John A. Campion

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The applicant sought to prohibit the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) from conducting a hearing into whether the applicant should pay costs to the respondents following an unsuccessful appeal.

The applicant argued that the lack of a transcript and the OMB member's refusal to consider a lawyer's notes demonstrated bias and precluded a fair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, holding that courts generally will not entertain piecemeal attacks on administrative proceedings before a final decision is made.

The moving party sought an order dismissing relief requested in a notice of hearing for directions and a declaration that the court lacked jurisdiction to continue a reference arising from a judgment for sale under the Partition Act.

The original judgment ordered the sale of jointly owned properties under the direction of a referee, with proceeds to be paid into court.

The applicant in the original proceeding later privately sold its ownership interest without complying with the judgment for sale and without paying proceeds into court.

The court held that the judgment for sale was the sole jurisdictional basis for the reference and had become unenforceable due to the private sale.

As a result, the reference master lacked jurisdiction to continue the reference.

The appellant, General Electric Canada Company, sought a declaration that its insurers had a duty to defend it regarding a request by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) to delineate the source of TCE contamination on its former property.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the MOE letter was a request for voluntary action and the costs incurred were compliance costs, not defence costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the pleadings rule and concluding that the MOE letter did not constitute a claim that triggered the insurers' duty to defend.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.

In a proposed class action arising from a train derailment, the defendants communicated directly with several putative class members during the pre‑certification stage and offered individual settlements in exchange for releases.

The plaintiffs sought disclosure of the releases, rescission of the settlements, and an order preventing further communications between the defendants and putative class members.

The court held that there was no evidence of misconduct or breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the communications were sent by the defendants rather than their counsel and there was no proof the defendants knew the recipients were represented.

However, to preserve the integrity of the proposed class proceeding, the court ordered disclosure of the releases and required the defendants to provide class counsel with copies of any future correspondence seven days before distribution while prohibiting communication with putative class members known to be represented.

Rescission of the settlements was refused due to the absence of evidence supporting grounds such as misrepresentation, duress, or unconscionability.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action regarding customs brokerage fees charged on international shipments.

The core issue for the leave motion was whether the motion judge erred in certifying as a common issue whether the brokerage services were 'unsolicited services' under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, without considering the consignees' knowledge or consent.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that consumer knowledge is irrelevant under section 13 of the Act, and noting that the issue is a matter of public importance.

The defendant brought a motion for directions to adjourn its motion for leave to appeal a class action certification order pending the disposition of its appeal of a summary judgment order to the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to dismiss the leave motion for failing to name a hearing date.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions, holding that the certification order frames the proceedings and the leave motion must be heard expeditiously before the summary judgment appeal.

The court declined to dismiss the leave motion on technical grounds and ordered it to be perfected and heard at the earliest opportunity.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Securities Commission order that imposed significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for failing to report insider trades and failing to adequately supervise trading.

The appellants argued that the AMP provision of the Securities Act, which allows fines up to $1 million per infraction, violates s. 11(d) of the Charter because its magnitude constitutes a true penal consequence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionality of an administrative penalty is assessed based on the actual penalty imposed, not the theoretical maximum.

The court found the fines were proportionate to the regulatory goal of deterring non-compliance in capital markets and did not amount to a penal sanction.

The court also upheld the Commission's findings regarding the appellants' failure to supervise and its consideration of the public interest in determining the sanctions.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a partial indemnity costs award of $650,000 granted to the plaintiffs following a lengthy and aggressively fought class action certification motion regarding allegedly defective pacemakers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order, noting that the defendants' aggressive approach significantly drove up the plaintiffs' costs.

The applicants sought to file a Notice of Hearing under s. 127 of the Securities Act to reprimand Commission Staff and rectify alleged past non-compliance related to the delayed issuance of a prospectus receipt.

The Secretary returned the draft notice, stating only Staff could bring a s. 127 hearing.

The applicants moved for directions.

The Commission declined to decide whether a third party could ever seek a s. 127 hearing, finding that even if they could, the relief sought here was punitive and retrospective.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Asbestos, the Commission held that s. 127 is a regulatory provision intended to be preventive and prospective, not to remedy alleged past misconduct or harm to private parties.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order certifying the action as a class proceeding regarding allegedly defective heart devices.

The defendants argued the motions judge misconstrued the 'some basis in fact' standard and that the class definition was overly inclusive.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the evidentiary principles from Hollick v. Toronto and made factual findings entitled to deference.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal a post-certification decision that dismissed their request to amend the class definition by inserting cut-off dates for three models of allegedly defective defibrillators.

The defendants argued the motions judge erred in placing the burden of proof on them and in finding some basis in fact for the plaintiffs' proposed dates.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, and that the burden was correctly placed on the defendants to justify amending the certification order.

The respondent commenced arbitral proceedings against the appellant.

The arbitrator ordered the respondent to post security for costs.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the arbitrator's order.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1991 to review the arbitrator's procedural order for security for costs, as it was neither an award nor a ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration.

The respondent was seriously injured when his motorcycle struck a freight train at a rural railway crossing at night.

The crossing had only a passive warning system.

The trial judge found the appellant railway company 75% negligent for failing to conduct nighttime inspections and failing to implement additional safety measures, and the respondent 25% contributorily negligent due to excessive speed and impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the railway company's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and contributory negligence.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action regarding a defective medical product.

The defendants argued that the pleadings did not satisfy section 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act and that the litigation plan improperly provided for a reference to determine individual issues under section 25.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the certification judge's decision, and emphasizing the deference owed to judges managing class proceedings.

Following the dismissal of several class actions against automobile insurers, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs, who had relied on a previous Court of Appeal decision that was subsequently reversed, sought their costs despite being unsuccessful, citing disastrous financial consequences for their contingency-fee counsel.

The successful insurers sought their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to either side.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act was not intended to insulate unsuccessful plaintiffs from costs, but also found that the insurers should not receive costs because the litigation constituted a test case and the plaintiffs had reasonably relied on the court's own prior jurisprudence.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal a decision substituting the representative plaintiff in a class action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought costs of $22,858.21, while the defendants argued costs should be in the cause or limited to $2,500.

The court found the plaintiff's costs excessive for a narrow procedural motion that arose partly from a carriage dispute among class counsel.

Applying the principle of fair and reasonable expectations, the court fixed costs at $2,500 payable by the defendants.

A two-year-old child suffered a catastrophic brain injury after falling from a fifth-floor apartment window with a broken screen.

The jury awarded over $12.9 million in damages, including maximum non-pecuniary damages and future care costs exceeding the plaintiffs' highest suggested scenario.

The landlord appealed the damage awards and several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of subsequent remedial measures and expert witness qualifications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and damages, finding the jury's awards supported by evidence and the trial judge's evidentiary rulings largely correct or harmless.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding a $350,000 costs premium payable by the landlord, reducing it to $50,000 based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, while allowing a cross-appeal to charge the balance of the premium to the child's award.