Jeremy D. Tatum

The appellant, Tyrone Burton, appealed his convictions for human trafficking, receiving a benefit from human trafficking, exercising control for the purpose of receiving a benefit from prostitution, and obstruction of justice, as well as his sentence of 10.5 years in custody and a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, with the exception of two counts of exercising control which were stayed by Crown concession under the Kienapple principle.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the sentence fit and within range, and upholding the long-term supervision order.

The court rejected arguments regarding the trial judge's application of law, questioning of witnesses, use of evidence, and the appellant's opportunity to testify.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude DNA and fingerprint evidence, arguing that police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching a public genetic genealogy database (GEDmatch) and seizing cast-off DNA without judicial authorization.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public database search results.

Furthermore, applying horizontal stare decisis, the court held it was bound by prior decisions establishing that the seizure of discarded items for DNA analysis does not violate s. 8.

This is an appeal from convictions for receiving a material benefit, procuring, and advertising under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by seeking positive evidence to support the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's reasons contextually and found that the judge understood and correctly applied the burden of proof, accepting the complainant's evidence which supported the elements of each offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a targeted shooting.

The Crown's circumstantial case relied on DNA evidence, video surveillance, and tracking data from the getaway vehicle's Infotainment system.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made multiple errors in the jury instructions, including cautions on exculpatory eyewitness evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant also challenged the admission of the Infotainment system data, alleging a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

Furthermore, the Court held the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle's data because he had fraudulently rented the vehicle and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession and making available child pornography, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The proceedings spanned approximately 50 months and involved disclosure disputes concerning forensic images of hard drives, bifurcation of the trial to accommodate an expert witness, and numerous defence applications.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the net delay exceeded the 18‑month Jordan ceiling and that the trial judge erred in characterizing the case as particularly complex.

However, because the charges were laid before the release of Jordan, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis and concluded that the Crown had justified the delay in light of the parties’ reliance on the pre‑Jordan Morin framework, the modest excess over the Morin guidelines, the defence’s limited diligence in advancing the case, and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges relating to the sale of sexual services.

The application judge had struck down sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3 (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted by the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, finding they infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate section 7.

The Court found that cooperative arrangements among sex workers do not constitute a 'commercial enterprise' under the material benefit provision, and that the procuring and advertising provisions are neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate to their objectives.

The Court also rejected arguments that the provisions unjustifiably infringed sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a review under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code of the dismissal of his third bail application.

The application argued that a pre-trial ruling allowing a third-party suspect defence constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo bail hearing.

The motion judge found it arguable that the most recent bail judge erred by applying too high a threshold for "material change" and by not fully balancing factors in his alternative reasons for denying bail.

The application for a direction to review by a panel of the court was allowed.

The Crown applied for forfeiture of a $20,000 release order against Abadula Biya and his sureties (his parents) following Mr. Biya's breach of bail conditions.

Mr. Biya had been released on bail pending appeal, which was later successful, leading to a new trial.

Despite a technicality in the latest release order form regarding Mr. Biya's personal liability, the court found jurisdiction for forfeiture based on earlier orders and Mr. Biya's admission of breach.

Applying principles from Horvath and Griffiths, the court considered the sureties' diligence, the family's financial hardship, and the need to maintain bail system credibility.

The court ordered partial forfeiture: Mr. Biya to pay $1,500 over two years, and each surety (his parents) to pay $750 over one year, totaling $3,000.

The appellant, Dylan Hird, appealed his conviction for various offences related to the trafficking and sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on two grounds: the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding identification evidence and the handling of the police's failure to conduct a photo line-up.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions on identification, which adequately cautioned the jury on eyewitness testimony frailties and the need to prove the appellant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's management of the photo line-up issue, concluding that the approach taken was fair to both the Crown and the defence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to s. 11(b) Charter delay.

The application judge had calculated the delay, subtracting periods for exceptional events and defence delay, resulting in a delay exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling by 16 days.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the application judge's failure to characterize a 65-day period as defence delay, which was implicitly and unequivocally waived by the defence.

Correcting this error brought the total delay well below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for human trafficking, procuring, and receiving a material benefit from a person under 18, arguing errors in the trial judge's jury charge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge was fair and legally sound.

Specifically, the court held that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the "purpose" element of human trafficking, the two modes of committing the procuring offence (despite the indictment only specifying one mode, the charge as a whole adequately covered the mens rea for both), and the application of circumstantial evidence for the material benefit charge, consistent with *R. v. Villaroman*.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The appellant, Kumaraguruparan Manickam, appealed his conviction for two counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of uttering a forged document, and in the alternative, his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found the appellant wilfully blind to a fraudulent cheque deposit scheme involving fake business accounts and counterfeit cheques, resulting in over $250,000 loss to banks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's finding of wilful blindness or credibility assessment, despite some imprecise language.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but denied the appeal, affirming that the sentencing judge properly applied the principle of restraint while imposing a significant jail sentence due to the seriousness and premeditated nature of the fraud.

This decision addresses motions by proposed interveners in a criminal appeal concerning the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services.

The respondent, N.S., was charged with offences under ss. 286.2(1), 286.3(1), and 286.4, which were declared unconstitutional by the trial judge.

The Crown appealed this decision and sought a stay of the declaration.

Proposed interveners, including sex workers' rights organizations, sought leave to intervene in the appeal and the stay motion.

They also requested to delay the appeal pending a separate civil application challenging broader Criminal Code provisions and to introduce fresh evidence.

The court granted leave to intervene in both the stay motion and the appeal, but denied the requests to delay the appeal and to augment the factual record.

The court emphasized the need for expeditious resolution of criminal appeals, particularly those involving constitutional challenges with conflicting jurisprudence, and reiterated that interveners act as friends of the court, not parties, and generally cannot expand the evidentiary record or issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault of his stepdaughter, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding the admission of post-incident evidence, the Crown's closing submission, and the exclusion of photographs under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, upholding the trial judge's decisions on the high probative value of the post-incident evidence, the acceptable latitude of the Crown's closing given no objection, and the s. 8 ruling that the daughter was an independent actor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Freddy Mawick, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5000, arguing that evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The evidence included information from UPS and financial institutions, some obtained via production orders and some without judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the UPS information, that the production orders were validly issued based on reasonable grounds, and that any alleged Charter breaches were minor and did not warrant exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court affirmed that the Crown does not need to show that records will afford evidence directly against the accused for a production order to be valid, only that they are relevant to the offence.

The appellant, Abadula Biya, appealed his conviction and sentence for charges including unauthorized possession of a firearm and ammunition, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence in rejecting the appellant's third-party suspect defence, specifically regarding the time available for a co-accused to hide contraband and his propensity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was material, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered on all counts.

The appellant, a private informant, laid an information against his ex-wife.

At the scheduled pre-enquete, before any evidence was heard, the Crown directed a stay of proceedings under s. 579(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant applied to the Superior Court to set aside the stay, but the motion judge summarily dismissed the application under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown has the authority to enter a stay at the outset of a pre-enquete and that prosecutorial discretion is only reviewable for abuse of process, which was not established here.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for armed robbery and wearing a disguise, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles and that a new legal development (Sharma) made a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's application of Gladue principles and declined to impose a conditional sentence, affirming the original sentence.

However, due to the appellant's significant post-sentence rehabilitation, the court allowed the appeal for the limited purpose of permanently staying the execution of his remaining incarceration and substituted it with a two-year probation period, also imposing a 10-year weapons prohibition.