Janet M. Simmons

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for welfare fraud.

The Court of Appeal found it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the appellant had undisclosed assets and income, and that his false reporting allowed him to continue receiving welfare.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The indictment was amended on consent to charge fraud over $1,000 to conform to the Criminal Code at the relevant time.

The appellants appealed a judgment giving effect to a Letter of Request issued by a United States District Court.

The Letter of Request sought documentary production and oral discovery from the appellants, who were non-parties to the US litigation involving alleged misappropriation of trade secrets by a former employee.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the scope of the requested discovery overly broad and unduly burdensome, as it risked exposing the non-party's own trade secrets without a mechanism to ensure relevance.

The court limited the scope of discovery to unobjected categories until the respondent disclosed particulars of the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets.

The respondent employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after a worker was fatally injured by a reversing dump truck while acting as both a signaller and a spreader operator.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, ruling that the Crown could not prove a failure to provide a signaller under section 104 of the Regulation by showing the signaller failed to perform the duties prescribed by section 106.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that sections 104 and 106 must be read together to promote the public safety purpose of the legislation, and ordered a new trial.

The respondents, operators of adult entertainment parlours, were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house contrary to s. 210 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the charges were stayed on the basis that the terms 'acts of indecency' and 'prostitution' were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that it was bound by stare decisis, as previous Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal decisions had already established that the community standard of tolerance test provides an intelligible standard and that the terms are not impermissibly vague.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed multiple sexual offence convictions arising from allegations by three young complainants, challenging the constitutionality of the anal intercourse counts, the jury charge on reasonable doubt, expert evidence on child sexual abuse disclosure patterns, the absence of a clear and sharp Vetrovec warning, and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The court quashed the three s. 159 convictions because the provision had been declared unconstitutional.

The remaining grounds failed: the charge as a whole did not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted on an improper standard, the expert evidence was necessary to explain inconsistent disclosures and recantations, no mandatory strong Vetrovec warning was required, and the similar fact ruling attracted deference.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal refusing a stay of an order enforcing Letters Rogatory from a California court.

They argued the original Letters Rogatory were null and void, depriving the court of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried.

The court held that under s. 60 of the Evidence Act, jurisdiction is established when it is made to appear that a foreign court has duly authorized a request, and the moving parties failed to challenge the validity of the request at the original hearing.

The insured municipality suffered a catastrophic bacterial infection of its water supply, leading to investigations and a class action lawsuit.

The municipality's insurer appointed counsel to defend the civil actions under a reservation of rights.

Dissatisfied with the appointed counsel's advice and the reservation of rights, the municipality retained independent counsel and sought reimbursement from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal held that an insurer is only required to surrender control of the defence and pay for independent counsel if there is a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest.

As the reservation of rights was based on policy limits and exclusions rather than the insured's conduct, no conflict existed.

The insurer was not obliged to pay for the independent counsel.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claims against the respondent Comstock for inducing breach of contract and assisting in a breach of fiduciary duty.

The motions judge had found that any breach of contract occurred before Comstock was approached and that the relationship between the appellant and the co-defendant was merely that of contractor and sub-contractor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that competing inferences could be drawn from the evidence regarding the timing of the breach and the nature of the appellant's involvement in the design-build project, thereby raising triable issues.

The appellant farmer appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay the respondent for soybean seed, chemicals, and spraying services, and dismissing his counterclaim for crop losses.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he authorized a herbicide substitution, in enforcing an allegedly illegal contract for an unregistered pesticide combination, and in calculating the quantity of soybeans ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that enforcing the contract for the unregistered pesticide combination was not contrary to public policy.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his infant daughter, who died from extensive intracranial bleeding.

The Crown alleged the death was caused by severe shaking, supported by extensive expert medical testimony.

The appellant appealed, seeking to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic neuropathologist and arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment, admitting certain expert evidence, and instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and conflicting medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria, and the jury instructions adequately conveyed the necessary legal principles.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a review of a decision denying him bail pending trial under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal confirmed the detention order, finding that the applicant failed to show his detention was not justified on the primary ground.

The court noted his significant criminal record, history of breaching court orders, recent misconduct in jail, and an inadequate release plan.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing following a street-level drug transaction and chase.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the jury charge was deficient on circumstantial evidence, cross-racial identification, and the included offence of manslaughter.

The court held that, although an explicit cross-racial identification instruction would have been appropriate, the identification charge as a whole was sufficient, the circumstantial evidence instruction did not misstate the burden of proof when read in context, and there was no air of reality to manslaughter given the depth and nature of the stab wound.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment denying her request to relocate with the child to British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the principles from Gordon v. Goertz and made factual findings supported by the evidence.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's assessment of the child's best interests in mobility cases.

The respondent was convicted of possessing contraband tobacco under the Excise Act and was subject to a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600.

Finding the respondent unable to pay, the trial judge gave no time to pay and imposed a 75-day conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Crown appealed, arguing a conditional sentence is not available in default of payment of a fine.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, holding that where an offender is given no time to pay a fine, the resulting immediate committal constitutes a sentence of imprisonment for which a conditional sentence may be imposed under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions for performing the controlled act of dispensing eyeglasses without authorization under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The individual appellant, an optician registered in Nova Scotia but not Ontario, sold prescription bifocals to a private investigator.

The appellants argued that the retail sale of eyeglasses to adults is not a health care service and that the controlled act of dispensing should be defined by the risk of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of prescription eyeglasses falls within the scope of opticianry and constitutes a health care service.

The Court further held that the plain meaning of the statute defines the controlled act, and courts are not required to engage in a risk analysis before determining if an activity is prohibited.

The appellant father appealed an order varying a joint custody arrangement to grant sole custody to the respondent mother and significantly reducing his access.

The father argued the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction by granting relief not explicitly requested in the pleadings.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to rely on a consent order directing a custody assessment as defining the issues between the parties.

The Court upheld the sole custody order due to worsening conflict between the parents but found the substantial reduction in the father's access was not justified by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part to restore the father's access to four overnight visits in alternating weeks.

The appellant, a Catholic priest, appealed his convictions for gross indecency and indecent assault relating to historical sexual abuse of a male complainant.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence regarding delayed recall and recovered memory to explain discrepancies in the complainant's testimony, including the appellant's arrival date and the absence of a described birthmark.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's use of the expert evidence, his assessment of the complainant's credibility, or his evaluation of the appellant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after a 12-year-old complainant identified him in a photo line-up 28 months after being attacked in her tent at night.

The Crown's case rested entirely on this identification.

The trial judge had excluded similar fact evidence of a prior sexual assault committed by the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as the identification evidence was too weak and the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's initial description.

The majority held that the trial judge did not err in excluding the similar fact evidence, as her assessment of its prejudicial effect versus probative value was entitled to deference.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

Criminal appeal from convictions arising from an armed robbery, where the principal issues were the admissibility of alleged confessions and the adequacy of the challenge-for-cause process.

The court held that the voir dire was infected by legal error and a failure to scrutinize all circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, including missing arrest records, lack of audio or video recording, allegations of assault, oppressive conditions, and right-to-counsel concerns.

The Crown failed to meet its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and one impugned statement was also inadmissible as bad character evidence.

The challenge-for-cause instructions were additionally found deficient.

Convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sued the Crown and two police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn upon his entering a peace bond.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim for failure to give proper notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and for expiry of the limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice requirements do not apply to individual police officers and that a limitation period defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence before a motion to strike can be brought.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence against the police officers.