past work in family businesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet his onus of establishing a material change in circumstances.

The majority held that the motions judge was entitled to conclude that his income was difficult to discern and that a trial of an issue was not required.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Racing Commission's decision to suspend him for 74 days and fine him $1,000 for an equine drug violation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the penalty was unreasonable, as the respondent treated his prior offences differently than in a previous hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the penalty was within the applicable guidelines and not patently unreasonable.

The defendants appealed a decision refusing to strike out paragraphs of a statement of claim in a proposed national class proceeding regarding the prescription drug Prepulsid.

The defendants argued the representative plaintiff, an Ontario resident, could not assert causes of action under the legislation of other provinces, such as subrogated health insurance claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Class Proceedings Act permits a representative plaintiff to advance claims on behalf of class members that the plaintiff might not have personally.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim to explicitly plead the out-of-province statutes relied upon as material facts.