Joanne K. Stuart

The appellant was convicted of threatening and criminally harassing his former common law wife.

Following the finding of guilt, defence counsel requested a psychiatric assessment, which led to a finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) due to alcohol-related dementia and delusions.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the NCRMD finding was unreasonable and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer raised his mental state without instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the NCRMD verdict was reasonable and that the appellant failed to prove his counsel acted without instructions or that the counsel's performance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR), was granted an absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown appealed, which automatically suspended the absolute discharge under s. 672.75 of the Criminal Code, reverting the applicant to a conditional discharge.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the automatic suspension.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the motion and found that s. 672.75 violates ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter by depriving the NCR accused of liberty without due process and arbitrarily detaining them.

The violations were not saved by s. 1.

The court declared the offending words in s. 672.75 of no force and effect, suspended for 12 months.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for extortion.

The trial judge provided only half a page of analysis after a ten-day trial, failing to address significant inconsistencies in the evidence or specify which of the five alleged incidents constituted the extortion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and demonstrated a failure to consider the whole of the evidence.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the Board failed to properly assess the risk of psychological harm to the public, misapprehended evidence, and exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision that the respondent was not a significant threat to the public was reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, was living in the community subject to a reporting condition.

After failing to report, he was apprehended and detained in a secure hospital unit.

The hospital and the Review Board failed to hold a restriction of liberty hearing 'as soon as practicable' as required by the Criminal Code, resulting in a delay of several months and a breach of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights.

The Board eventually ordered his return to the community but allowed the hospital up to 60 days to release him, increased his reporting to weekly, and refused to grant an absolute discharge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal of an absolute discharge and the increased reporting requirement, but set aside the 60-day delay and the Board's guideline that hearings should generally be held within 30 days, finding no evidentiary basis for those timeframes.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing there was insufficient evidence of a pattern of violence and that the predicate offence was intended as a property offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded there was a pattern of violence against women in their homes.

The Court also agreed that a long-term offender designation was unrealistic given the appellant's history of failing to follow through with therapy and the level of supervision required.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and his cousin were driving at excessive speeds in close proximity, resulting in the cousin's vehicle losing control and striking another car, killing the cousin and injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on factual causation and tandem driving.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the appellant's post-verdict application to re-open the defence case to adduce fresh evidence regarding a prosecution witness's credibility.

The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of counselling murder and conspiracy to commit murder after planning to hire a hitman to kill the appellant's wife.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 6 years' imprisonment and the co-accused to 3.5 years.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing for parity with his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was the prime mover, motivated by greed, and that the intended victim being his wife justified a higher sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on six counts of sexual assault against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior allegations against another individual without holding a hearing, and that Crown counsel's comments during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the evidentiary application and concluding that the Crown's comments did not result in trial unfairness.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to obtain Gladue information for the Aboriginal offender and by incorrectly characterizing the offence as a breach of trust.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the impact of residential schools and pervasive oxycontin use in the appellant's community.

The sentence of imprisonment was reduced to time served, with the 18-month probation order remaining in place.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert police evidence regarding a 'code of silence' in the community where the shooting occurred.

The Crown introduced this evidence to explain why the sole eyewitness initially lied to police about witnessing the murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was relevant and necessary to provide context for the witness's behaviour, and that the trial judge implemented extraordinary safeguards to prevent prejudice, including prohibiting the word 'gang' and providing clear limiting instructions to the jury.

The appellant pleaded guilty to driving without insurance and was fined the statutory minimum of $5,000.

After a complex procedural history involving a prior overturned conviction, the appellant appealed the fine, seeking a reduction or suspension due to financial hardship.

The Court of Appeal, with the Crown's consent, allowed the appeal and reduced the fine to $2,500, finding that exceptional circumstances existed under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board finding that he presented a significant risk to the public and ordering his detention.

The amicus curiae argued the finding of risk was unreasonable given the appellant's history of living in the community without incident, and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's findings regarding risk and the necessity of a detention order to facilitate treatment and protect the public were reasonable and did not constitute an error of law.

L'appelant a plaidé coupable à de multiples chefs d'accusation de conduite en état d'ébriété et de conduite dangereuse causant la mort et des lésions corporelles après avoir causé un accident de la route mortel.

Le juge de première instance a imposé une peine d'emprisonnement de 8 ans.

L'appelant a interjeté appel, soutenant que la peine se situait en dehors de l'échelle établie par la jurisprudence.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté l'appel, concluant que la peine n'était pas manifestement inappropriée compte tenu des circonstances aggravantes extrêmes, notamment le taux d'alcoolémie élevé, la vitesse excessive et le dossier de conduite antérieur de l'appelant.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple counts of impaired and dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed collision that killed three people and seriously injured another.

The trial judge imposed an eight-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was outside the four- to five-year range established by previous jurisprudence for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that previous cases do not cap sentences and that the catastrophic consequences, combined with the appellant's prior driving record and ignored warnings, justified the eight-year sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior consistent statements made by the complainant to her school friends and by failing to properly resolve inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior statements were properly admitted to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication and that the trial judge's resolution of the evidentiary inconsistencies was reasonably supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in her jury instructions.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim during a sexual assault, relying on forensic evidence and the appellant's post-offence conduct.

The defence argued the sexual intercourse was consensual and pointed to an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly set out the defence's position and the evidence supporting it.

Furthermore, the trial judge's instructions on the appellant's post-offence conduct and fabricated statements were flawed, and she failed to instruct the jury on how to use the alternate suspect's post-offence conduct.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a paralegal, was convicted of theft, forgery, and fraud after stealing personal injury settlement funds from vulnerable clients.

He was sentenced to 23 months' incarceration and ordered to pay $141,752 in restitution.

He appealed the restitution order, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his inability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in cases of breach of trust, the claims of the victims are paramount.

The court found the trial judge properly considered the appellant's future employment prospects and the lack of evidence regarding the whereabouts of the stolen funds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation for DNA evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of intoxicated witnesses, and misused evidence of vaginal bleeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she did not err in her treatment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions and 15-year sentences for attempted murder.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to unreliable eyewitness identification and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The appellant Nguyen also argued the trial judge erred in applying party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the identification evidence was supported by other evidence and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeals, holding that the 15-year sentences were within the appropriate range given the horrific nature of the shooting that rendered the victim quadriplegic, and that the trial judge did not err in denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit to an offender who committed the offence while serving a conditional sentence.