Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was stopped by police during a random routine traffic check without any suspicion of unlawful activity.

He admitted his driver's licence was suspended and was convicted of driving while suspended.

He appealed, arguing the random stop violated his Charter rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing and substantial concern of highway safety.

The respondent was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the provision infringes s. 2(b), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court further held that the provision does not infringe the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, as its target is expressive conduct rather than conduct of an associational nature.

The appellant was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution after offering sexual services to an undercover police officer.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the Criminal Code provision violated freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting its reasoning from a companion reference case to hold that while the provision infringes freedom of expression, it is a demonstrably justified reasonable limit, and it does not violate the right to life, liberty, and security of the person on grounds of vagueness.

The appellant, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band, was charged under the Fisheries Act with fishing with a drift net longer than permitted by the Band's Indian food fishing licence.

He defended the charge on the basis that he was exercising an existing aboriginal right to fish and that the net length restriction was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a framework for analyzing s. 35(1) claims, holding that an aboriginal right is not extinguished by mere regulation and that any government regulation infringing upon an aboriginal right must be justified.

The Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, ordering a new trial to determine whether the net length restriction constituted a prima facie infringement and, if so, whether it was justified.

Members of a Huron band were prosecuted for cutting trees, camping, and making fires in a provincial park while carrying out ancestral customs and religious rites.

The Court held that a 1760 document signed by General Murray was a treaty within s. 88 of the Indian Act, remained in force, and protected the exercise of the respondents' customs and religion on territory frequented by the Hurons in 1760, so long as the activity was not incompatible with Crown occupancy.

The Court adopted a broad and liberal approach to treaty interpretation, capacity, and extinguishment, and found that provincial park regulation could not be enforced against the respondents in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada previously ordered that all proceedings in this appeal, including the judgment and reasons for judgment, be sealed to protect the safety of the appellants.

The Court subsequently notified the parties of its intention to make the proceedings public unless cause was shown.

As neither the appellants nor the Crown provided a valid reason to continue the sealing order, the Court concluded that the circumstances warranting confidentiality were no longer present.

The Court ordered the release of the court file, including the reasons for judgment.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding it unnecessary to consider the applicability of the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant hotel owner applied for fire insurance, which was accepted without a requirement to maintain his automatic extinguisher system.

The subsequently issued policy contained a clause requiring bi-annual maintenance by an authorized representative.

Following a fire where the extinguisher failed, the insurers denied coverage based on the maintenance clause.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the insurance contract was formed upon acceptance of the application.

Because the insurer did not indicate the inconsistency between the application and the policy in writing, the application prevailed, and the insurers were liable to compensate the appellant.

The respondent, a police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the appellant's negligence.

During his recovery, the respondent was unable to work but continued to receive his full salary pursuant to his collective agreement.

He sued the appellant for damages, including a claim for lost wages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent could not recover damages for loss of earnings because he had not suffered an actual financial loss, as his employer had continued to pay his salary.

The Court ruled that wage benefits paid while a plaintiff is unable to work must be deducted from a claim for lost earnings to avoid double recovery, unless the employer has a subrogated claim.

The appellant, a Treaty 8 Indian, killed a grizzly bear in self-defence while hunting for food.

A year later, in financial need, he obtained a licence and sold the hide.

He was charged with trafficking in wildlife under the provincial Wildlife Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while Treaty 8 originally protected commercial hunting, the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement restricted this to hunting for food.

The sale of the hide was a commercial act, not hunting for food, and therefore the provincial prohibition applied.

The appeal was dismissed, though a stay of proceedings was ordered due to the unique circumstances.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had overturned the respondents' convictions for contempt of court.

The respondents had been convicted by the Superior Court for failing to comply with an order restricting publication.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and restored the convictions, applying its previous decision in R. v. Vermette regarding the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the principle of reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge frequently and correctly instructed the jury that the onus was on the Crown to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting his wife.

At trial, he raised the defence of intoxication and delusional jealousy.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the effect of intoxication on intent and on planning and deliberation, but failed to explicitly state that a lesser degree of intoxication could negative planning and deliberation than is required to negative intent to kill.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's repeated use of the phrase 'very intoxicated' may have misled the jury into believing the same high degree of intoxication was required for both.

The appellants' fishing vessel sank at its berth due to the ingress of sea water caused by corroded cap screws and a valve left open.

The marine insurance policy covered 'perils of the sea'.

The trial judge found the loss was fortuitous and covered, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding the sinking was not a foreseeable consequence of the negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a peril of the sea must be fortuitous and of the sea.

The loss was fortuitous because it was not intentional or inevitable, and the failure of the cap screws was due to negligent installation, not ordinary wear and tear or inherent vice.

The Court emphasized that foreseeability of loss is not a necessary condition for recovery under a marine insurance policy.

The respondent lawyer was sued for fraud by a bank.

He sought a defence from his liability insurer.

The insurer denied the obligation to defend, relying on an exclusion clause for fraudulent acts.

The bank later discontinued the action, and the respondent sued the insurer for his unrecovered defence costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty to defend is governed by the pleadings.

Since the pleadings only alleged fraud, which was excluded from coverage, the insurer had no duty to defend.

The appeal by the insurer was allowed.

The appellant was arrested at an airport ostensibly for outstanding traffic warrants, but was subsequently subjected to a rectal examination which yielded heroin.

The Crown conceded that the appellant's rights under ss. 8 and 10 of the Charter were violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the evidence must be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the search and used the traffic warrants as an artifice, rendering the highly intrusive search a serious Charter violation that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the evidence were admitted.

The appellants challenged a provincial commission of inquiry into alleged dealings between named private individuals, a corporation, and public officials.

The majority held that, in pith and substance, the inquiry functioned as a substitute police investigation and preliminary inquiry into a specific Criminal Code offence, thereby intruding on Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The naming of private individuals, the close mirroring of s. 121 of the Criminal Code, and the inquiry's coercive powers were found cumulatively to render the Order in Council ultra vires.

The Court therefore allowed the appeal and did not decide the remaining Charter issues.

The respondent, a director of education, was dismissed by the appellant school board on three months' notice without cause.

The respondent sued for wrongful dismissal, alleging a breach of procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the respondent held an office at pleasure and could be dismissed without cause, the board owed him a duty of procedural fairness.

However, the Court found that the duty was met because the respondent knew the reasons for his dismissal and had an opportunity to be heard during negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment dismissing the action was restored.

During an income tax audit, Revenue Canada served the appellants with demands for information and documents pursuant to s. 231(3) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellants failed to comply and were charged under s. 238(2).

They challenged the constitutional validity of s. 231(3), arguing it violated the protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a demand for documents constitutes a seizure, it is not unreasonable in the administrative and regulatory context of the Income Tax Act, which relies on self-reporting and requires random monitoring to ensure compliance.

The appellants, managers of a corporation suspected of price discrimination, were ordered to appear and testify under oath pursuant to s. 17 of the Combines Investigation Act.

They sought a declaration that s. 17 violates s. 7 of the Charter.

Relying on the concurrently released decision in Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 17 does not infringe s. 7 of the Charter.