Jennifer A. Y. Trehearne

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, sexual interference, and sexual assault involving three complainants.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The appellant appealed the convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from three educators who claimed the appellant resembled a police composite sketch, that the jury charge on eyewitness identification was inadequate, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury charge failed to highlight specific weaknesses and exculpatory features in the eyewitness evidence.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that the verdicts were unreasonable because the identification evidence was largely generic and contradicted by distinctive features the appellant did not possess.

Acquittals were substituted for all convictions.

The appellant, K.R., appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual interference against his step-daughter.

The grounds of appeal included impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge, undue weight on the complainant's demeanor, and an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility and reliability, and concluding that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence, with proper application of the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge refused to grant an adjournment to allow the appellant to retain counsel, resulting in the appellant proceeding unrepresented.

The trial judge failed to address the appellant's inability to read or write and his limited English proficiency despite being informed of these facts.

The trial judge also improperly directed the defence expert to conduct cross-examination of the Crown's expert.

The Court of Appeal found these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and communicating with a person believed to be under 18 for sexual services contrary to s. 212(4).

He was one of 104 people caught in a police sting operation on Backpage.com.

The appellant claimed he believed he was engaged in role-play with an adult, not a 16-year-old.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and found the appellant actually believed the person was 16.

The appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months' imprisonment under s. 172.1(2)(a) and 6 months under s. 212(4), to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the mandatory minimum under s. 172.1(2)(a) was declared unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, though the 12-month sentence imposed was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of touching for a sexual purpose against a child victim aged 9-11 years old.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and alleged errors in the assessment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were properly grounded in the evidence as a whole and that no reversible error occurred.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, with the victim surcharge being set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the complaint due to pressure from his father.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instruction that "the timing of the disclosure signifies nothing" arguing it was improper in the context of the case.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction was ill-advised but not misleading when considered in context with the full charge and counsel's closing addresses.

The court clarified the instruction referred to delay between incidents and disclosure, not the circumstances of disclosure.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the victim fine surcharge was set aside with Crown consent.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The conviction arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, particularly the eyewitness testimony regarding the movements of the vehicles immediately before and at the time of the accident.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the mens rea component of the offence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 18-month custodial sentence and the 10-year driving prohibition as being within the appropriate range.

The applicant, Katrina Vanderwyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on a count of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing her in the absence of any evidence on an essential element of the offence, specifically regarding her intent to aid an attempted murder.

The court, applying the "scintilla of evidence" standard for jurisdictional review, found that despite competing inferences and a minor error in considering certain evidence, there remained a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury to infer the requisite elements of attempted murder.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, upholding the committal.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and pleaded guilty to breach of recognizance.

The crimes involved the slashing and robbery of a 57-year-old blind male complainant.

Identity was the only contested issue at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the alternative suspect defence or the Vetrovec charge.

However, the court found sentencing errors and imposed a stay on the aggravated assault and weapon dangerous convictions pursuant to Kienapple principles, and varied the sentences on the uttering a threat to cause death and breach of recognizance convictions to 18 months and three months concurrent respectively, while affirming the global sentence of seven years less 771 days' credit for pre-sentence custody.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused brought two motions seeking further instructions to the jury at the end of the jury charge.

The first motion sought an instruction to disregard evidence elicited in re-examination regarding the accused's prior interest in firearms.

The second motion sought an instruction that the Crown's failure to call the accused's girlfriend as a witness constituted a gap in the evidence providing a basis for reasonable doubt.

The trial judge dismissed both motions, finding that the re-examination evidence was necessary to correct a false impression left during cross-examination, and that the failure to call the witness did not leave a gap in the Crown's case as she was an unnecessary and unreliable witness.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to override the Attorney General's refusal to consent to a judge alone trial under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that extensive adverse pre-trial publicity from a prior murder conviction rendered a fair jury trial impossible.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the demanding standard for Charter relief was not met and that traditional safeguards, including challenge for cause, should be attempted first.

The court granted the alternative motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and approved a set of six questions for the jury selection process.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the defence sought to limit the scope and terminology of expert opinion evidence from two forensic anthropologists regarding photographs of objects burning in an incinerator.

The court granted the request to prohibit the experts from using potentially misleading terminology such as 'consistent with' or 'cannot exclude'.

However, the court dismissed the defence's challenge to one expert's qualifications to opine on the differences between human and deer bones, finding she met the threshold for expertise, subject to a brief voir dire at trial.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit various pieces of circumstantial evidence, including firearms purchases, text messages, and statements made by the accused.

The court applied the test of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that evidence of a handgun purchase shortly before the victim's disappearance was highly probative of intent and planning and thus admissible.

However, evidence of other firearms purchases and certain highly prejudicial text messages referring to other criminal activities were excluded or ordered to be edited.

Evidence of the financial relationship between the co-accused was deemed admissible to show the nature of their relationship.

The Crown and one of the co-accused brought a joint pre-trial motion to admit numerous out-of-court statements made by the alleged murder victim prior to her disappearance.

The statements were tendered either for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and the state of mind exception, or as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence.

The court admitted most of the statements, finding them substantively reliable or relevant to the declarant's state of mind, but excluded certain statements alleging prior assaults as unreliable and irrelevant.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit similar fact evidence and discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior murder conviction involving the disposal of remains in an incinerator, as well as prior criminal acts, text messages, and rap lyrics.

The court dismissed the similar fact motion, finding the moral prejudice of introducing a prior murder outweighed its probative value.

The court also excluded most of the discreditable conduct evidence, but allowed an edited calendar entry and the first verse of a rap song that had a strong circumstantial link to the alleged disposal of the victim's body.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial motions for severance and for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the severance motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial and that any prejudice from out-of-court statements could be managed with limiting instructions.

The court also dismissed the s. 11(b) motion, calculating the net delay at 29 months after deducting 15 months for the discrete event of a concurrent murder trial involving the same accused.

Alternatively, the court found the delay justified by the case's exceptional complexity and transitional provisions.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 20-month sentence for possession and distribution of child pornography.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test to his defence of innocent possession, misapprehended evidence regarding deleted files, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law and relied on compelling evidence of knowledge, including the sophisticated organization of the files.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-month term was within the appropriate range and the trial judge made no errors in assessing aggravating factors.

This decision contains pre-charge conference rulings in a first-degree murder trial involving two accused.

The court addressed two main issues: the Crown's request to include constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code as a route of liability, and Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning regarding certain Crown witnesses.

The court denied the Crown's request for constructive murder, finding no air of reality to unlawful confinement distinct from the killing.

It also denied Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning for the specified witnesses, concluding that the jury would be capable of assessing their credibility with general instructions.

However, the court granted Mr. Millard's counsel's request for a caution regarding Mr. Smich's testimony where it implicates Mr. Millard.

The Crown applied mid-trial to admit text messages between the two accused, previously ruled inadmissible, arguing that defence cross-examination had "opened the door" by asserting lack of planning, good character, or lack of knowledge of the "Eliminator." The accused opposed, citing prejudice and lack of material change in circumstances.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of the prior ruling, and that the probative value did not outweigh the significant prejudice, especially given the potential for references to another alleged murder.

Limited exceptions were made for cross-examination if the accused testified on specific points.

The Crown sought a mid-trial order for the jury to conduct a view of multiple crime scenes and an incinerator device in a murder trial.

The accused opposed, arguing prejudice due to late timing, potential for misleading the jury regarding the theoretical route, and inflammatory impact of the incinerator.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown failed to demonstrate a "very real and demonstrable advantage" that could not be achieved through existing evidence, and that the late stage of the trial exacerbated the risk of prejudice and overemphasis.