Howard Borenstein

The accused pled guilty to trafficking 0.24 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer for $60.00.

At the time of the offence, the accused was 18 years old with no criminal record.

He had been on bail with an 11 pm to 6 am curfew for nearly two years, breaching it once.

The Crown sought 90 days intermittent custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months' probation, considering the accused's youth, lack of record, single instance of trafficking a minimal quantity, positive rehabilitation efforts, and community service.

The defendants, Gerald Lougheed Jr. and Patricia Sorbara, were charged with corruptly promising employment or appointment to Andrew Olivier to induce him to withdraw his candidacy or refrain from becoming a candidate in the Sudbury by-election, contrary to section 96.1(e) of the Election Act.

Sorbara was also charged with agreeing to employ two of Glenn Thibeault's staff to induce Thibeault to become a candidate.

Following a directed verdict application at the end of the Crown's case, the court found that Olivier was not a "candidate" under the Election Act as he was only seeking the Liberal Party nomination, not running in an election to the Legislative Assembly.

The court also found that once Thibeault committed to running, it became impossible for Olivier to become the Liberal candidate, and therefore the defendants could not be convicted of inducing him to refrain from becoming one.

Regarding the Thibeault count, the court found that the agreement to employ campaign staff did not constitute bribery as defined in the Act and did not offend the Act's purpose of ensuring fair elections.

Directed verdicts of acquittal were entered for both defendants on all counts.

The accused was charged with numerous fraud and related offences arising from a phishing email scam involving inheritance scams, romance scams, and military service scams originating from Nigeria and Dubai.

Victims in the United States and elsewhere were defrauded and directed to send money to bank accounts and Western Union accounts belonging to the accused.

The accused admitted receiving monies into his accounts and withdrawing them, but maintained he did not know the funds were fraudulently obtained.

The Crown's case was that the accused had actual knowledge or was willfully blind to the fraudulent nature of the funds.

The trial judge found the accused's evidence incredible and rejected his explanation that he was merely receiving a 2% commission from an intermediary named Eddie Obijohn.

The judge found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and carrying a concealed weapon following an altercation at the Sheraton Centre Hotel in downtown Toronto.

Security witnesses observed the accused wielding a knife with a distinctive red handle and hooked blade during a fight.

The accused was detained by police, and despite pat-down searches finding no knife, a red-handled folding knife with a hooked tip was later discovered under the rear seat of the police cruiser after the accused was observed on video moving around extensively in the back seat.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed and concealed the knife and did so for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The sole issues at trial were Charter violations.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the initial detention for investigative purposes regarding a robbery was lawful, the arrest for public intoxication lacked objective grounds.

The court also found violations of the right to counsel, as the accused was not advised of his right to counsel in relation to the drug charge until over an hour after the drugs were discovered, and was further delayed in implementing that right for over six hours due to his intoxication.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine as a remedy for the Charter breaches.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a three-year-old child.

The alleged incident occurred in a park and was witnessed by the child's mother.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the mother and the child's father.

The defence called no evidence.

The court found that while the Crown presented evidence of the alleged touching, there remained a reasonable doubt as to whether the assault occurred.

The court considered the fleeting nature of the alleged contact, the unlikelihood of such conduct occurring in broad daylight in front of the mother, the prior ill will between the parties, and inconsistencies in the witness's account regarding the reason for the breakdown in their relationship.

The accused was acquitted of the charges but placed on a peace bond with conditions of no contact.

The accused was charged with assault following an altercation at a hot dog stand at approximately 2:00 a.m.

The Crown alleged that the accused initiated the incident by mocking the complainant's voice in a homophobic manner, then punched the complainant in the face at the hot dog stand, chased him into a nearby laneway, knocked him down, and continued striking him until bystanders intervened.

The accused claimed the incident was mutual banter that escalated when the complainant pushed him down, and that he punched the complainant once in self-defence before becoming involved in a general scrum.

The court found the accused guilty, accepting the credible evidence of an independent witness and rejecting the accused's account as incredible and materially contradicted by reliable evidence.

The accused was charged with fraudulently disposing of property contrary to section 198(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Crown alleged that the accused disposed of a BMW X5 that he had financed but failed to pay for, subsequently claiming it went missing from his driveway.

The trial examined whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused disposed of the vehicle.

The court found that while the accused acted fraudulently, the Crown failed to prove that he disposed of the property as opposed to concealing it, and therefore acquitted him of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

A Charter motion was heard and blended with the trial.

The defence raised six alleged Charter violations: (1) that the officer making the ASD demand lacked grounds; (2) that there was a violation of the right to counsel at roadside; (3) that the delay between suspicion and demand violated the "forthwith" requirement; (4) that there was no evidence the device was an approved screening device; (5) that the officer failed to verify calibration; and (6) that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court rejected all Charter violation arguments and found the accused guilty.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained following an approved instrument demand.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the initial approved screening device (ASD) demand, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding the grounds for the ASD demand was contradicted by video evidence.

The officer had decided to demand an ASD before obtaining information about when the accused consumed alcohol or observing signs of impairment.

The court concluded the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the ASD demand and excluded the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, resulting in acquittal.

The accused was convicted after trial of two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where he approached two young women fundraising for charity, mistakenly believing one had stolen money from him.

He grabbed one by the wrist and brandished a knife.

Subsequently, while on bail pending sentencing, he was arrested carrying a concealed 12-inch knife and pleaded guilty to breaching a no-weapons recognizance and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of six and a half months, taking into account the accused's paranoid schizophrenia and its causal connection to the offences, while balancing the need for denunciation and protection of the public.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown's case was overwhelming except for one issue: whether the accused consumed the majority of the alcohol either shortly before driving or after the accident.

The toxicologist testified that assuming driving occurred at 3:45 p.m., the accused's BAC would have been between 350 and 405 milligrams.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the accused drove within two hours of the breath test.

The trial judge found that the issue of bolus drinking (consuming large amounts of alcohol shortly before driving) or post-accident drinking was a live issue on the record.

Given the presence of an open vodka bottle in the accused's purse, the amount of vodka missing from the bottle, the accused's attempt to prevent police from finding the bottle, and the minimal signs of impairment observed by officers at the scene, the trial judge concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had consumed 7.5 ounces or more of vodka at the relevant time.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with fraud, forgery, and obstructing police arising from an attempted purchase of cell phones using forged identification at a retail store.

The Crown sought convictions on all counts.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were violated through searches of his laptop bag, seizure of car keys, and warrantless search of his vehicle without valid consent.

The court excluded evidence obtained from the unlawful vehicle search.

The accused was convicted of attempted fraud and using forged identification but acquitted of obstructing police charges, finding any obstruction was de minimis.

Charges related to possession of forged documents were dismissed due to exclusion of evidence.

A 29-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to possession of 190 grams of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of $470.00 in proceeds of crime.

The offences occurred in December 2013 when police executed a search warrant.

The court balanced aggravating factors (the dangerous nature of ketamine and trafficking for commercial gain) against significant mitigating factors (youthful offender with rehabilitation prospects, single father caring for a 10-year-old daughter, hard-working, guilty plea, clean bail record, and no criminal history).

The court imposed a 6-month jail sentence for the trafficking charge and an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 2 years probation for the proceeds charge, with strict conditions including house confinement for the first 6 months and a curfew thereafter.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample into an approved instrument following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a proper breath sample during approximately 10 attempts over 12 minutes at the police station.

The accused testified she was genuinely attempting to provide a sample.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to refuse to provide a suitable sample, as the video evidence (without audio) was not conclusive and the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

An undercover officer conducted three drug transactions with the accused over several months, purchasing what the officer believed to be cocaine.

The substance from the final transaction tested negative for cocaine.

The court found that while the accused clearly sold a substance held out to be a narcotic and received proceeds from the transaction, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was specifically held out to be cocaine, as neither party ever explicitly or implicitly referenced cocaine during any transaction.

The accused was acquitted of the trafficking charge but convicted of possession of proceeds of crime.

Applicants sought to vary or terminate sealing orders made in relation to two search warrants executed on their home in 2013 and 2014.

No items were seized and no charges were laid.

The Crown provided redacted copies of the Informations to Obtain (ITOs), with redactions limited to information that might identify confidential informants.

The applicants challenged the scope of the redactions and sought full access to the ITOs.

The court held that once a search warrant is executed, the warrant and ITO are presumptively accessible to the occupiers of the searched premises, subject only to redactions necessary to protect confidential informant identity.

The court ordered the Crown to produce unredacted copies for judicial review to ensure redactions were not overbroad.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit (over 80).

The Crown proved the over 80 charge through breath test results.

However, the court found the accused not guilty of impaired driving due to weak evidence of impairment.

The court also found serious Charter violations: an unlawful and arbitrary detention under section 9 based on an erroneous policy requiring out-of-province residents to post bonds, and a violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court granted a stay of proceedings on the over 80 count due to the severity of the Charter violations and the state's entrenched discriminatory release practices.

The accused was charged with two counts of resisting a peace officer in the execution of his duties and one count of assaulting a peace officer.

The accused was in custody in holding cells and was touching a sprinkler head on the ceiling.

When court officers directed him to stop, he refused.

Officers entered the cell and attempted to restrain him.

The accused was taken to the ground and eventually handcuffed and placed in leg irons.

The Crown alleged the accused bit Officer Mason during the restraint.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the officers' testimony regarding the events that occurred once the accused was on the ground, including conflicting accounts of who was present, how many officers participated, and whether a bite actually occurred.

The court acquitted the accused of the assault charge due to reasonable doubt but convicted him of one count of resisting a peace officer based on his initial failure to comply with the officer's direction to stop touching the sprinkler.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose.

The Crown sought to adduce a statement allegedly made by the accused to police during an investigative detention at the roadside.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statement on grounds of voluntariness and alleged violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that there was no Charter violation.

The court also found that even if a violation had occurred, the statement would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.