Jennifer A. Y. Trehearne

The applicant, Katrina Vanderwyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on a count of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing her in the absence of any evidence on an essential element of the offence, specifically regarding her intent to aid an attempted murder.

The court, applying the "scintilla of evidence" standard for jurisdictional review, found that despite competing inferences and a minor error in considering certain evidence, there remained a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury to infer the requisite elements of attempted murder.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, upholding the committal.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and pleaded guilty to breach of recognizance.

The crimes involved the slashing and robbery of a 57-year-old blind male complainant.

Identity was the only contested issue at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the alternative suspect defence or the Vetrovec charge.

However, the court found sentencing errors and imposed a stay on the aggravated assault and weapon dangerous convictions pursuant to Kienapple principles, and varied the sentences on the uttering a threat to cause death and breach of recognizance convictions to 18 months and three months concurrent respectively, while affirming the global sentence of seven years less 771 days' credit for pre-sentence custody.

This decision contains pre-charge conference rulings in a first-degree murder trial involving two accused.

The court addressed two main issues: the Crown's request to include constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code as a route of liability, and Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning regarding certain Crown witnesses.

The court denied the Crown's request for constructive murder, finding no air of reality to unlawful confinement distinct from the killing.

It also denied Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning for the specified witnesses, concluding that the jury would be capable of assessing their credibility with general instructions.

However, the court granted Mr. Millard's counsel's request for a caution regarding Mr. Smich's testimony where it implicates Mr. Millard.

The Crown applied mid-trial to admit text messages between the two accused, previously ruled inadmissible, arguing that defence cross-examination had "opened the door" by asserting lack of planning, good character, or lack of knowledge of the "Eliminator." The accused opposed, citing prejudice and lack of material change in circumstances.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of the prior ruling, and that the probative value did not outweigh the significant prejudice, especially given the potential for references to another alleged murder.

Limited exceptions were made for cross-examination if the accused testified on specific points.

The Crown sought a mid-trial order for the jury to conduct a view of multiple crime scenes and an incinerator device in a murder trial.

The accused opposed, arguing prejudice due to late timing, potential for misleading the jury regarding the theoretical route, and inflammatory impact of the incinerator.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown failed to demonstrate a "very real and demonstrable advantage" that could not be achieved through existing evidence, and that the late stage of the trial exacerbated the risk of prejudice and overemphasis.

Mark Smich, a co-accused in a joint trial, brought an application to introduce evidence of Dellen Millard's general propensity or bad character, arguing that Millard's counsel had put Millard's character in issue during cross-examination of a witness.

Millard and the Crown opposed the application.

The court found that the cross-examination, which elicited evidence about Smich's violent temperament, anger issues, and control over others, including rap lyrics, was within the scope of a Pollock and Morrisson application.

This evidence was deemed probative to specific issues, such as Smich's ability to intimidate and weapon ownership, relevant to Millard's antagonistic defence.

The court concluded that Millard's general character had not been put in issue by these questions and that there was no imbalance requiring rebuttal.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s.5(3)(a.1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime contrary to s.354(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police executed a search warrant at a residential address that was divided into two units without obtaining a separate warrant for the basement apartment.

The Crown conceded a breach of s.8 of the Charter.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant to determine whether evidence should be excluded under s.24(2).

The court found that the seriousness of the breach and impact on the accused's Charter-protected privacy interests favoured exclusion, despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded and the charges were dismissed.

The defendants were charged with production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant executed at their residence.

The court found that the search warrant could not have been reasonably granted based on the information before the issuing justice.

The affiant's investigation was characterized by lack of diligence, selective presentation of evidence, and unreliable conclusions.

The court determined that the warrant violated section 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) using the three-part test from R. v. Grant.

Both defendants were acquitted.