Joanne K. Stuart

The appellant challenged his conviction as a party to a sexual assault with a weapon arising from a group sexual assault committed during a heavily intoxicated gathering, arguing that the trial judge failed to address intoxication and scrutinized defence evidence more harshly than Crown evidence.

The court held that the intoxication defence had an air of reality, but the trial reasons, read contextually, showed the trial judge was aware of the defence and rejected it, thereby permitting meaningful appellate review.

The court also rejected the complaint about uneven scrutiny, finding the credibility analysis thorough and balanced.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the custodial term was fit and parity with youth co-accused sentenced under a different statutory regime did not assist the appellant.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years for ten armed robberies and two unlawful confinements.

He argued that an arithmetic error was made in calculating his pre-trial custody and that he should receive credit for time spent in custody on a separate drug conviction that was subsequently quashed and stayed.

The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed to correct the arithmetic error, reducing the sentence by 70 days.

However, the majority held that the appellant could not receive credit for time spent serving a sentence for an unrelated offence, even though that conviction was later quashed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for mandamus with certiorari in aid against a Justice of the Peace who refused to issue process against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no jurisdictional error because the consensual medical examination lacked evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

The Court also agreed that issuing process would be an abuse of process given prior unsuccessful civil and criminal proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences, including historical assaults and an incident on April 11.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the inculpatory inferences drawn from the appellant's conduct when confronted.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding it was at the high end but within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition for driving-related offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to his guilty plea and failed to give 3:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal held that even if there were errors in principle, the three-year sentence was fit given the appellant's horrendous record for driving-related offences.

However, the Court varied the lifetime driving prohibition to a 10-year prohibition.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pointing a firearm without lawful excuse.

At trial, the appellant testified that he was a drug dealer and an active participant in a 'gangster' lifestyle.

The trial judge gave a limiting instruction regarding the appellant's criminal record but failed to provide any instruction on how the jury was entitled to deal with the bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the complete absence of instructions on the issue of bad character evidence constituted reversible error, as there was a real risk the jury could infer guilt based on character.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a weapon, arguing the sentencing judge placed too much weight on his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant had 62 convictions over 14 years.

The sentencing judge properly considered mitigating factors, but the combination of the crimes and the lengthy record made the sentence fit.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of DNA evidence found on a scarf and the use of his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the criminal standard of proof applies to the evidence as a whole, not individual items, and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the prohibited use of the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by ignoring what amounted to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing position was not a joint submission as there was no prior discussion or reliance by the accused when entering his plea.

The sentence was within the appropriate range and fit given the appellant's serious record for similar offences.

The respondent sought costs following the dismissal of the Ontario Securities Commission's motion for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs on the dismissal of such a motion.

Furthermore, the court noted that even if jurisdiction existed, the general rule in proceedings under the Act is that no costs are awarded against either party, and there were no circumstances justifying a departure from that rule.

The request for costs was denied.

The appellant pleaded guilty to eighteen offences, including ten for fraud under $5,000, and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment plus 161 days of pre-trial custody.

She appealed the custodial portion of her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody without providing an ascertainable rationale.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in principle, allowed the appeal, and reduced the sentence to time served based on a 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Ontario Securities Commission sought leave to appeal a Superior Court judgment that overturned the respondent's convictions for ten counts of tipping under the Securities Act.

The Superior Court had ordered a new trial based on the trial judge's inadequate assessment of the key witness's credibility and failure to consider each count independently.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal involved the application of well-established legal principles and did not raise questions of law essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice as required by s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the offence was very serious and would normally attract at least a three-year sentence, particularly given the element of planning.

However, because the respondent had already served nine months in a reformatory and was making progress with his addiction problems, the Court declined to send him to the penitentiary.

The sentence was varied to a maximum reformatory term of two years less a day, followed by three years' probation.

The appellant was convicted of careless driving and failing to report a snowmobile accident under the Motorized Snow Vehicles Act.

He appealed, arguing that the justice of the peace failed to consider his due diligence defence—specifically, his mistaken belief that he was uninjured and that the snowmobile damage was minor—and failed to provide sufficient reasons under the Sheppard standard.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the lower courts ignored the appellant's evidence regarding his condition, the apparent damage, and the trail conditions.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from R. v. Handy and R. v. Blake, finding that the similarities between the prior incident and the current allegations were merely generic and lacked distinctive unifying features.

The court concluded the probative value of the evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.