John Macdonald

A ratepayers' association applied for judicial review of a school board's decision to lease a closed school site to a private developer for a seniors' complex.

The ratepayers argued the board breached a duty of fairness by failing to consult the public before approving the lease, relying on a voluntary board policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board owed no general duty of fairness to local residents regarding the disposition of surplus property.

Furthermore, the board's internal policy did not create a legitimate expectation of public consultation because it was not published or relied upon by the community.

The appellants, minority shareholders in Colio Wines of Canada Ltd., appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy and the appointment of an inspector under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The appellants alleged that a 1992 amalgamation unfairly valued their shares at one cent each.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to provide cogent evidence that oppressive conduct appeared to have occurred, as required by s. 161(2) of the Act.

The court confirmed that mere suspicion or a report suggesting oppression 'may have been' present is insufficient to warrant the appointment of an inspector.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision under the Employment Standards Act awarding the respondent employee vacation pay for his last two years of employment.

The employer argued the employee had ample down time during the winter months to take vacation in lieu of pay.

The adjudicator found the employee worked year-round and was entitled to vacation pay.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, found no palpable or overriding error in the adjudicator's findings, and dismissed the application.

The appellant, a professional engineer, appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and breach of statutory duty against the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario and its employees.

The trial judge dismissed the action on the basis of statutory immunity under s. 45(1) of the Professional Engineers Act, finding the respondents acted in good faith.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on good faith or her refusal to extend the time for a jury notice.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in awarding solicitor and client costs, and reduced the costs to a party-and-party basis.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the remuneration of a condominium director and an agent.

The Divisional Court held that while s. 28(3) of the Condominium Act requires a specific by-law for the remuneration of directors, s. 28(1)(c) permits the board to remunerate officers and agents without a by-law.

The appeal was dismissed regarding Mr. Sisto, who was remunerated as a director without a by-law.

The appeal was allowed regarding Mr. Cianfarani, an agent of the corporation, as he could be remunerated without a by-law.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their application for a declaration that the insured was dead under section 208 of the Insurance Act.

The trial judge had relied on hearsay evidence from an investigator regarding statements made by the insured's sister, which suggested the insured had planned to fake his death.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by using this hearsay evidence for a truth purpose without properly applying the principled approach to hearsay.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal establishing a pricing formula for live chickens in Ontario and ordering the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Commission to amend its regulations to implement the formula.

Applying the pragmatic and functional approach, the Divisional Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

The court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act and the Farm Products Marketing Act to establish the pricing formula, fix the starting price, and direct the Commission to amend its regulations.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal confirming the Registrar's proposal to revoke his registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice and that the tribunal erred in its factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the hearing was appropriate, hearsay evidence was permitted under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, and there was ample evidence to support the revocation.

The applicant, a probationary police constable, sought judicial review of the police services board's decision to terminate his employment.

He argued the board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to require witnesses to give evidence under oath or allow cross-examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under section 44(3) of the Police Services Act, the board was acting as an employer exercising an administrative function.

The Court held that the board was not clearly wrong or unreasonable in exercising its discretion not to take evidence under oath or permit cross-examination, given the circumstances and the information already before it.

At the commencement of a judicial review application, the applicant raised a preliminary objection without notice, arguing the Information and Privacy Commissioner should not be permitted to address the correctness of its own decision.

The Divisional Court adjourned the application, ordering that the preliminary objection be properly briefed with facta and that an amicus curiae be appointed to assist the court on the substantive issues in the event the Commissioner is denied standing to argue the correctness of the decision.