Joanne K. Stuart

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence on the effects of crack cocaine and the complainant's capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was alive to the dispute between the experts and that it was open to him to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's account.

The court further held that, even if the treatment of the expert evidence was inadequate, the conviction remained supported by the accepted evidence that the complainant was unable to move, speak, or think clearly and did not consent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of mischief after placing a spray-painted, beat-up van on his property line to interfere with his neighbours' attempts to sell their home, amidst an ongoing dispute over basement flooding.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected his defence under s. 430(7) of the Criminal Code, which protects acts done solely for the purpose of communicating information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the s. 430(7) defence applies even if the communication is intended to persuade or pressure others by interfering with their property rights, provided the act itself is peaceful and solely communicative.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving after the trial judge excluded breathalyzer evidence, finding the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge improperly altered the transcript of her oral reasons and erred in her legal analysis of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal held that while altering transcripts of oral reasons is inappropriate, it did not affect the outcome.

Applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Shepherd, the Court found the officer's subjective belief was objectively reasonable given the appellant's erratic driving, flushed face, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of robbery and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several errors, including impermissibly altering the substance of her oral reasons after the Crown filed its Notice of Appeal, raising the issue of the accused's identity in a videotaped interview when it was not contested by the defence, and failing to compare the likeness of the accused in the video with the accused in court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault against two young female family members.

He argued that the verdict on one count was inconsistent with acquittals on other counts, that the verdict on the second count was unreasonable due to weak evidence, and that the trial judge failed to adequately put the theory of the defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not unreasonable and that the jury charge, while brief, was adequate in the context of the short and uncomplicated trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from a street racing incident.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of a recanting witness, allowing the jury to view a DVD of the statement during deliberations, and instructing the jury on criminal negligence.

He also appealed the rejection of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statements were necessary and reliable, the jury instructions were adequate, and a significant custodial sentence was required to deter street racing.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal judge, which upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance to the administration of justice, nor did the trial judge commit any clear error of law.

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted of aggravated assault after throwing a beer bottle and mug at the complainant in a bar.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and improperly used the co-accused's out-of-court statement against him.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in her treatment of the co-accused's statement, the error caused no harm and the verdict would have been the same.

The curative proviso was applied, and the appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing police in two separate incidents after being stopped while driving an uninsured vehicle.

In both instances, he interfered with police efforts to impound the vehicle and, in one case, to seize his licence plate.

On appeal, he argued the police lacked statutory or common law authority to impound an uninsured vehicle, meaning they were not acting in the lawful execution of their duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while no express statutory power exists, police have common law authority under the Waterfield/Dedman test to impound uninsured vehicles to protect public safety and control traffic.

The appellant, subject to a s. 161(1)(a) Criminal Code prohibition order preventing him from attending public parks where children under 14 could reasonably be expected to be present, was arrested while working at a fairground.

He appealed his conviction for breaching the order, arguing the paved fairground was not a 'public park'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a public park does not require greenery and that the location's recreational use and accessibility to the public, including children, satisfied the definition.

The appellant, bound by a s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order preventing him from attending a public park where children under 14 could reasonably be expected to be present, was arrested while working at a game booth at the Super Ex fair at Lansdowne Park.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a paved fairground is not a 'public park'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'public park' under s. 161(1)(a) focuses on the recreational activities available to the public and the likelihood of children being present, rather than the physical geography or presence of green space.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after he asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found the appellant was eager to tell his story and only wanted to ensure his lawyer was available for his bail hearing the next day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant was not interested in consulting counsel before speaking to the police and therefore his rights were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of welfare fraud for collecting social assistance while in an undisclosed common law relationship and failing to disclose support payments.

She appealed the convictions and the $90,127.15 restitution order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the first conviction, finding the trial judge did not err in determining she was a common law spouse based on family court affidavits.

However, the Court set aside the second conviction because the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her disclosure of support payments, which the Crown had conceded she reported.

The restitution order was correspondingly reduced to $51,263.85.

The appellant pled guilty to assault causing bodily harm following a racially motivated group attack on a disabled victim.

He appealed his five-year sentence, arguing he received insufficient credit for pre-trial custody and that his sentence offended the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's role as the instigator, his use of racial slurs, and his extensive criminal record distinguished him from his co-accused.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to limit pre-trial custody credit, concluding the overall sentence was fit given the brutal and senseless nature of the attack.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, attempt to obstruct justice, and failure to comply with an undertaking.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the investigating officer's testimony about why he did not charge the complainant after she recanted her allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the officer's testimony explained his investigative process and did not constitute improper oath-helping.

The appellants were convicted of possession of stolen property under $5,000 and fraud over $5,000 arising from the sale of a motorcycle containing stolen components.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding recent possession, wilful blindness, after-the-fact conduct, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

They also appealed their conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate when read as a whole and no Vetrovec warning was required.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using the child complainant's section 715.1 videotaped statement to bolster her trial evidence, and that the Kienapple principle should stay the latter two convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instruction was unnecessary as the videotaped statement forms part of the trial evidence, and holding that Kienapple did not apply because the offences have different legal elements.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari and setting aside his discharge at a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by dealing with the evidence on a piecemeal basis and choosing among competing inferences rather than considering the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and break and enter, as well as his sentence of 30 days intermittent.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the W.D. framework, overemphasized the complainant's lack of motive to fabricate, misapprehended evidence regarding the assault with a gold chain, and erred in accepting the complainant's evidence about the break and enter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, and held the sentence was fit.

The appellant, a first offender, pleaded guilty to attempted murder, forcible confinement, robbery, and sexual assault after a brutal and prolonged attack on a young woman.

He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was excessive and that the judge failed to apply the principle that first offenders should receive the shortest possible sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the shortest sentence principle does not apply to very serious and violent offences, and that the 15-year sentence was proportionate given the severe aggravating factors and the devastating, permanent injuries inflicted on the victim.