John A. Campion

The appellants, automobile insurers, appealed the dismissal of their motions to dismiss class proceedings brought by the respondent insureds.

The insureds claimed that the insurers breached statutory condition 6(7) by reducing their actual cash value payments by the policy deductible when taking title to the salvage in total loss claims.

The motion judge, bound by the Court of Appeal's previous decision in McNaughton, dismissed the insurers' motions.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal held that McNaughton was wrongly decided, as statutory condition 6(7) does not quantify the insurer's payment obligation but merely gives the option to acquire salvage.

The Court overruled McNaughton, allowed the appeals, and dismissed the insureds' actions.

The appellant appealed a decision granting an application for partition and sale of commercial properties under the Partition Act.

The appellant argued that the scope of discretion to refuse partition and sale should be broadened beyond circumstances of malice, oppression, and vexatious intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that co-tenants have a prima facie right to compel partition or sale, which should only be refused in limited circumstances including hardship amounting to oppression.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The respondent, a 25-year employee of the appellant Board, was summarily dismissed for using his position to obtain a direct monetary benefit.

He had purchased computers at a discount from a registered employer and accepted a $1,000 payment from an employer representative, subsequently lying about these events during the employer's investigation.

The trial judge found the dismissal was wrongful and awarded 24 months' notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply the correct legal standard from McKinley v. B.C. Tel and by not considering the full extent of the respondent's misconduct.

The Court held that the respondent's intentional and repeated dishonest acts constituted a fundamental breach of his employment obligations, justifying summary dismissal.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The plaintiffs in a class action brought motions to quash the defendants' appeals from orders dismissing their Rule 20 and Rule 21 motions.

The plaintiffs argued the orders were interlocutory, not final.

The Court of Appeal held that the orders, which dismissed the motions on a question of law and bound the court to a specific interpretation of the Insurance Act, gave rise to res judicata and were therefore final orders.

The motions to quash were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting the respondent's application for the sale of five commercial properties under the Partition Act.

The parties were co-tenants, and the respondent, holding a minority interest, refused to consent to the appellants' management and leveraging plans after the appellants acquired their majority interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a co-tenant has a prima facie right to compel a sale under the Davis test, and that the respondent's conduct was not malicious, oppressive, or vexatious, but rather a predictable response to a business relationship breakdown.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision declaring it had a duty to defend and indemnify the respondent insured for claims arising from a carbon monoxide leak in the insured's apartment building.

The insurer argued that the absolute pollution liability exclusion in the commercial general liability policy barred coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion clause was intended to apply to traditional environmental pollution, not to routine commercial hazards like a faulty furnace causing indoor carbon monoxide poisoning.

The court emphasized that exclusion clauses must be interpreted narrowly and in a manner consistent with the main purpose of the insurance coverage and the reasonable expectations of the policyholder.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision holding a non-party liable for costs and ordering that the costs of the 45-day trial be fixed rather than assessed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the test for non-party costs and reasonably concluded that the non-party exercised de facto control over the claim.

The Court also upheld the decision to fix costs, agreeing that the protracted history of the proceeding and the age of the parties made an early resolution imperative.

The appellant bank appealed a decision ordering a court-appointed receiver to pay municipal realty taxes to the respondent municipality in priority to the bank's secured claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 382 of the Municipal Act, municipal realty taxes have priority over all other claims except the Crown.

The Court also held that a court-appointed receiver is a 'trustee' within the meaning of section 400(11) of the Act, giving the municipality priority over the proceeds of personal property realized by the receiver.

The defendants in a proposed class action appealed a motions judge's decision refusing to compel the proposed plaintiffs to answer questions about an alternative compensation scheme.

The Divisional Court held that 'procedure' in s. 5(1)(d) of the Class Proceedings Act includes alternative dispute resolution methods outside the court system.

However, the court dismissed the appeal, finding that whether an alternative method is preferable is an objective determination for the motions judge, and little is gained by asking the proposed plaintiffs for their opinion on the matter.